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The Seminar on Water Resource Problems  in LDC's was sponsored by the
Economic Development Center in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics
at  the University of Minnesota.  The idea for  the seminar came from the director of
the Center, Martin E. Abel, who was instrumental in organizing and  implementing the
seminar.
The papers by Howe and by Levine and Wickham, along with the extended com-
ments by Schramm, Bromley, Easter and Abel provided the focus for  the seminar.
These proceedings  include three papers and the related discussions.  Howe's paper
considers water development emphasizing its  relationship to development of  other
natural resources, emerging conflicts in the allocation of water, and environmental
concerns.  The Levine and Wickham paper focuses on the multitude of  irrigation
management problems with particular reference to  the Philippines.  Finally Abel's
long discussion of  the planning and management of  irrigation systems in Taiwan
evolved  later  into  an article,  which  is  included  as  published.
The discussion drew on the experience of  the participants in other countries.
Schramm talked about irrigation problems  in Mexico.  Bromley considered the pro-
blems of LDC's ranging from the non-viability of  some African nation states to  the
lack of a latent entrepreneurial ethic in LDC's.  Easter discussed improving vil-
lage irrigation distribution systems in eastern India.  Larson discussed the cost
and potential for irrigation in Nicaragua.  Finally, Corey related the experience
of  AID  in  water  management  projects.
In addition, the seminar addressed the general question of the role of
American universities in training for LDC's  in natural resource economics.  This
discussion revolved around the following questions:
(1)  Can American universities and research institutions be of assis-
tance to  developing countries and donor  agencies in dealing with  the
economic problems of natural resources?  What assistance--training,
research, or consulting--is most needed and how can it be best deli-
vered?
(2)  If training is one of  the priority needs, what kinds of skills are
needed by resource economists trained  for the developing countries--
economics of irrigation, fisheries, nonrenewable resources, forestry,
environmental quality, etc?  How should training programs be organized
and operated?
(3) Can resource economists  contribute significantly to meeting some
of  the most  important needs of  developing countries?  If  so, how?
(4)  Is  it possible for a group of  resource economists  to play a  useful,
if modest role, advising donor agencies trying to  assist developing
countries dealing with economic problems integrally connected with
natural resource development?vi
(5)  Is it possible that a panel of  resource economists could be
useful as an honest broker in bringing together resource econo-
mists and those who need  their services--developing countries and
donor agencies?
The editors wish to  thank all the participants who made this seminar  truly
exciting.  Hopefully readers of  these papers and discussions will get a flavor
of the  ideas and interaction that occurred during  the seminar.
K. William Easter
and Lee R. Martin
July 1977WATER RESOURCE PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
INCREASING SCARCITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS, AND
DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES
Charles W. Howe  /
Summary
Under  "increasing water scarcity", it  is  argued that  (1) present schemes  for
the provision of potable water to  rural populations in developing countries are
terribly inefficient, absorbing vast resources and experiencing high failure
rates;  (2) conflicts between irrigation  and hydro-power which emerged in the
1960's have been given a sudden twist  by the  international petroleum situation
and need  to be re-evaluated;  (3)  there are increasing  concerns about  the trade-
offs between consumptive water uses in agriculture and  the maintenance of  coastal
ecosystems, including valuable fisheries;  (4)  water related development projects
often have the effect of worsening the already skewed distribution of wealth.
Environmental considerations do not  receive high priority in LDC's.  Yet,
industrial developments and urban population concentrations are having highly
detrimental environmental impacts which need to  be controlled  and/or taken into
account  in  planning.
The development of  other natural resources requires less water than commonly
assumed.  Horticultural and dryland opportunities which use very small quantities
of  water are widely overlooked.  The incredibly important problems of  range manage-
ment under traditional  (tribal) social systems are  closely geared to water management.
While high value mineral development can bear very high water costs, new low value
mineral-water combinations are needed  to broaden the relevant resource bases for
the  semi-arid  LDC's.
Introduction
The themes of  this paper will be developed in three sections as  indicated
by the title.  The development is based largely on case study material ex-
tracted from the author's experience rather than being based on any complete
theoretical  framework.  The three sections  containing these materials are not
mutually exclusive, either, in  that a problem might well involve both a water
supply conflict with other uses and significant environmental impacts.
Professor of  the Department of  Economics, University of  Colorado. 1/A.  Increasing Water Scarcity or Emerging Conflicts in Water Allocation
The idea that water is a bottleneck to economic growth in many developing
countties is widely held and  is undoubtedly valid in some of them, but the ways
in which water or water related  services can be a limiting factor need to be
spelled out in  some detail.  Five ways are  suggested by theory and experience.
1.  fixed production coefficients;
2.  fixed or slowly expanding supplies with limited substitution possibil-
ities of other inputs for water;
3.  rigid allocation of water among uses;
4.  as a factor in human health and productivity;
5.  through the absorption of limited complementary resources, especially
trained manpower and capital,  in the process of water development.
The fixed coefficient representation of water as an input  to agricultural
or  industrial processes  is  frequently used in planning models but  can easily be
exaggerated.  While fixed coefficients may appear at  the macro level and even at
the level of  the firm or  farm in the short run, the observed responsiveness of
farmers  to  impending water shortages or  to  the initiation of water charges  and
the responsiveness  of  industry to  environmental constraints  (especially water
pollution constraints) demonstrate the flexibility of  the water-product output
relationship.
The more general representation of production processes by production
functions permits the explicit- expression of substitution possibilities.  The
real issue  is  the ease of  substitution.  If water supplies expand more slowly
than the supplies of other  inputs or can be expanded only at increasing marginal
cost, then water can be a drag on the expansion of production in spite of
substitution possibilities.
Institutional and physical factors which result  in a rigid allocation of
existing water supplies  among uses  is  an important factor  in the creation of
growth bottlenecks.  Since the economy consists of different sectors and geo-
graphical regions which seldom grow at the same rate, the reallocation ofwater
from the lowest value uses to  emerging high value uses can facilitate continued
expansion even with fixed or sharply increasing-cost supplies.  While such
reallocation does  trade one activity against others, the net value gain can be
extremely high.  Kelso's  studies on the Arizona economy  (1973) and Cummings'
work on water alternatives in Northwest Mexico  (1974) illustrate the existence of
such beneficial trade-offs very clearly.
The human input into economic growth is  critical, both as an unskilled energy
input and as an agent of  organization and management.  White et al  (1972) have
documented both the enormous amount of human energy which goes daily into  the
gathering of water and the tremendous variety and complexity of ways in which
debilitating human conditions are  transmitted to man through water systems.  Too
often, however, one facet  of man's complex water milieu is identified as the
source of trouble with resultant ineffective investments.The fifth way in which water may act as a constraint on growth grows out of
its  own development projects and relates closely to  the point above:  an
uneconomic over-expansion of  the quantity or  quality dimensions of water supply
systems absorbs resources which could, by definition, be used elsewhere to
greater advantage.  While this would  be true of investment  in and maintenance of
any sector of  the economy, there are institutionalized biases  in the water
resources sector pushing toward  over-investment  in water quantity and quality.
More on this  later.
We will now look at  some specific situations  involving increasing water
scarcity which appear to  be of  increasing  frequency and importance.  Scarcity
may be manifest in any of  the ways mentioned above.
1. The Provision of Potable Water, Especially Village Water Schemes.
At least  90%  of  the developing world's population lives in rural areas or
villages.  There are great political pressures  to bring reliable, high quality
water supplies  to  these people but  the scale and methods used are generally
inappropriate.  The results often include  (a)  over-investment of  limited  capital
and manpower in a small number  of  sophisticated systems;  (b) exclusion of  large
parts of  the population from any assistance in water supply;  (c)  a very frequent
failure to achieve  the desired results  even in the areas  served because of  supply
system failure.
White et  al  (1972) makes it very clear  that,  in the East African context,
improved water supplies result  in great savings of  human time and energy and are
positively related  to improved health conditions --  although the strength of this
relationship is  not well quantified or understood.  A middle income worker
($80/month) in Nairobi may  spend 8% of his income on water --  more than on fuel,
transport  or  household equipment, but a heavier relative burden falls on
unskilled, low income urban dwellers who pay carriers 1 to  3 cents per 4-gallon
tin, representing as much as 10% of  income.  These expenditures are incurred to
avoid the time required to  fetch the household's requirements when carried by a
member of  the household:  33 minutes per day on the average for  urban dwellers
(range:  14  to 68 minutes) and  46 minutes per day on  the average for rural
households  (range:  11 to  84 minutes)  [White et al,  pp.  102-104].White provides  a useful classification of diseases related to water:
Table 1.  A CLASSIFICATION OF INFECTIVE DISEASES





















Gambian  sleeping  sickness
Onchocerciasis
Source:  White et  al,  Table 6.7, p. 163
White also shows a striking relation between access to water and toilet
facilities and morbidity, shigella incidence, and ascaris incidence:
Table 2.
Morbidity/1000





Water and  flush
toilet inside  428  139  1.1  7.0
Water inside,
toilet outside  829  238  2.4  25.0
Water and privy
outside  1140  360  5.9  42.0
Source:  White et  al,  Table 6.6, p. 160
How much of  these differences are due to water quality, how much due to
better personal hygiene, and how much to  the toilet facilities is not known.
The real health issue from an economic viewpoint is  to  know the trade-
offs among accessibility, quantity, and quality  and impacts on health.  White
_  __  __  Lfound  for East Africa that "diseases potentially related to water supply"
account directly  for 11.2%  of  the deaths  (for which causes have been attributed),
11.8% of  all in-patient diagnoses, and 20.9%  of  all out-patient diagnoses.
Working from much more detailed data, White concludes that the expected reductions
in these percentages which could be achieved through "greatly improved supplies"
are 5.6%,  6.1%,  and  10.9%.  Just how "greatly improved supplies" are defined
is  not  made  clear.
White estimates a total cost due to  poor water supplies  (health care, loss
of  work, and up-bringing costs  of  young children who die from water-related
disease) of  about  $0.14 per capita per year or $3,769,000 for all of  East Africa,
a surprisingly small sum.  Again, the real issue is  the rate at which these  (and
other) losses  could be reduced  through various water-related investments.  White
concludes:
... We can be confident that  increasing supply by half  a liter
for  those consuming 3 liters a day will have some effect...
There is  a sector - we would guess  somewhere in the 20  to  80
liters per person range - where health benefits of  increasing
water  (quantity) begin to  level out...  The common delusion that
everything useful or important  is  already known about infections
and water-borne disease is  clearly far from true...
In spite of  such vast ignorance, rural water "needs" have been translated
into quantity, quality, and system design criteria by WHO and other national
and international organizations which are nearly the same as those applied in
the industrialized high income countries.  The assumptions implicitly behind
these criteria are  that  (1)  water-related contamination will not occur from
other sources  (e.g. irrigation water);  (2) the sophisticated plants will be
operated as  intended by the designer;  (3) that people will use the water when
provided;  (4) that there are constant or increasing returns to water quality and
quantity  in terms of  health effects.
That misperceptions exist regarding the utility of  rural and village potable
water supplies  is  seen in  the opening sentence of a World Bank paper  (IBRD, 1971):
"Urban communities  of any size without adequate piped water and sewerage are not
viable and  thus  seriously compromise national development prospects."  This simply
is  not true of  all areas.  One observes  traditional villages in Africa  (e.g. in
Botswana) of  20 to  40 thousand persons which exhibit good economic and human health
without  either of  these amenities.
What in many cases goes wrong when overly sophisticated potable water systems
are installed  is  excellently described for Thailand by Frankel  (1974, 1975).  The
Community Potable Water Project was  started in 1966 as a major development effort
for  the Northeast.  By July 1972, 165 potable water systems serving some 357
communities  (average population 1350) had been completed.  It  is estimated  that
25,000 rural  communities are still to be served.  During the planning and design
phase, the Environmental Health Division of  the Ministry of  Public Health adopted
a small number of  standard designs  intended to  expedite and simplify the program
and  to  meet WHO standards for product water.  Frankel's ex post analysis of  the
165 projects uncovered  the following  (1975):6
1.  the systems were over-designed and too  sophisticated for  small rural
communities;
2.  water quality generally failed  to meet WHO standards but was  still
highly acceptable to  the customer populations;
3.  the standard design criterion of 50 liters per day per capita for
villages using standpipes  or 80 Ipcpd for villages having individual
house connections, greatly exceeded actual use rates of  15  to  30 Ipcpd;
4.  use of local building and maintenance materials was not  incorporated in
the designs, and differences among villages in terms of water sources,
quality, and demand growth were overlooked;
5.  plants were shut down on an average of 20%  of the time with shut down
times averaging between 12  and  30 days;  36  plants were closed the entire
year  of  the  survey.
The main factors behind the down time were lack of  spare parts, lack of chemicals,
and poor operator training and pay,  the last resulting in incorrect use of
chemicals, lack of maintenance, incorrect use of  filters, and general neglect of
duties.
The main characteristics  leading to  acceptance of water supplies  seem to
be convenience and availability of water during the dry  season.  It clearly does
little good  to  develop systems capable of producing water of WHO  standards when
system failure  for prolonged periods forces  the  users  to return  to  traditional,
low quality sources.  Costs of the systems also averaged about  $1.00 per thousand
gallons, an extremely high figure by any comparisons.
Such systems obviously fail  to meet the desired health objectives, they drain
the foreign exchange resources of the nation, and they deprive  the majority of  the
rural population of any water supply improvements.
2.  Irrigation vs. Hydroelectric Power.
Few general statements  can be made regarding priorities  to be assigned to
irrigation and hydro-power, except that the world energy crunch since 1973 has
significantly changed the parameters of the appropriate benefit-cost analyses.
In many of the world's river basins, there is a definite trade-off between
development of the head for power and consumptive diversions for irrigation.
Efficient allocations of water depend upon the physical trade-offs and  the
product values involved.
Looking back over the post-war period, it might be  said that 1950-1965
was the period of large-scale hydro-power developments.  In Africa, Owen Falls
Dam on the Nile in Uganda, Kariba Dam on the Zambesi, Volta Dam in Ghana, and
Aswan were undertaken.  With the exception of the latter, these were power dams,
intended to  stimulate industry and urban growth.  By the late 1960's, the picture
began to  change:  population and food demands were burgeoning and pressures for
new land settlement were mounting.  Where the trade-offs existed, irrigation
began to  look much more important.An excellent example  is  found  in the Tana Basin in Kenya.  In the  early
1960's under World Bank sponsorship and with the consulting help of  Sir Alexander
Gibb and Company, Kenya "finalized"  a national power plan, concentrating upon
the construction of  five major power dams on  the upper Tana.  No study of
irrigation trade-offs was included in  the analysis.  The World Bank funded the
first two of  these dams and became very much committed  to  the entire plan,
partly because  the storage provided by later projects of  the system would
enhance the energy output of  the earlier dams.  In the middle and late 1960's,
the Government came under  increasing pressure  to consider large-scale irrigation
in the upper Tana Basin.  Population had exploded and the politically most influ-
ential  tribe wanted more arable land,  having already pushed to  the margin of
cultivation  close  to  the  Tana  River.  Under  Dutch  sponsorship,  several  large-
scale irrigation projects in both upper and lower Tana Basins were studied  at the
pre-investment surveillance level.  Power-irrigation trade-offs  occur only in
the upper basin since that  is where the head is but  the lower basin suffers
from a desert climate, tribal hostilities to  resettlement, and extremely
high development  costs.  By early 1972, making allowances for advances in thermal-
electric generation and long distance transmission, irrigation in the Upper Basin
began to  appear economically feasible.  Exactly what an appropriate benefit-cost
study would show at this  point for the Tana and similar situations is not known,
but new analyses are needed, with emphasis on the optimal plan's sensitivity to
future  oil  prices.
3.  Irrigation vs. Coastal Resources Management.
An area of  increasing concern around the world and of relevance to  some
developing countries is  the effect of  diminished streamflows and consequent
concentration of  salts and other  pollutants on the ecosystems  of bays,  estuaries,
and  coastal areas.  The major cause of  diminished streamflows is  consumptive use
in irrigation.  The detrimental impacts, realized and potential, are upon fish
and shellfish populations  either growing or  breeding in coastal waters.
Specific cases  in which this has been a concern would include the West
Coast of Mexico,  the Texas Gulf Coast  (in relation to  the Texas Water Develop-
ment Plan),  and,  in an ex post  sense, the dams  at Aswan and Volta.  The potential
severity of  the impacts  in the Mexican and Texas cases  is  currently being studied.
In the Aswan  case, the high degree of  control and lack of nutrients  formerly
carried by the sediment loads of  flood flows are  thought  to have been the cause of
the loss  of  the Delta sardine and  shrimp fishery and  other large-scale changes
in eastern Mediterranean  fisheries.  In the case of  the Volta dam, one unantici-
pated effect  of creating  the large lake has been a significant change in the
ground water regimes and  coastal  lagoons  in the region.  Large areas which used
to  flood seasonally and  then drain off  to  form  excellent farm land are now
permanently flooded  (e.g. in the Keta Lagoon area).  Lagoons which used  to  be
salty during  the dry season and fresh during the rains are now filled continuously
with fresh water.  Changes  in fish and  shell fish life have been noted, but  poor
baseline data make meaningful comparisons difficult.
These conflicts between increasing consumptive uses and control of river8
flows and appropriate management of coastal ecosystem resources appear to be
growing and attracting policy-makers' attention.
4.  The Wealth Concentrating Effects of Water-Related Developments.
We have entered fully into the age of multiple-objective  planning, income
distribution being one objective of great importance.  The World Bank is
concentrating its  plans for the next several years on programs which will reach
the poorest countries and the poorest people within each developing country
served by the Bank.  Yet a number of important traditional forms of water related
developments  frequently have the effect of concentrating wealth in the hands of
a few.
There is  frequently a clash between equity and efficiency when choosing the
form for irrigated agricultural development:  small holder agriculture or large-
scale commercial development.  For field crops in Northwestern Mexico, Cummings
has estimated the difference  in gross product per acre to be 15%.  Some of the
earlier apparent reversals of this  situation where small holders appeared to be
out-producing large-scale farms now seem to be disappearing, e.g. the quantity
and quality of small-holder produced coffee in East Africa.  Others appear  to
be maintained, e.g. tea production.
A major source of concern in the semi-arid and arid parts of  the developing
world is  range management.  The Sahelian conditions, also found in parts of East
Africa and Southern Africa, arise in part from the elimination of water as the
limiting  factor on livestock with range taking  its place.  When these conditions
are combined with a common property tradition over rangeland, destruction of  the
range results --  an often irreversible process.  The most frequently used policy
in controlling livestock numbers is  borehole spacing and private ownership of  the
water.  In Botswana, boreholes are to  be drilled no closer  than a 5 km. radius
and nearly all livestock boreholes belong to syndicates of owners who legally
either prevent non-syndicate members from using the water or charge handsomely
for  it.  In either case,  the borehole owners have an interest in restricting the
number of livestock in the neighborhood of  the well.
An effect of these policies is  to  squeeze out  the small  stockowner.  Naturally,
part of  the problem is political since the cattle syndicates could be formed of
small stockowners, but  to date this has not happened.
A closely related resource management and distributional issue  is also found
in Botswana:  the methods being employed  for hoof and mouth disease control.
Aside from the more recently found minerals, cattle constitute the major  form of
wealth in Botswana.  The excellent range, when properly managed, permits produc-
tion of high quality beef, even when long drives are required to  reach the market
(cattle actually gain weight on 500 km drives from some parts of the country).
At the same  time, wild game  such as the various gazelles --  springbok,  impalla,
eland, etc. --  still pervade  the country and, by casual  estimates, still
provide  a substantial part of human protein intake  (drivers may carry an old
family rifle along on business trips, and one may return to  find  a buck laid out
across the hood).  Since these animals can carry hoof and mouth disease, there is
a trade-off between their presence as a continuing protein source andthe probability of a serious outbreak of  hoof and mouth disease among the cattle
herds.  The nature of  this trade-off  is not known in any quantitative sense, but
the Veterinary Department in the Ministry of Agriculture has  an "all out" program
to  stop hoof  and mouth disease.  In addition to the usual quarantine camps for
the inspection of  cattle, chain-link game  fences have been erected across the
country, presumably to prevent  the transmission of  disease, but  effectively
stopping seasonal migration of game herds.  The effect has been the decimation
of  native game of  all sorts with increasingly severe impacts  on its availability
to  the population.
In concluding this section on conflicts in water allocation, two factors
contributing  to inefficient  decisions can be identified:
1. Water is  frequently unduly subsidized,  especially for livestock and
irrigation  purposes;
2. Water is  frequently provided  (and financed) through programs which do
not induce or  indeed permit local decision-makers to consider trade-
offs between water and other  programs.
An example of  the former is  found in many irrigation schemes around the world,
where no charges or  only very low charges are made for water, inducing ineffi-
cient water use.  Another is  the former high degree  of  subsidy in the drilling
and  equipping of  boreholes  for cattle in Botswana, leaving very much in doubt  the
actual  economic viability of much of the past expansion of  that industry.
The second factor mentioned above constitutes one of  the institutional short-
comings of  planning  in many countries:  particular  types  of  investments or programs
are offered  to local  areas on a "take  it  or leave it" basis without permitting the
local unit  to  consider various trade-offs or  to express  their own values over
alternative programs.  Calling on Botswana again for example, the country is
divided into districts for governmental and planning purposes.  Most planning
decisions are  formulated by a District Planning Board  and approved by an elected-
traditional District Council.  Development funds for health, education, and roads
are granted by central government  largely on  the basis of  the overall development
plan submitted by the District and negotiated with the central Planning Ministry.
Water funds,  however, are  either granted without any District  inputs  (for village
water supply schemes) or  are made available without apparent  limit  (for boreholes
for  all public purposes) by permitting the District to  "queue up"  its requests
for borehold drilling and  equipping along with all  other Districts.  The problem
then  is that  the lowest priority borehold request  is  indistinguishable from the
highest priority needs, and  no attention is  given to  the ordering of priorities
among functional areas, e.g. between water supply and health clinics, education,
or  roads.
B.  Environmental Considerations
Environmental concern is not widespread in developing countries --  with the
exception of a few genuine  efforts being made to preserve wildlife.  The problem
is  that modern development projects, whether they be public sector large dams,
thermal power plants, or  private industrial plants,  are large relative to the
assimilative capacities of  local environments.  Thus negative externalities10
(other  than  simpleaesthetic  degradation)  are often  quite  serious  but  are  seldom
considered.  This  is partly a function of the institutional  segmentation or
separation and lack of bureaucratic coordination mentioned at the end of the
previous  section,  but  is  also  a  function  of  shortsightedness.
The possibility of irreversible damages to  ecosystems should always be
considered and appropriately weighed  (in a present-value sense) when considering
the economic  feasibility of different developments.  The major potential for
irreversible damages as observed by this author is  destruction of coastal eco-
systems and fisheries resulting  from industrial-municipal pollution (e.g. the
Gulf of Thailand) and sedimentation due to  deterioration of soil conservation
practices  (e.g. the Tana River in Kenya).  The attitudes of  LDC's  toward
contamination  and  waste  from nuclear  power  plants are  yet  to  be  seen.
1.  Preservation of Natural Environments.
The developing countries which, at the time of their independence, still
had significant endowments of natural  areas and wildlife have done a commendable
job by any comparison with more economically advanced countries of  taking steps
to  preserve significant parts of these systems.  As experience has  shown, it  is
frequently difficult to  tell what steps will result in "preservation."  The
British banned  "poaching" (the name given to native hunting methods)  of elephants
in Tsavo Park  (Kenya), only to  have the elephants multiply to  the point of
destroying their habitat.  Two  thousand elephants per year are being cropped by
professional hunters  (or illegally by game wardens' friends),  just  the number
estimated to have been taken by tribal hunters  in earlier times!  On  the other
hand,  the development of intensive European  farming along the Limpopo River, both
in Botswana and on the South African side, has enhanced  the wildlife populations
of  the region.  Farmers, who have built barrages  to hold back the seasonal flows
for irrigation, proudly show off  "their" hippos which occupy the pools, and one
nightly sees new leopard and  crocodile tracks.
Excellent examples of the dilemmas  faced by LDC's  in preserving natural
areas and wildlife are  the wildlife  resources of East Africa  (Kenya, Tanzania,
and Uganda) and  the Okavango  Swamp in northwestern Botswana.
In the East African case,  the resources have been relatively well developed
for tourism, a solid foreign exchange earner  for  the countries involved.  The
major problems appear not  to be "poaching" as  frequently asserted but  encroach-
ment of competing land uses, namely agriculture.  Population pressures and  the
gradual breakdown of  traditional tribal land areas create pressures  for settle-
ment at  the borders of  the large wildlife preserves.  The major difficulty  is
that  the people who are asked  (required) to  forego this settlement receive
few benefits from the tourism supported by the preserves.  Again, a
distributional issue lies at  the core of a resource management problem.
The Okavango Swamp is a totally unique wilderness swamp environment.  Its
scientific and curiosity values are high, but its  tourist potential is  limited by
its remoteness.  Very high priced air safaries both  for hunting and sightseeing
yield high government revenues per user but small totals.  About 12 million acre-
feet of water is "lost" from the swamp through evapotranspiration each year, a11
large amount in an arid country.  To date, the costs of extracting water and
transporting it  to  the populous and industrializing regions of the country has
been too high to make this  attractive.  However, growing water demands,  espe-
cially the establishment of  several large mineral complexes  (diamonds, copper-
nickel, iron ore) may eventually make it possible to utilize the scale economies
in water transport  to bring the unit  costs  to a competitive level.  The questions
will then be  (a)  what is known  about the impacts of water  removals on the swamp
and on possible groundwater recharge to much of  the country?;  (b)  what trade-
offs will the country opt for,  given the natural swamp does not produce much
tourist revenue?
2.  Pollution Problems.
One  could undoubtedly cite many horrors of pollution, fromothe air pollution
of Mexico City and Delhi  to  the contamination of  the Gulf of Thailand.  The real
question, however,  is  "What makes  sense from the LDC's own viewpoint if  all
effects are  taken into account?"  The quantification of external damages in
physical or value terms is  difficult at best, but not always impossible.  The
eradication of  the shrimp fishery in  the northern Gulf of Thailand  could be
valued in terms of  the annual net value lost by having a smaller catch and having
to fish at greater distances from the markets.  Air pollution damage in the
crowded cities  is more difficult  to quantify.  In either case, the identification
of  sources and decisions on efficient programs of control are extremely difficult,
both technically and politically.
Industry and population tend  to  congregate in areas until their pollution
loads  surpass the assimilative capacities of  the environment.  Industrial
complexes are now often established on such large  initial scales that  they can-
not be treated as  "marginal" changes from either  economic or environmental
viewpoints.  For developing countries as  for  the industrially advanced countries,
a system of  effluent standards for stationary sources linked  to  the desired levels
of  ambient environmental quality and allowing for  the loads  of  non-stationary
sources, is  the only practicable approach.  Obviously, costly externalities clearly
call for some controls, e.g. Bangkok has no  sewage treatment (some homes and hotels
have septic tanks, but  the water table  is at the surface) and Thailand imposes no
effluent constraints on  industry.
A point  frequently forgotten by the LDC's  is  that when new plants and towns
are established, the costs of  avoiding the worst pollution loads are relatively
low.  While one usually encounters  the rejoinder,  "But we're poor and must feed
our people first",  it  is also  true that the poorest get hit hardest by the
pollution:  the workers who cannot afford  to move out of the industrial smog
or  the fishermen who find their livelihood wiped out by municipal and industrial
wastes.  If  anything, the  incidence of  pollution by income group reinforces the
rationality of  basic control programs.12
C. The Relationship of Water to Other Natural Resource Developments
This  section lists various forms of natural resource development which
relate in important ways to water availability.  A major point is  that natural
resource development projects  commonly require much less water than people
perceive them to.  Even  in agriculture, horticultural and dryland opportunities
which require very little water are commonly overlooked.
Another point of  general importance is that  in mixed economies, private
sector  response to public  sector water undertakings is often the crucial
determinant of  success or failure.  An excellent example is found in the Owen
Falls Dam at Jinja, Uganda, on the Nile River.  It  was intended in 1955 to
create "the Detroit of Africa" on the basis of cheap power.  When no industry
was attracted by either the power  or the industrial tract,  the excess power
was sold on extremely attractive terms to neighboring Kenya  (see Elkan and
Wilson,  1968).
Another excellent example of  the crucial nature of private sector response
is  found in the failure of  farmers to construct field channels within irrigation
project commands.  The importance of this failure in parts of India and
possible responses to  it are analyzed by Easter  (1975) and are emphasized as
the major reason for underutilization of water from irrigation projects in  India
in the Government of  India's Report...on Underutilization of Created  Irrigation
Potential  (June  1973).
A final general point on supplying water for natural resource development
is the importance of a  mechanism for water reallocation over time.  Again,
the Kelso et  al study  (1973) and  the experience of the high growth centers
of the  semi-arid Southwestern United States are highly relevant.
Among agricultural developments, horticulture yields many benefits.  It
can be developed to  serve different markets.  It combines very efficient water
use  (as little as  10 inches per year) with labor intensity  (up to 10 persons
per acre).  The market may be local, as in Botswana where fresh produce is
now purchased  from South Africa, or it  may be foreign.  For  the latter, Kenya
ships fresh fruit and flowers by air to  European markets, but other countries
have opportunities for growing and shipping less perishable commodities  such as
flower plantings, young trees, and seeds.  Botswana is in an excellent position
to undertake the latter type of activity because of its  (plant) disease-free
environment.
It  is shocking how little research is underway on the development of
drought resistant varieties for use in  semi-arid zones.  The great variability of
precipitation in such zones also means that agriculture must be risky.  In
eastern Kenya, much of  Botswana, northern Ghana, etc.,  two crops out of five are
likely to be nearly complete failures, even with the use of drought resistant
millets, beans, sorghums, maize, etc.
In the face of these conditions, traditionally oriented agricultural
ministries and their advisors  seem to have given up.  This appears to overlook
a great potential,  necessary inputs to which are  (a)  a reliable supply
of water for households and draft animals,  (b)  a national  (regional) food
purchase and storage scheme from which supplies can be taken to support  the13
population during drought, and  (c)  capacity for rapid processing of range
animals after drought begins.  Northern Ghana lacks even a seasonal grain
storage system so  that there is a "hunger season" every year.  Botswana farmers
in good years  sell off  their grains to South African traders at harvest, only
to buy them back, processed or  unprocessed, at high prices later  in the season.
In bad years,  some simply starve.  Ways in which these basic adaptations to
drought can be provided need further definition and discussion.
High value minerals can bear high water  costs.  In  Botswana, the large
diamond mines utilize a combination of surface water  (unreliable) and  ground
water the average cost of which is  about $1.50 per 103  gallons.  The copper-nickel
complex at  Selibe-Pikwe was part of a "package" which involved building a very
large  surface impoundment  50 miles from the mine and smelter site.  The water is
filtered and  sent by pipeline to  the smelter and further distributed to the
township which was constructed to house the work force.  The delivered cost  of
the industrial water is  approximately $1.50 per 103  gallons, while the distributed
cost of the residential water for the township  is about $2.50 per 103  gallons
(highly subsidized by the mining company).  With such mineral commodities,
water cost  is not a critical factor.
Low value minerals in remote areas are likely to be unexploitable unless
new ways of using  them are found.  For example, Botswana has vast  deposits of
lignite and  low BTU coal.  Distances  to  the South African and export markets
combined with the low BTU  content rule out exports per  se.  Suggested alter-
native uses  include  (a)  mine-mouth generation of electric power which would be
exported on ultra-high voltage lines, or  (b) exportation as a water slurry with
the joint coal-water product being sold.  The Transvaal in  South Africa is very
short  of water,  so the joint purchase of coal and water might be attractive to
both parties.
D.  Conclusions
Water is  becoming increasingly scarce in many LDC's.  Trade-offs must be
studied with greater precision  than in  earlier years.  Further, the scale of
water projects and other development projects has become so  large that very
extensive natural systems are  involved with "externalities" being pervasive.
Environmental capacities are being exceeded and valuable natural areas  are being
impacted.
LDC's typically do not have established environmental policies nor the
analytical capabilities for studying the large  systems involved in large-scale
development  projects.  Nonetheless, the desirability of much more frequent
applications of broad benefit-cost analyses of both public and private under-
takings  is  obvious.  Assistance must be given these  countries by developing in
their own people the capacity for such analysis.14
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II.  DISCUSSION OF HOWE'S PAPER
SCHRAMM:
My comments on Professor Howe's paper are necessarily selective, touching
only upon a few of  the many  topics he discussed.  But these are topics  I have
had  to deal with on several occasions, and  topics I believe to be quite important
in the context of  orderly and  efficient water resource development in low-income
nations.  The first deals with the broad problems of  increasing water scarcity
and emerging conflicts in water allocation;  the second with some issues related
to  project  scope  and  timing.
Most of my examples relate  to Mexico where I am presently participating
in the work of  the National Water Plan, but  the issues are undoubtedly similar
in many or most of  the more arid and  semi-arid nations around  the world.
Let us  first look at some of  the problems related  to present or  future
water scarcity.  In most of these nations,  agriculture still provides  the largest
share of  employment.  But  in those regions in which rainfall is limited, output
is  limited as well.  One of the ways of increasing the income of  the backward
rural population is by irrigation.  In Mexico, for example, a hectare of  irrigated
land will produce, on average, five times more in terms of value of  output than a
hectare of rainfed agricultural land.  Of course, this  ratio does not  apply to
very arid areas where the land,  in the absence of irrigation, can at best be used
for extensive livestock raising, but  to areas with at least 700-800 mm of seasonal
rainfall.  Equally interesting are  the labor intensities.  On average, two  or
three times more labor will be employed per hectare on irrigated land  than on dry-
land farms.  From these two points of view, income and employment, irrigation
looks like a useful  tool  to bring about  (a) increases in agricultural output;
(b) crop diversification, which is  important in markets where relative prices
and demands may change rapidly;  (c) increased income and,  (d) increased employ-
ment.
On the other hand, we also know that,  in terms of value added, the value of
water in agriculture is very low, relative to other uses  (with the exception of
hydro-electric energy production).  One cubic meter of water, used  for irrigation,
may on average produce output worth between 2 to  4 cents;  the same cubic meter,
dropped a few hundred feet through a penstock to  produce electricity, may generate
perhaps one cent worth of it.  However, used  in a so-called "wet" industry such
as  pulp and paper, the value added supported by that  cubic meter will increase to
twenty cents  to  one dollar, while in a typical dry industry such as  apparel
manufacturing or automobile assembly the value added may rise to  several hundred
dollars or more.  From an economic point of view  there appears  to  be no question
that in situations where water  is scarce and  choices between different uses have
to be made, it  should first be allocated  to domestic-commercial-industrial uses
rather  than to agriculture.
This conclusion is  contrary to many legal and  institutional water allocation
rules.  In  the water-scarce Western United States,  for example,  the prior appro-
priation rule applies,  and all a user would have to  show to maintain his water
rights is  some form of "beneficial use',' regardless of  its relative merit compared
to  competing uses.  In Mexico, the rather recent 1972 Water Law determines a
hierarchy of beneficial uses which ranks domestic use highest, followed by agri-
culture, hydro-electric energy production and,  finally, industrial use.  It  seems16
clear that the legislators who formulated  this ranking order were more attuned
to Mexico's revolutionary history (which  was essentially an agrarian revolution)
than to  the necessities of modern economics in a country that by the year  2000
will have more than eighty percent of its population living in urban centers.
The Valley of Mexico provides an excellent example.  This hydrologically
closed basin, lying at an altitude of  roughly 7,500 feet, is  running short of
water.  Groundwater tables have been falling for many years, downtown buildings
and streets have settled in some places by as much as twenty feet, and fierce,
choking dust storms rake the City during the dry season when the ancient saline
lake bottoms surrounding it are dried out.  Housing by now some 12.5 million
people and growing at an annual rate of  6 to  7 percent, physical water supplies
are running short.  Planners now are seriously considering a huge water transfer
scheme, tapping  far away sources some hundred miles and  two mountain ranges away,
and almost 3,000 feet below the City's elevation.  This scheme would cost some 1.5
billion U.S.  dollars and require, among other  things, pumping plants with a capa-
city equal to  20 percent  of the country's present electric power supply  system.
Water costs would run at some 25  to  30 cents per  cubic meter, or more than 10 times
its  gross  value  in  irrigated  agriculture.
On the other hand, there are some 55,000 hectares of irrigated land in the
Valley.  Assuming an annual application of  25  inches of irrigation water per hec-
tare on 37,000 hectares, the annual use of  irrigation water would amount to
something like 20 percent of the total present water use in the urban area.  If
this water were to  be transferred out of  agriculture, the  (perhaps inevitable)
water transfer  scheme could be postponed by about  three or four years.  Given the
opportunity costs  of  capital  in a country that has an annual net borrowing require-
ment of  some $3 billion, the savings in  interest alone would be of the order of
$150 to  $200 million per year.
But desirable as  it  may sound, nobody is  going to  take that water away from
those farmers, because these are small-scale holders with, on average two  to three
hectares  each, living at  the marginal end of the income scale.  From a realistic,
political point of  view it is clear that water, once it has been allocated  to  irriga-
tion, is almost  impossible to get back for other uses.  This, of  course, is  true not
only  in Mexico, but all around the world.  We only have to  remember the wildly
uneconomic scheme of treating saline irrigation return flow water in  the Colorado
River with an atomic desalinization plant in order to deliver water of acceptable
quality  to our Mexican neighbors who will use it for low-value irrigation.
Given these political facts  of life, it  is not hard  to draw the conclusion
that  it  is  highly  unwise  to  allocate  presently nonutilized  water  resources  to  low-
value uses in  those regions in which (a)  physical  supplies are limited and,  (b) alter-
native, higher-value uses are likely to  grow at  rapid rates.  This  is certainly  true
on the high mesa of  Central Mexico which already contains half  the population of  the
country and is,  from the point of  climatic and environmental considerations,  the
ideal location for those additional 40 to 50 million urbanites  that will live in  the
country some  25 years from now.  However, institutional arrangements generally
militate against such sensible precautions.  In Mexico, for example, irrigation
planning is  in the hands of the powerful Ministry of Hydraulic Resources whose
clients and political supporters are those farmers  that stand to benefit from
government-paid irrigation works.  While the same Ministry  is responsible for urban17
water supplies as wellI/  traditionally some 85 percent of  its budget goes to
irrigation and most of its  prestige and political power  come from  that base.
Hence, while current urban and industrial needs may find recognition, future
demands and needs do not.  As a result, we now find in Mexico some 32 major
groundwater basins  in which the water table is  falling steadily, but in which
expansion of  irrigation works is still taking place.
But a rational water allocation policy cannot stop at sectoral decisions
only.  As we all know, the marginal value of water in practically all uses drops
rather rapidly after the most important requirements are met.  A village family,
living several miles away from the next water source, will make do with a few
gallons a day while an urban family with indoor plumbing will use many times
more.  In the Valley of Mexico, which contains some 50 percent of the country's
industrial capacity, the majority of  these industries  pump their own water, and
control over quantities pumped are perfunctory at best.  Most household connections
are unmetered, and  it  is a common sight at seven in the morning to  see the maids
in the better parts of  town hosing down the  hundreds of  feet of  sidewalks in
front of  their properties.  Would  this pattern persist if their  owners had to pay
the full  costs of future incremental water supplies,  i.e.,  some 25  to  30 cents
per cubic meter plus distribution costs?  It  hardly seems likely.  But it  is quite
certain  that  the additional investment  and collection costs of metering would be
far  less  than the costs  of transferred water.
The same is  true  in many other areas of the world.  In Lima, Peru,  for
example, a $500 million plus water transfer from the Mantaro River  in the Atlantic
Watershed is  thought  to  be necessary to  provide the incremental water needs of
Lima in a few years hence.  But at  the same time,  industrial plants in the metropo-
litan watershed pump their own water, without any quantity limitations,  at a
perfunctory license fee that  is  paid to a Ministry which has no direct responsibility
for water supply.  Again a more rational policy would be  to  charge these firms the
marginal opportunity costs of groundwater use, which are equal to the marginal costs
of  future water supplies.  Such a pricing policy would undoubtedly reduce water
utilization and, therefore, postpone the time when additional water supplies are
needed.  With interest cost savings  of between $50  to $100 million per year  (in a
country which has  the unenviable record of  having the highest debt/GDP ratio in
the world) this  certainly looks  like a good alternative.
Let us now look at  some problems  related to project scope and  timing, and
particularly  to one which some years ago I christened the "lock-in" effect.  As
a result of the sudden 1973  increase in world oil prices many countries have once
more turned their attention  to  the development potential of  their more remote
hydropower sites.  These sites, usually far from existing load centers, have to  be
very large in order  to be economically viable, since transmission costs are high
but subject  to rather substantive economies  to scale.  For example, the cost per
kilowatt-mile of a 230 kilovolt, 270 megawatt, 600 mile long transmission line
would be about  two-and-a-half times as  high as  that  of  a 345 kilovolt, 800 megawatt
line;  if  the voltage would be further increased  as well as capacity, to between
3,000 and 4,000 megawatt capacity costs, per kilowatt-mile would fall to  something
During the 1976/77 reorganization of  the Federal Government, the Ministry of
Hydraulic Resources was combined with the Ministry of Agriculture.  The urban-
industrial water supply responsibilities were transferred to  the Ministry of
Public Works.  This division of responsibilities  is  likely to exacerbate  the
problem.18
like 20 percent of  the kilowatt-mile cost of  the 270 mw line.  But even at these
low unit costs,  total transmission costs are high because of  the large distances
involved.  On the Nelson River power development in Manitoba, Canada, for example,
costs of  the 550 mile long transmission line amounted  to over 40 percent of  the
initial investment  costs of the  overall project.  Practically all transmission
costs are capital costs.  Hence, once a line is built or committed, marginal
transmission costs are essentially zero since all costs for  the 40 or  50 year
life expectancy of the  line have been committed in advance.  As a result, the
developer is essentially "locked-in",  regardless of  changes in the costs  of  alterna-
tive power sources.  In the Nelson River Development case, the transmission line
"locked-in" Manitoba Hydro, the owner, into a 20 year hydro development scheme
which it  now has to pursue even though civil works construction costs on remote
sites have increased much faster than the thermal power plants.  These later
plants could have been built in discrete, smaller unit sizes  to meet  incremental
demand.  When the decision to proceed with the Nelson Scheme was made, however,
both its assumed costs  and that  of  the thermal alternatives were essentially
equal.  The question which must be asked in such situations  is what kind of a
risk premium should be applied to  the large scale, non-reversable alternative.
This risk premium obviously should be higher the larger a given scheme  is relative
to  the financial capacity of  the developer.  While a rich country such as  Canada
or the U.S.A. could accept a gamble, a country such as  Zaire  (with  the fabulous,
100,000 mw potential of  the lower Congo River),  India  (with the almost equally
impressive potential of  the Upper Brahmaputra) or Peru (with its precarious finan-
cial position) obviously should and could not.
A  related  question  is  that  of  timing.  It  generally  will  be  wise  for  a
developing  country with scarce capital and skilled human resources  to postpone
the development of very large or interdependent project  sites as  long as  possible.
Objections to Mexico City's or Lima's water transfer schemes are frequently
brushed aside by the remark:  "Even if we use some intermediate solutions even-
tually we have to  do it  anyway;  therefore, we might as  well do it now."  Clearly,
whoever voices such an opinion has given little thought  to the question of  the
opportunity cost of capital and other scarce resources.
A more subtle, but equally important issue is  that of optimal  timing for
multi-purpose projects.  In Mexico, for example, the federally-owned Electricity
Corporation is  pressuring the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources  to participate in
the financing of the various hydropower  dams on the Grijalva-Usumacinta  complex
near the Guatemalan border.  Incidentally, from the power development point of
view, this  is  a development scheme to which the "lock-in" effect, described
above, applies forcefully, since the sites are huge and more than 600 miles away
from load centers.  Participation by  the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources  is sought
because of the potential flood protection benefits in the lower, almost undeveloped
basin.  But for the latter Ministry, agricultural development of  the Grijalva-
Usumacinta flood plains has  (or should have) low priority,  since there exist
several million hectares of un- or underdeveloped tropical land along  the Gulf
Coast rim which could be developed at considerably lower costs.  Until these
lower-cost land reserves are fully utilized,  the Grijalva floodplains are really
not needed.  Developing them now would substitute a high-cost land development
scheme for lower-cost alternatives elsewhere.  Even if  the hydro-development could
be justified on its  own merit, the percentage contribution by the Ministry of
Hydraulic Resources, should be limited to  the lower per hectare  costs  of alternative
development schemes outside the Grijalva floodplain.19
These, my rather  selective comments on  the topics raised in Professor Howe's
paper, were strictly limited  to economic  issues.  This restriction was deliberate.
I am, of  course, fully aware that  in the development of water resources political,
institutional, social,  cultural and historical factors may play a much larger role
than economic ones.  However, for us, who are advisors to  these nations  and govern-
ments, it  is essential  to  stress the economic side by answering the twin questions
of "how much" and  "for whom".  This as analysts we can do.  What we cannot do is  to
tell these governments and  these societies what they actually should do, since this
involves  value judgments; making value judgments  is exclusively their business not
ours.
BROMLEY:
What I will try to  do is  focus on issues  to keep  in mind  in our discussions
tomorrow.  As we sit around this room and begin to  formulate problems and research
areas,  I want to  share my concerns with you.  The issues I will raise are familiar
to all  of us and yet we tend  to  forget them sometimes and need  to have our memory
jogged.
The first  issue is  that many  countries--particularly in Africa where we
have seen  the emergence of many  independent nations over  the last  ten years--are
not viable nation states.  Rather, they are pieces of geography occupied by tribes
or by military governments.  When you are talking about national policy in those
situations you are dealing with a vastly different institutional structure than
what most western economists are familiar with.  This  is  less true in Latin America,
but  it  is  characteristic of many of  the LDC's.
Secondly, most of  them are characterized by severe misuse of power and
control.  We all know this,  yet it must loom very large in our discussion of
policy.  Most policy, if  not all of it,  is undertaken by a very small fraction
of the population with the expectation that  the gains from that policy will be
distributed in about the same way that power is now distributed.  It is necessary
to distinguish between nice sounding pronouncements that come out and  actual
behavior or performance.  I am reminded of  John Mitchell's quote when he said,
"Don't listen to what we say, watch what we do,"  and  in a slightly better context,
that is what I have in mind.  It is  one thing  to listen to what governments say,
it  is  another to  see what  they do.  We all know that the push for  colonization
projects  in developing countries is  a high-sounding concept, but in fact it is
a way to deal with the mal-distribution of land without really confronting the
current distribution of wealth.
My third point  is  that most of these countries are what Myrdal would call
"soft states".  The best  possible interpretation of a soft state is  that favoritism
flourishes. The worst possible interpretation is  that non-violent corruption is
rampant;  it  is what we call white collar crime.  With this potential for "slippage"
in  the system, economic planning and policy formulation is  extremely stochastic
in its  output effects.
My fourth point, and perhaps the most  important, is  that with few exceptions,
there is  an absence of a latent entrepreneurial ethic on a widespread scale among
people  in these countries.  I do not see any reserve army of willing risk-takers
or profit-seeking economic men.  Rather, I see a reserve army of largely illiterate,
risk-averse people who struggle from day to  day just to get by.20
There are my four starting points for any discussions about problem defini-
tion in the LDC's.  We must avoid transferring not only incorrect technology to
these countries, but also incorrect intellectual concepts and problem definitions
which derive from those intellectual concepts.  It was at this point that I went
back and read Myrdal's  first chapter of his book, The Challenge of World Poverty--
the title of  the chapter is  "Cleansing Our Approach From Biases"--and  that was a
nice reminder to me of  these biases.  The bias Ihad in mind here is  that we define
a problematic situation from our cultural and intellectual heritage and tend to
impose that in another context;  that scares me.  The real problem in dual economies
is  the lack of  a positive net expected value on the part of  any individual actor
from undertaking fairly certain costs  to change traditional behavior.  We can talk
all day about public policy, about the public sector, and  about what  the govern-
ments of  these countries ought to  do, but we all know it is the little guy who has
to "pull it  off".  When the expected value of his private gain is low vis-a-vis  the
rather certain cost he has to  incur, we know what he will do.
I would now like to  turn to Chuck's paper and mention a few places where
our cultural and intellectual tradition might lead us down the wrong path.  The
first  concerns  the  rigid  allocation  of  water.  As  economists  we  are  all  concerned
about highly mobile resources, and getting water to  the highest use.  We talk
about  getting  a  "better  allocation  of  water,"  and  yet  those  of  us  who  have  tra-
veled  in  LDC's  have  seen  the  traditional  watering  hole  "laundromat"  where  the
women go  to wash  their clothes  and fetch a bit of water.  If we increase  the mobility
of water and move it  from one use to another, I am concerned that  third parties will
get lost in the shuffle.  I fear that when we talk about  transferring water rights
we exclude some third party interests that are fairly significant in  the LDC's.
The protein from wild game in Botswana is  another example of significant third
party benefits from a given set of  property rights.
In Gunter's example regarding the reallocation of water in the Mexican
valley, there are some third  parties that are benefiting from the current rigid
allocation of water.  Can we be certain that  the opportunity costs of  changing
that allocation do not  far outweigh some obvious economic gains?
Skipping to  another issue, Chuck, I see that old bugaboo common property
resources rear its ugly head as  the villain of  the piece in the Sahel.  If  it  has
to bear  the blame now, then it must also  take credit for dealing with the resource
allocation problem for thousands of years in which the  tribes in the Sahel dealt
with what Western economists would call a common property situation.  I do not see
it  as a common property problem, I see it  as  an institutional lag vis-a-vis, a
changing environment, and I am not sure that it is  fair  to put  the blame on common
property, per se.
You also discuss viable irrigated agriculture and mention the complementary
inputs that must go along with it.  The very recognition of the complementary inputs,
which, of course, I agree with, is  even further evidence that we have to  be very
careful when we talk about irrigated agriculture and efficient water use.  We are
all in favor of efficiency, but I like  the way Al Schmid puts  it:  "efficiency
for whom?"  Efficiency like optimality is  a unique function of  some existing set
of property rights and opportunity sets,  and I get uneasy when I hear Western
economists talk about efficiency in the context of a different culture.
Another point  concerns treating water as an  input  to growth.  It might be
better to  think about water as  an input into reducing  the degree of dualism that
exists in these economies rather  than as an input to  growth.21
In conclusion, all of  Chuck's problem situations derive from our unique
intellectual heritage and  that  is crucial regarding economic policy.  Any problem
identification is,  by definition, based upon some conceptual framework about
what is a little better,  or what is a little worse.  We start with some criteria
(objective function) and the problematic  situation is  a felt need which compels
us  to move closer to  some goal.
Tomorrow we will be discussing the following kinds of  things:  Can U.S.
universities and research institutions  assist in natural resource use?  Can
resource economists  contribute to meeting important research needs?  How might
research needs be better  addressed?  What are the priority resource  training
needs in developing countries?  How can resource economists contribute and how
can U.S. universities help?  I am concerned about, and sensitive to,  intellectual
imperialism and I hope that we can be very careful of  this tomorrow, and  later on
this  afternoon.  Our definition of problematic situations derives out of a parti-
cular view of  the world which comes from our culture and our  intellectual history;
that  is rather ominous when we plan to  sit around this  room tomorrow and pontificate
about what ought to  be done about resource use  and development in the LDC's.
General Discussion
TIMMONS:  Chuck, in your paper dealing with water, why did you omit the whole
dimension of  drainage?  Both drainage per se and drainage in conjunction with irri-
gation?
HOWE:  An omission probably caused by a particular set of problems  that I have
dealt with in LDC's.  I am now involved in a project studying damage in the lower
Colorado basin due to  inadequate drainage and which could be ameliorated
by drainage improvements.  I should not have left drainage out of my discussion.
This  is  clearly an important issue.
TIMMONS:  Do you feel that pressures currently in LDC's  toward immediate use of
water and other natural resources has important intertemporal allocation impli-
cations?  Do immediate pressures of population and export demand on resources
cause serious intertemporal misallocations, particularly of exhaustible and
nonrenewable resources when future demands  for  these resources may be greater
than current demands?  This question would apply to  soil erosion, forest deteriora-
tion and water losses, in particular  LDC's pressed with current needs for  food
development and for improvements  in income distribution now.  How will current
pressures on national resources affect future productivity and loan repayment
potential?
HOWE:  The World Bank and other  institutions making  financial loans are concerned
about  the payback potential of  their loans.  If  the resources are being depleted
or their income flows being guided by mistaken assumptions,  it  could have serious
implications  for loan repayment and  future levels of  living based upon this
resource.
ABEL:  May I put  this question in a different  context?  To what extent are we
pushing  countries  to a  technological frontier that exceeds their capability to
manage the investments?  Developed  countries have had more time to  evolve their
technical systems and develop their management  skills.  Now we are going  into
developing  countries  to build large water works for a city or  irrigation systems22
that cannot be operated effectively with existing management capability.
GOLAN:  I  disagree totally.  If you look in terms of the final reports on which
investment  decisions  are  based,  it may look  like  that  is  the case.  In the prepara-
tion of feasibility studies, however, in  case after case we are looking into  (a)
multi-purpose projects which have other uses, other demands, and  (b)  future demands.
Look at the number of country-wide studies being done to determine water alloca-
tions,  not just for  today, but  20 years from now.  I can give you one example
after  the other.  In Thailand, the government is undertaking a fairly expensive
study of  the Chao Phrya Basin to  determine future demands.  There is no serious
conflict over water use at present, but it will probably arise in a few years.
They are studying this  problem at very high cost in order to  resolve conflicts
between transportation, salinity, irrigation, power, fishery, etc.  In the
Philippines the same thing is  being done  in central Luzon.
HOWE:  I want to differentiate between studies made of projects  to be built, and
actual implementation of  a  project with its  technology to manage, and  the relation
between private and public activities.
You have to  evaluate future demand  in order  to determine how best  to allocate
water between conflicting demands, and I am very happy to hear  that  it is  being
done, but it is not done as  a  matter of  course.  It  is done on a one country here
and  one  country  there  basis.
There is a distinction to  be made between renewable resources such as water where
you do want to  project future demands  to avoid some of the problems in fixity of
use, and nonrenewable resources like the mineral resources.  The question with
respect to  the latter is the rate of exploitation of the nonrenewable resources
such as  diamonds and copper.  For example, are the oil resources of Nigeria being
intelligently utilized with respect to time?  The developing countries appear to
be doing as  good a job as we are as a  developed country.  These considerations
are not very adequately taken into account in our own society.
I am not  aware that any of  the development projects I  have worked on have had any
real  analysis.  Is  this deposit worth more to us today or shall we hold it for
future markets?  In our  course work we tell students of  the importance of  looking
at  the optimum time  for undertaking a particular project.  In practice we usually
looked at  the benefit/cost ratio, or at  the present value today, and if it  is  posi-
tive, we go ahead.
QUESTION-:  Do you think exhaustible resources ought to be a part of our concern?
HOWE:  It should be in developing countries like Botswana, where they have come
upon rich mineral deposits which are finite, although some of  them are very large.
What kinds  of  activities are going to  replace the exploitation of natural resources
once those deposits run out?  A question related to  optimizing the rate of exploita-
tion over time is  in what kinds of  activities do we invest the proceeds  of resource
exploitation, in the hope of having a  viable economy when the resources  are depleted?
This brings me back to my worry about the inappropriate pricing of resources, water
in particular, in the sense that you can distort the calculation of viability of
When we were unable  to  identify the speaker  from the tape recordings, QUESTION
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alternatives which are being built up from the foreign exchange proceeds of
current resource exploitation.  Are we subsidizing certain inputs and making
investments  look socially profitable which are in fact not socially profitable?
Once the net savings from resource exploitation are exhausted  (the easy source
of subsidy for  these on-going activities  that have been built up),  then a lot of
these activities are going  to be found to be nonviable.
That does not answer the question about how we ought  to time resource exploitation,
but I do not think  those calculations are being made.  One thing that is  being
distorted by inappropriate pricing of water and subsidizing of water enterprises
is heavy investment in water dependent activities in the hope that they will
carry on after  the diamonds are gone in Botswana or in some parts of  Africa.
These water dependent activities are not  going to  survive because nobody around
them is  going  to be willing to  pay the bills.
If  you look at  the total water consumption of a developing country, industry
takes a small percent of  the total water and the overwhelming amount is  taken
by agriculture.  How you price water for industry goes in terms of  the amount
taken and  in terms  of  the cost of water for  the industry as a whole.  How you
price water will not make a great impact on decisions.  In terms of agriculture,
pricing of water is not  really the critical element, it  is much more of a political
decision.  We have the example of the Tana River  in Kenya.  As far back as  1917
there was a report done by consultants for the government of Kenya which stated
that  the power investment will preempt  any future irrigation development upstream
of  the power dam.  We reviewed it;  it was nothing new.  The government decided to
go ahead, nevertheless, based on political considerations.  It was not an economic
decision, it was a political decision.  No pricing of water would have changed it.
In most cases,  the government makes a decision on how to allocate water, irrespec-
tive of how you charge the consumer.  The question of pricing of water is blown
out of  proportion for developing countries.
If  in 1970 you had  charged  the farmers in the Upper Tana basin the opportunity
costs  of that water in terms  of power, none of  them would have paid it.  But this
is not  the issue.  Whether  the farmer pays  for water  is a question of resource
and revenue generation.  We are looking for  the economic allocation of that quan-
tity of water for irrigation or power, not whether  they can recoup the investment
from the beneficiary.  How much you price the farmer for  that investment is not
an issue.
GOLAN:  However, with 10,000 farmers  in a river basin, prices charged farmers is
quite a problem.  There are really two types of  pricing questions involved.  One
is on the revenue aspect of  the pricing,  the repayment of  the investment.  That
can be done  either through pricing the water or  through taxation or through other
means.  But  there  is another important aspect and  that is the efficiency with
which water is used on the individual farms and the extent to which price can play
an allocative role.
MARTIN:  A  third price question is  the one concerning water use efficiency.  I
am not denying that you can allocate water  efficiently administratively.  It  is
a lot easier if you know in the design stage that you are going to  do it  that way,
but it is harder  to do  afterward.  What may come  to be  the reason for pricing
water is  the income distribution effects of giving farmers water  free versus
charging  them for  it.  Every country we are thinking of has so many peasants that
there is  really no way the government can do as much for all peasants as  it  is
going  to do for those to which it  is  giving irrigation water.  Even if they were
marginal farmers under the old situation, you are going to put them in  the upper
quartile of  the income distribution of farmers after irrigation water is made24
availahle.  Unless the political reasons are overwhelming it makes sense to
try to  collect what the water is  actually worth to farmers  and use these capital
funds to help somebody else in the society.  Otherwise the value of the irrigation
water will just be capitalized into higher land prices.  In one of Randy Barker's
sections  of  the annual IRRI  reports they found a place near Bataan where in a five-
year period the combination of making free irrigation water  available and  the Green
Revolution drove up  land values by three to  five times their former level.  If you
do not use water prices,  it will be difficult  to do  the same things well that you
can  do  with prices.
HOWE:  I  agree  that incorrect pricing of water leads to misallocation of  resources.
Water pricing is  a critical element  in terms of  income redistribution.  The failure
to  price water correctly leads to  investment decisions that are incorrect.  Another
aspect of  this is  the extent to which a government considers water to  be a scarce
resource.  This does not mean that it has  to  charge the farmers a certain price for
the water to pay off the project, but at least in doing its investment planning, it
should arrive at a shadow price that reflects the scarcity value of water.  If  the
project evaluation assigned shadow prices to water that reflect scarcity value,
this might lead  to a different type of investment decision.
One has to define the degree of centralization of  the planning and the allocation
process before you can be sure what decisions will be affected by pricing.  If
you are going to plan downward  from the major storage project to the final field
channel, you can always have centralized decisions that will accomplish what prices
will accomplish.  We may have in mind an unrealistic degree of centralization of
the actual decisions  that go into planning.  There is a lot left for private initia-
tive in most countries.  There is  also a lot of private investment  if  the right
atmosphere is created by the provision of structure or services.  One of  these is
water.
Another illustration of  inefficient investments being made privately in response
to  the public provision of water is  the vast expansion of range cattle in parts
of Africa.  The government permits  the district to put together groups of small
cattlemen and apply  in their name for government provision of water including the
pump and the tank for  cattle.  If the value of the cattle sold is sufficient to
cover the costs of  the cattle scheme, then it will go.  At the moment there is a
large expansion of cattle raising going ahead simply because the government is
not  imposing the cost of  that water on the people who are making the decisions.
If the ground water is fossil water, then there is  another cost that  should pos-
sibly be imposed.
SCHRAMM:  There is still another efficiency issue.  For the  typical irrigation
project, you end up with an assumed cropping pattern that is a  mixture of high-
value and low-value crops,  reflecting historic patterns.  In Mexico,  for
example, about 60  percent of the crops grown on irrigation are grain crops with
relatively low value.  If  you look at project proposals you see 100,000 hectares
here, 50,000 hectares there, and a  mixture of 40 percent or  50 percent grain
crops,  20 percent vegetables, 10 percent  fruit and so on, which may in fact be
the actual pattern once it is established.  If you combine  this analysis with
the market analysis for high value crops, you find that you preclude a switch
in an existing irrigation district from low-value to high-value crops by taking
part of  the market for high-value crops for the new land.  The marginal contri-
bution of the 1QQ,0Q0.  hectares  of new land  is only the addition to grain crops
and not the output from the high valued crops.  It still has very substantial
effects and who gets the benefits is  still a  very important issue.  If there was
enough of a  market for strawberries, a lot of other people would  like to  produce25
them.  However, the demand for strawberries  is limited so  that small increases
in production bring considerable decreases  in price.  That is  why projects under
consideration should be valued in terms of efficiency in a  national and a  mar-
ginal context.
STATEMENT:  What you are suggesting is that the economic evaluation of  the project
assumed a total demand  for a  high-value crop that does not really exist.  The
country is already in equilibrium and all you are doing by growing high-value
crops in this particular project  is displacing production elsewhere.  An example
of  this was the California water plan.  The West Side water was assumed by the
planners  to go  into high-value crops.  When economists  did the price analysis,
they found the production of high-value crops on the West Side would displace
almost as much high-value crops grown elsewhere in the state.  Even in terms of
the California economy the California Water Plan was a gross over-estimate of
the net value of  additional production.
ABEL:  I would  like  to come back to  John Timmons' original point.  One problem
is  that only a very narrow range of investment possibilitiesis being  considered
dered.  Whether we are talking about irrigation, range management or management
of  forest resources, one starts from an existing resource use pattern.  Existing
investment is  associated with a known technology in the use of the resource, the
demand for  the resource, and on a certain set of  institutional arrangements.
Typically we look at  alternatives in terms of  the best we can do;  that  is  the
most modern of  engineering designs,  the most modern aspects of management tech-
niques, etc.  These alternatives usually place a great deal of stress on indigenous
capability to manage the system being created.  What one usually does not consider
is  an incremental approach of  improving resources in a way that does not put
great stress  on the existing managerial capacity and institutional structure.
In the water area, the kind of  thing  that Bill Easter was working on in India
on improving village irrigation was an  incremental approach, as  is  the work of
Tom Wickham and others  in the Philippines.
There is  a lot of  irrigation in place and incrementally improving the quality of
existing irrigation systems  is  an alternative to building new systems.  Are we
looking seriously at  the sequence of incremental improvements in our resource
use that may be more consistent with institutional and managerial capabilities
in developing countries rather  than at  the alternative of  coming in with the
most modern system?
A short, cynical answer is  that it  is  appearance that counts.  Non-marginal changes
have a nice appearance and make it  look as  if  things  are being done;  marginal
changes are hardly noticeable.
TIMMONS:  Martin, two  of  your statements bother me.  You mentioned undue stress
on existing institutions, and you  imply that  incremental investments  should be
made that are consistent with existing institutions.  I would be more comfortable
arguing that we should stress or alter some of  the  institutions now in existence.
Economists are not being very helpful when they assume away  institutions or when
they assume that institutions cannot be changed.  This is  a real bias  that people
from developed countries have in working with less developed countries.  Institu-
tions are going to have to be changed in terms of being made conducive to  resource
utilization in such a way that resources yield  their potential productivity with
an income distribution and employment patterns  that are consistent with national
goals  of  less  developed countries.  This may be one of  the greatest single biases
that people from developed  countries take into developing countries.  The way out
is  to  realize that institutions are man-made and  can be changed by man when they26
do not serve his purposes.  Institutions can he put into a programming frame-
work where the institutions can be tested as constraints right along with other
kinds of  constraints and relaxed in normative terms in order to predict the out-
comes  of changes in institutions.
ABEL:  I  would agree with you wholeheartedly.
TIMMONS:  What do you mean when you say we should not understress institutions
or we should make incremental  changes  in technology?
ABEL:  We have not paid enough attention to  institutions and  to the required
changes in institutions.  Implied in an incremental approach is  an assessment
of how rapidly the existing institution structure can be changed,  in what direc-
tion, and what is  it going to  take to do  it?  Large modern projects are a way of
ducking the necessity to deal with institutions in any way.  Modern projects may
be outside  the mainstream of human relationships, not always, but many times  they
are.  In a settlement scheme you are trying to create a new set of relationships
that hopefully will not be in conflict with old relationships.  To what extent
are some of these jumps  so big  that it  is beyond the capacity of  the country
within the foreseeable future either to provide the management or to  be able  to
operate these projects efficiently?
CROSSON:  Water management presents a set of issues where the question of confron-
ting institutions  cannot be ducked.  It is  fairly well known or is widely believed
that bringing in large new irrigation schemes from now on is  going to be a lot more
costly in most parts of  the world than it has been.  In an economic sense, the
alternative you suggested of making better use of what we now have is  going to  look
increasingly attractive.  Once you start thinking of  it  that way, you cannot make
any headway on better water use without confronting the institutional issue as
the reason why so many irrigation projects are using only a small percentage of
their potential capacity.  The reason is not because they are badly designed in
a technical and engineering sense.  The problem arises because the terms on which
water  is  made  available  to  farmers  do  not  provide  them  an  incentive  to  use  the
water  efficiently,  or  the  water  never  reaches  them  due  to  breakdowns  in  the  insti-
tutional  structure.
In  Latin  America,  the  characteristics  of  these irrigation systems are the rigidity
and  centralization  of  control  at  high  levels.  In  effect, decisions  are being
made  about  water  use  by  water  managers  who  are  sitting  in  a district  office  or  in
some cases even in a capitol.  They do not really know what the conditions for
efficient water use are on a farm.  As a result of  their decisions,  the patterns
they impose are inconsistent with efficiency under existing conditions, to say
nothing of future conditions as markets change, technology changes and  so on.
This extremely rigid set of institutions governing water allocation at  the farm
level  is crucial to  getting at the question of how do we do better with what we
have?  It may be a place where economists  can play a role perhaps  in the way that
Timmons suggested of estimating what it costs  to keep  this institutional structure.
In other words, the opportunity costs of  this existing pattern of allocation in
terms of output foregone.  This  can be a point of argument  for those who want to
change things.
ABEL:  This matter of  efficiency depends a little upon just what aspect of effi-
ciency you are talking about.  If you are talking strictly about  the efficiency
of water application and you have a reasonably well-designed surface or gravity
irrigation system, you can increase the application efficiency by going to  sprin-27
kler systems  and perhaps save 25  percent of  the water.  You may not increase
yield very much.  That does not provide much incentive, and it  is  going to  cost
you quite a bit more.  In Hawaii the  sugar growers are changing systematically
from surface  to sprinkler irrigation because they have a fixed amount of water
and  can afford  to make the changeover.  The change will allow them to irrigate
25 percent more land.  They can afford to do  it, but the situation may be quite
different for small farmers in a developing country.
In  the developing countries the  cost and income situation is a lot different and
the most efficient method is not necessarily the best.  It might be in Hawaii,
where labor has a different relationship to production.  I can see good reasons
for many countries  to  subsidize farmers  and to make water available to them at a
subsidized rate.  In some districts where water is a scarce resource and has high
value in alternative uses  it might be desirable  to price water at the margin to
reflect  its value in  these other uses.  Marginal pricing can still be combined
with a subsidy.  You can give a farmer a layer of  two-acre feet and make that free.
That  is  the minimum to grow a crop under the ecological conditions.  If  the farmer
wishes to go  to some higher value use of  the water, we will charge for it.  The
cost of  metering and administration  is  an added  consideration.  However, you would
only want  to meter  the water if you had some other use for  the water.  If  you have
100,000 hectares of  land, of which only 30,000 are  irrigated, and you could extend
the canals at  reasonable costs,  then a marginal water pricing scheme would be highly
beneficial.
You also might need a scheme  to subsidize  the farmer who installs meters.  The law
could require meters next year, but also provide  the money for  the equipment.  You
cut back administratively or price-wise on the amount of water a farmer can get
because  of  its  other  valuable  uses.
The  cutback  could be for  energy reasons.  In Nicaragua the government has spon-
sored sprinkler irrigation which costs them up to  twice what it  should.  The
government is making up  the difference, but it  is  taking roughly twice the amount
of  energy because you must pump it  higher.  If  it  is government policy to  do that
to  save water, it might make sense, but it  does not in this particular case.  In
Columbia a good-sized surface irrigation project from stream flow was operating at
one-third the capacity.  The canals  and distributaries are there for irrigating
three times  as much land but farmers grow only one crop of  rice per year because
they  do not have enough water.  The basic reasons are no water storage capacity
and sediment.  Operating at  full capacity would require basic changes in  the
water supply system but  area farmers  are not interested because they are doing all
right as  it  is.  They have enough land and  it may be in their interest to  keep
things  as  they are but  it may not  be in the best interest  of the country.
WICKHAM:  Martin, you started by saying we push on developing countries technology
they are not  ready to  adopt.  When we talk about water that  is  true if we  give
them a sprinkler  irrigation or irrigation they cannot handle.  In developing
countries  the bulk of  irrigation is  gravity.  They have been using it  for  thousands
of years.  You are not installing a new sophisticated system.  It is  a simple irri-
gation system and  in India there are very few sophisticated systems.  There are
also very few well managed  systems in India.  You cannot simplify the system any
further, so  the issue is not  that we are giving them too  complicated a tool.  The
problems are different.
Second, it  is  very easy  to  talk about efficiency on the farm.  In the  case of  India
or  the Philippines, when systems were analyzed, it  turned out first that the system28
was not properly designed.  Long before you come to  the farms you cannot deliver
the water to  the point where the farmer can make efficient use of it because the
system was not designed for efficient water delivery.  In India, when we reviewed
system after system, we concluded that the government has to accept that past
investment in large scale systems is probably  only about one-third of what is
required.  Before you can talk about  efficiency to  the farmer you have to have
additional investments in the system and  its structures.
The next question is,  can the farmer be efficient?  It makes no sense to  talk
about farmers using water efficiently if  they cannot level their land  or  if  they
do not have proper drainage.  We have to see that  they have a real opportunity to
use the water efficiently and that may require a lot of  capital.  They are finding
it out in country after country.
ABEL:  The word efficiency is  being used here in several different ways.  I do
not  think we are using it the way I would use it as an economist.
WICKHAM:  I am using it  in the way an irrigation engineer would use it.  How
much of  the water is  used for  crops and how much of  it is wasted?
ABEL:  I do not have any objection to  that.  But what you may conclude is  the most
technically efficient way to deliver water, I may conclude is economically very
inefficient.
WICKHAM:  I am looking at efficiency in terms of  the incremental (marginal)
investment versus the savings of a cubic meter of water price at its opportunity
cost?  Then you would ask, does  it pay  to  invest in improving the system to save
that cubic foot  of water?
ABEL:  Now you are turning around and  looking at  economic efficiency.
WICKHAM:  I am looking at it both ways.  What we are asking is  how much can you
invest to obtain the optimum use of  that water?  Does it pay the farmer to invest
in improving the efficiency of his water use?29




The efficiency of  the management of  irrigation systems in Taiwan, viewed
as decentralized public enterprises, depends on  four interrelated factors.  These
factors are  (1) the recognition that water is a scarce factor in agricultural
production, (2) the legal administrative basis  for centralized planning of  irri-
gation investments but decentralized management of  irrigation systems,  (3) the
information systems which permit the exchange of  agronomic and  engineering in-
formation between the users  of water and  the managers of  a system, and  (4) the
use of  incentive structures for both the managers  of  irrigation systems and  the
users of water that  appear to  be compatible with the efficient use of water within
the irrigation system.
1.  Introduction
The use of irrigation, particularly in Asia, is  centuries old.  Irrigation
systems were built in India as  early as  the second century A.D.,  and irrigation
development was given major  emphasis in British India during the nineteenth and
early  twentieth centuries  [Ministry of Irrigation and Power, 1972, pp. 60-82].
In Japan, emphasis on irrigation dates back to  the Tokugawa Era  (1603-1867)
[Fukuda,  1973].  In Taiwan the first large irrigation system was built during
the period  1680-1719 [Ko  and Levine,  1972].  One can find similar  long experi-
ences with irrigation in many other countries of Asia  [Takase and Kano, 1969].
Despite this long history of irrigation, only a few countries have evolved
designs  of  irrigation systems  and  the management principles and  techniques that
result in efficient water use.  Japan and Taiwan are undoubtedly the most advanced
in these respects, followed probably by Korea.  The People's Republic of  China
may rank high in efficiency, but insufficient information is available  to make
any firm judgments.  Throughout the rest of Asia, efficiency  in canal irrigation
system water use is  quite low.
Our concern is with surface, or  canal, irrigation systems, typically con-
structed and operated by public agencies, which provide water to a given area
of  land from a combination of  streamflow and reservoir  storage.  The  area  irri-
gated can involve numerous  farms and an even larger number of fields.
In an ideal situation, water would be allocated efficiently in an irrigation
system when the marginal value product of water in each use is equal  to  the mar-
ginal scarcity value  (shadow price) of  the water in  the system.  Alternative
mechanisms could be employed to  achieve optimal water allocation.  One mechanism
would be to  charge the marginal scarcity value of water in the system for each
type of use.  The other mechanism would be to allocate to  each user of
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water the optimal quantity, whereas the actual price paid by users  could be less
than or equal to the marginal scarcity value of water in the system.  If  the
users paid  less than the shadow price of water, they would be capturing part
of  the economic rent associated with irrigation.
In an irrigation system with storage  (reservoir) capacity the manager of
the system must be concerned with the allocation of water among farms, among
crops,  and between crop seasons or even crop years.  The supply of water in any
particular crop season may not be treated as  fixed because water might be carried
over from one crop season to  the next.  The calculation of the optimal distribu-
tion of water is a problem in intertemporal allocation.
The efficiency of  an irrigation system can be increased through either improve-
ment of the management of  the system or  improvement of  the physical design of the
system.  Both types of  improvements may be desirable.  However, there may be  some
degree of  substitution between management and design dimensions of a system.
A great deal has been written about the importance of  increasing the effi-
ciency of water use in irrigation in Asia, particularly with respect to  canal irri-
gation systems  [Asian Development Bank, 1969, 1973;  International Rice Research
Institute, 1973;  Ministry of  Irrigation and Power, 1972;  International Rice Research
Institute and College of Agriculture of  the University of  the Philippines, 1969].
Improved efficiency in water use is judged  to be an important source of  growth in
agricultural output and productivity and  is of  particular importance in most countries
of Asia, where land  is a scarce factor of  production.  There are compelling reasons
to  economize on or  to increase  the productivity of land in relation to  the more abun-
dant  factors, most notably labor.  Expanding the  irrigated area and improving the
efficiency of water use are  two ways of increasing land productivity, which as yet
have not proven to be simple matters.
Increasingly, it is being recognized  that efficient canal irrigation systems
are very complex entities  involving interrelationships among economic, technical,
and administrative factors.  A recent publication [International Rice Research
Institute, 1973, pp. v, vii]  summarizes well the complexities involved:
If the irrigation system is  to be effective, the farmer must be
able  to depend on getting the water when he needs it.  This requires
an administrative mechanism that can build and maintain physical struc-
tures for providing water--dams, canals, ditches,  and pumping systems.
At the same time, it  requires a mechanism to  insure fair allocation and
efficient use of water among farmers.  Maintenance of  the physical
structures can be confused with management of the system because these
two  tasks often merge in the hands of one individual  (e.g.,  the ditch-
tender).  Thus  the ways in which the  tasks  differ, and the different
talents they require, often go  unnoticed.
One prerequisite for sound management of an irrigation system is a
set of  procedures for keeping continuously informed about the farmer's
situation--the size of his farm, cropping patterns, soil characteristics,
the availability of water  from other sources,  etc.  Representing the
farmer's interests in water management decisions calls for an ingenuity
that is not yet in evidence in the management of many irrigation systems.
Some administrative functions performed by government or professional
bodies also require reciprocal cooperation and action from the farmer.
Where these responses are essential to management success, there is  a
need to  find policies  and mechanisms of  the administrative body which
would  help  to  secure  them.31
Good water management, and especially good management of  irri-
gation projects, requires a balance of  at least four kinds of  inputs:
physical facilities,  inputs  of  scientific and  technical knowledge,
management inputs,  and inputs  of  current information and data.  And,
the management of these inputs will have to be adapted to  the cultural
and political settings in which irrigation systems operate.  It is
wasteful  to make investments in ways that put some of these factors
far ahead or far behind the others.  What steps can be taken to  analyze
systems  to  see how well these ingredients  are balanced and to  identify
and  correct points of imbalance?  Development of human resources  is  clearly
an issue here ...
This paper attempts to  describe the operation of  canal irrigation systems
in Taiwan, judged by many people to be quite efficient with respect  to water use.
The focus will be on how economical, technical, and administrative factors have
been incorporated into the management of these irrigation systems  to yield a
high level of efficiency of water use.  The factors judged  to be important
have been distilled from available literature.  No attempt has been made to eval-
uate empirically  the relative importance of  each of  these factors or  the precise
way in which they are handled.  These are subjects for future work.  Nor is it
feasible in  this paper to  compare the operation of  irrigation systems  in Taiwan
with  those in other countries.  By implication, however, all of  the factors
critical to  the successful management of  an irrigation system discussed for
Taiwan are not present in full measure in most other  countries.
An examination of the management of irrigation systems  in Taiwan reveals
four factors that  seem to contribute strongly to  efficient management of the
systems.  These factors, which are different from what one  finds in most other
countries of Asia, seem to  be highly interrelated, which makes it difficult  to
evaluate  the contribution of one in isolation from the contributions of  the
others.
First, in order to  increase agricultural production, Taiwan has recognized
water as  a scarce factor of production to  be used as  efficiently as  possible.
Second,  the national government of  Taiwan has  evolved a basis for centralized
planning of  irrigation investments and at the same time decentralized manage-
ment of  the systems.  This was true until 1975.  During 1975 the national
government took several steps which appear  to restrict the degree of  decentral-
ization in the management of  irrigation systems.  Our concern in this  is with
the development of  irrigation systems  in Taiwan up to  1975.  Planning of new
investments by the central authorities was important  to ensure rational alloca-
tions of resources among all  categories of  development expenditures.  However,
responsibility  for management of  irrigation systems was given to those who
directly benefited from irrigation.  The mechanism used was the cooperative
irrigation association.  Users of water have participated in the  planning  and
management of irrigation systems.  Third, within the irrigation associations,
information systems were developed which permitted  the exchange of agronomic and
engineering information between the users of  the water and  the managers of the
system.  These information systems were and still are especially important because
water is  administratively allocated  to  the users on the basis of  some calculation
of  the  scarcity value of  water;  prices actually charged do not play a major role
in the allocation of  water among users.  The information systems also facilitated
continued improvements in the physical design of  irrigation systems and in the
agricultural production technologies used by farmers.  Fourth, the irrigation
associations employ systems of  incentives  for both managers of irrigation systems32
and users of  the water which appear to be compatible with the efficient use of
water.
2.  Clear  and  Effective  Policy  to  Increase
Agricultural Output
One of  the essential principles which contributes to  efficient irrigation
systems as well as  to rapid growth in agricultural output is a clear and effec-
tive set of  policies  that place high priority on agricultural development and
that recognize water as a scarce factor of production.  Historically, in many
countries of Asia, either strong emphasis on agricultural development was lacking,
or  if agriculture was emphasized, water was not visualized as a scarce factor.
Levine and Wickham  [1975]  point out that a great deal of  the irrigation in Asia
was developed to  provide supplemental water during the wet season at which time
expected rainfall is  almost equal to total crop requirements but is unevenly dis-
tributed throughout the growing season.  In this approach to  irrigation, water is
not viewed as a scarce factor to  be managed intensively.
Taiwan has emphasized agricultural development and has treated water as a
scarce factor of production, at  least since about 1920.  The early impetus for
these policies came from Japan, ruler of Taiwan from 1895 to  the end of World
War II.  The long-run strategy of Japan was to supply the Japanese market by
developing the agriculture of Taiwan.  Heavy emphasis was placed on increasing
the production of  sugar cane and rice  [Ho,  1971].  During the first two decades
of the twentieth century there was a decline in  the rate of growth in rice pro-
duction in Japan, while demand for rice continued  to grow rapidly.  This resulted
in rapidly rising rice prices and  the rice riot of 1918.  The Japanese government
adopted a policy  to develop Taiwan into a major exporter of rice.  (Sugar cane
production was also emphasized  to meet the import needs of Japan and to  free
foreign exchange for industrial development.)
The Japanese strategy to  increase rice exports from Taiwan relied on two
basic policies.  One set  of policies was highly exploitative.  It  reduced the
incomes of Taiwan farmers through heavy taxation and forced Taiwanese to  substi-
tute sweet potatoes and other  'inferior' foods for rice in their diets.  The
other set of policies was directed at increasing agricultural productivity through
programs of  investment in irrigation and water control, research and  extension
to diffuse high-yielding Japanese rice varieties adapted to  local conditions in
Taiwan and institutional development to support the development of a more produc-
tive agriculture.  These efforts yielded a tremendous  surplus of  rice for the
Japanese market  [Hayami and Ruttan, 1970, pp. 570-571].
Lee  [1971]  has described the period 1895-1930 as one in which the economic
and social basis  for future agricultural growth was established by relying heavily
on strong measures of force rather than on economic incentives  [Lee, 1971, pp.  39-42]:
Development programs  emphasized both material input as well as insti-
tutional organization.  Emphasis was placed on heavy investment in infrastruc-
ture, such as communications, transportation, harbors, power, education,
general public health, flood control, and irrigation  ...  Institutional and
organizational reforms were imposed on the administrative system, land
tenure system, monetary and fiscal system, and farmers'  associations.33
Irrigation came under government control in 1901.  Before that
date, irrigation projects consisted largely of repairing damaged
canals,  but now expansion of paddy land and protection from the
hazard of drought were the main goals of  the program.  Institutional
roles underwent significant changes  in this period with the creation
of  the landlord class  ...  They were convinced  that agricultural improve-
ment was to  their benefit under the new land-tenure system and land-tax
payment.  They were  encouraged to direct villagers to  adopt new seed
varieties and better cultivation methods... The farmers' positive re-
sponse  to new technology, in  this period, was pervasive, largely because
of  the influence of  the landlord class and the government.
The profitability of  the new technology, however, was not broadly
recognized by cultivators until 1922, when the new variety of Pon-lai
rice appeared and previous investment  in agriculture began to  show results.
The process  of  altering the old cultivation methods and  the extension
of  the use of  the new varieties  ...  was not characterized by persua-
sion, but rather by government enforcement.  Police stayed  in the local
communities and effectively participated in agricultural extension
services.
The period 1931-1940 saw a continuation of basic developments, infrastruc-
tural,  technological, and institutional, but with one major difference:  the
activities of Taiwanese farmers were guided more by economic incentives than
by force  [Lee,  1971, pp. 42-43].
In the post-World War II  period, agricultural development was concerned
with the recovery and rehabilitation of agriculture from the damage and neglect
which occurred during World War II  and with the sustained growth of agricultural
output at rapid rates beyond the period of  recovery.  The government of Taiwan
recognized the fact  that rapid agricultural development was essential to  create
a domestic surplus and  the foreign exchange earnings required to  finance indus-
trial development.  Strong emphasis was  given to  the development of  infrastructure,
including irrigation and water  control, institutions, technology, and economic
incentives.  And this emphasis did  create large amounts of  resources for indus-
trial development.  Taiwan also benefited from large amounts of  foreign aid  from
the United States.  It is significant  that this aid did not seem to lessen the
efforts of Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources for development  [Lee and
Hsieh, 1971].
Ko and Levine  [1972]  state that in 1895  there were 107,716 ha.of land  in
Taiwan irrigated by canals and ponds.  During the next 50 yr.the irrigated area
was expanded  to  561,999 ha.  In recent years there have been 540,000 ha of irri-
gated  land, which accounts  for about 60%  of  the total cultivated area.
There have existed since 1895,  and especially since 1920, clear policies  to
increase agricultural output in which water was recognized as an important and
scarce factor.  Further,  the development of  irrigation and the control of water
were necessary to exploit  the output potential of high-yielding fertilizer
responsive varieties of  rice and other crops  [Ishikawa, 1967, pp.  108-109].
These policies were not mere pronouncements by governments.  Rather, they were
policies which were  implemented with considerable vigor.  There was a clear
recognition by all levels of  government in both Japan and Taiwan that investments
on a broad front were necessary to  increase agricultural productivity and to
generate a surplus to  finance industrial development  [Falcon, 1974].34
3. Centralization of Planning and Decentralization
of Operations of Irrigation
It may be important  to distinguish between the optimum level of  centraliza-
tion in decision making for planning of  investments in irrigation systems and
the optimum level for operating a system.  In many countries  of Asia, government
agencies responsible for planning new investments in irrigation systems also
have the responsibility for operating these systems.  The skills  required and the
criteria used for planning and constructing new systems are not necessarily those
needed  to operate a system efficiently.  Levine and Wickham  [1975] make this
same point with respect  to  the distinction between operation and maintenance
of a system.  The distinction between the two functions in terms  of  skills and
criteria is not always recognized.
Explicit recognition of the need for centralized planning but decentralized
management of  irrigation systems has  evolved in Taiwan.  The planning of  new
irrigation systems or  the improvement  of  old systems was guided by  the policy
objectives discussed  in the previous section.  There was a fairly clear basis
for assessing the social value of additional agricultural output, particularly
rice.  The demand and price structure for rice was reasonably well understood
both in  Japan prior  to World War II and in Taiwan in the postwar period.  The
cost of  improving and expanding irrigation was also well known.  The social costs
of  and returns to  irrigation development had to be evaluated in relation to other
investments, especially in the nonagricultural sector, since government provided
a substantial part  of  the capital used to construct or improve irrigation
systems.  Centralized planning of water resource development was required to
allocate development resources  efficiently among alternative investments.
However, the skills of  farmers and local government officials, supplemented by
a limited number of  technical and administrative personnel provided by the
central government, could be used  to manage irrigation systems.  Mechanisms to
utilize local personnel in the management function were developed which reduced
the administrative burden on the central government and gave farmers a  vested
interest in how well the systems were operated.
The separation of responsibilities for planning and management is reflected
in  the national laws governing the use of water and the assignment of legal
responsibilities  for different functions.  The national water law is fairly
comprehensive, covering most relevant aspects of water resource use for  all pur-
poses.  A detailed description of the law is contained in"Water Law of  the Republic
of  China',' promulgated by the Chinese national government on July 7, 1942, as
amended on November 29,  1963, and promulgated on December 10, 1963.  The law
governs the control and utilization of  surface water or groundwater with respect
to  flood control, tide control, irrigation, drainage, leaching of injurious salts,
soil conservation, storage of water, water supply for human and industrial con-
sumption, harbor construction, water transportation, and  development  of  hydro-
electric power.
The law stipulates which agencies of government, referred  to as water con-
servancy agencies, have responsibilities for the planning, the development,
and/or the regulation of water use.  These agencies are specified at  the central,
provincial, and municipal levels of government.  The law also defines water
rights, i.e.,  the legal rights that persons individually or  collectively have to
the use of  surface water or groundwater.  As a part of  the water rights, priority
is  assigned to various uses of water.  These priority uses, in descending order
of  importance, are domestic use and public water supply, agricultural use,35
power use, industrial use, water  transport, and other purposes.  It is not
clear that the ranking of  priorities  for water use corresponds to a ranking
of the marginal value products for water in these different uses.  For  example,
the rapid growth of  industrialization in Taiwan may have resulted in the mar-
ginal productivity of water for power and for industrial use being higher than
the marginal productivity in agriculture.  Provision is also made for  the
transfer of  water rights among individuals  and organizations, private or govern-
mental.  With the growth of  urban areas and industrialization, water has been
transferred from agriculture to human, industrial, and power uses.
Procedures are also specified for the development of water utilization
or  conservation projects, the protection and maintenance of  water structures,
and  the assessment of  penalties for violations of the water law.
The national .water  law provides a basis  for  the central, provincial, and
municipal governments to  plan the development of water resources in Taiwan
with respect to  all uses of water resources.  Theoretically,  at least, this
form of  centralized, or governmental, control over the development and use of
water resources should yield  results consistent with national  economic and
social objectives.  And we suspect that there is  in practice a reasonably high
degree  of  performance.
With respect to  irrigation, and possibly other uses  of water as well, the
national water law provides for the management of  irrigation systems to be con-
ducted by autonomous local organizations in the form of irrigation associations.
In addition to  the national water law there are separate regulations governing
the establishment and operation of  irrigation associations.  (These are found in
"General Rules Governing  the Organization of  Irrigation Associations," promul-
gated by presidential decree on July 2, 1965, and revised and promulgated by
presidential decree on February 9, 1970, by unofficial  translation.)  These asso-
ciations are self-governing corporate bodies organized by users of water for
construction and operation of  irrigation facilities.  The associations are
cooperative in nature and are operated by those who use water for  their own
benefit.  In  the late 1960's  there were 26  such associations  in Taiwan,
covering 464,872 ha.of irrigated  farmland  [Takase and Kano, 1969, p.537].
The concept of  cooperative irrigation associations was developed  in Japan
and introduced into Taiwan during the period of Japanese rule.  In Japan the
Irrigation Association Law was passed in 1899.  This law together with the
Land Improvement Law of  1949 provided  the basis for farmers' organizations
engaging  in the construction, operation, and maintenance of  irrigation
facilities  [Fukuda, 1973,  p.205].
Either a group of  farmers or  the government may  take the initiative in esta-
blishing an irrigation association.  Proposed irrigation projects must be
approved by appropriate governmental agencies.  Once established,  the responsibi-
lities of the association include  the construction, improvement, operation,
and maintenance of  irrigation projects,  the prevention of damage  to  facilities,
the financing, the study and further development of systems, and  the performance
of any other duties entrusted by appropriate authorities under law.
The members of  an irrigation association are entitled  to  irrigation water
and other benefits and are required  to pay  fees and perform certain duties  for
the association.  Noncompliance of a member with the obligations  imposed on
him by laws and regulations can lead  to a  suspension of rights  to water and
other benefits.36
While members of the irrigation association are entitled to  receive water,
this does not mean that each member receives all the water he desires in any
given crop  season or  that he receives it in all crop seasons.  Clearly, when there
is  not enough water in the system to meet total needs and the water available
is  allocated efficiently, some users will receive only a part of  the water they
desire, and some producers will not receive any water  in certain years.  But as
will be discussed in the next section, users know the quantity of water they
will  receive  before  planting  decisions  are  made.
The government has borne part of  the construction costs of irrigation
systems, as much as  50% in some instances.  The remainder of  the construction
costs and the operating expenses of a system are paid  for by the membership of
the irrigation association.  Usually, separate schedules of fees exist for
construction and engineering costs and for operating costs.  The fees are
based on  the approximate amount of water used.
It is  not clear how well the water fees reflect the scarcity value of
water in the system or how the fees are actually set.  This is  an important
topic for which more research is needed.  Are the special fees covering construc-
tion and engineering costs set to  cover the full cost of these activities
incurred by the irrigation?  Are the regular fees, which supposedly cover the
operating costs of  the system, based on average or marginal operating costs?
The association membership elects a general assembly which has  the re-
sponsibility for formulating the policies and operating rules.  The policies
and directives of  the general assembly are carried out by the staff of the
association.  Staff members may be either hired by the association or appointed
by  an  appropriate  government  agency,  depending  on  the  functions  to  be  performed
and  the skills required.  Even employees appointed by a government agency are
responsible in large measure to  the governing body of  the association.
4.  Integration  of Agronomic and  Engineering
Information  onto  Management  of
Irrigation Systems
One  outstanding  characteristic  of  irrigation  associations  in  Taiwan  is  an
information exchange system between water users and managers of  the system.  The
formal  handling  of  information  is  important  not  only  to  the  management  of  a system
of  a  given  physical  design  but  also  to  the  improvement  of  efficiency of water
use by changing the design of systems.  The design and management of irrigation
systems have an influence upon each other.  According to  Levine and Wickham
[1975, p. 3]:
Management must be organized around  the physical components  of  a
system, which are specified by design.  Certain management practices
are precluded by some design choices while others are favored.  Rota-
tional irrigation at  the turnout cannot be practiced if  farm ditches
are not provided  in the design.  Management's  influence on design is
less obvious but equally important.  Shortcomings commonly attributed
to poor design can sometimes be alleviated by intensive and dedicated
system management ...  No design can be considered ideal in a permanent
sense, and an evolving management program is  necessary to continually
bring out  the fullest potential of a system and  to identify appropriate37
changes  in the physical system.  Evaluations of different manage-
ment  priorities  in  existing  systems  will  also  provide  excellent
information to  serve as a base for design choices for future systems.
Irrigation associations have developed the capacity to integrate information
and technology concerning  crop production and  engineering design into the manage-
ment practices used  in distributing water.  Mechanisms have been devised which
facilitate the flow of  information between farmers and system managers on a timely
basis.  These informational mechanisms contribute to an efficient allocation of
water and reduce the uncertainty of  the availability of water to farmers.
It was recognized some time ago, probably in the 1920's or  earlier, that a
high degree of  certainty of  water supply to  farmers could lead to more efficient
use of  water in rice production.  Increased certainty of water supply to farmers
involves both the amount of  water supplied and  the time during the growing  season
when it is received.
The rice plant  tolerates and thrives on large amounts of water.  As a minimum,
the soil should be saturated fully with water during the growing season.  However,
the plant will tolerate standing water in the paddy fields,  the depth depending
on the height of  the plant.  Standing water is  also an important form of weed
control.  The fields are drained  and allowed to dry just prior to harvest  time.
The need  for a high degree of  control can be traced to  the particular nature
of  the water response function for rice.  More detailed discussions of  the water
response  function for rice are reported by Barker  [1970]  and Reyes 11973].  A
typical function is  illustrated in Figure 1.  Too much water in the paddy fields
will cause  the yield response curve to  decline.  This portion of the response
curve  is  not  shown  in  Figure  1.
The shape of  the water response function can result in sharply asymmetrical
effects on rice yields of  given absolute changes  in the level of water application
about some given  level such  as W0 . If  farmers  face uncertainty in  the amount of
water they will receive  in any  time period,  they will tend to apply water at some
rate higher than W0  in order  to minimize losses in yields.  They can do this by
permitting a greater depth of  standing water in the rice fields,  i.e.,  by main-










deeper wAter haa in the control of  weeds.  To  the extent that the total supply
of water available  in an irrigation system is  limited, excessive use of water
by some farmers will result in reduced availability to others.  Such a situation
will not  lead  to  the optimum allocation of water throughout the irrigation system.
Farmers will try  to  get as much water as possible if  the variance in their
water supply is  large.  They may  try to  obtain an average amount of water which
may exceed the level of W  in Figure 1 in order  to minimize the risk of opera-
ting to the left of W0 . Thus the larger the degree of uncertainty in the supply
of water, the more farmers will use on the average.  Conversely, reducing  the
variance in water availability can reduce the average amount of water used per
hectare of  land without necessarily reducing the output per hectare.
Information developed about the nature of the water response function for
rice provided convincing evidence that reducing the variance in the amount of
water  to farmers  could increase the total area irrigated from a given total
supply of water.  This information was used to modify the physical design of
irrigation systems and management practices used to deliver water to  farmers.
There was also another important set of new information which had a profound
impact on the design and management of irrigation systems and the efficiency of
water use.  This was the discovery through experimentation that rice did not
require a continuous  stand of water during the growing season and  that a continuous
flow of water through the rice fields is not necessary.  As a result of this
information, the rotational system of irrigation, which led to a large increase
in efficiency of water use within each irrigation system, was developed, and
the design of the systems was modified to provide controlled delivery of water
to  individual farms and fields.  A larger area could be irrigated without
increasing  the water supply  [Vandermeer,  1968;  Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruc-
tion, 1968;  Tsui-Yuan, 1965].
In a system of rotational irrigation, each farmer receives water at regular
intervals, for  example, once every 5 days.  The amount of water received and  the
length of  the rotation interval are sufficient  to provide  the necessary amount of
water for maximizing the yield response of  the farmer's crops but not in excess
of  that  amount.  The delivery of  water and  the length of  the rotation interval
are based on the requirements during different parts of  the growing season.  These
requirements will depend on the requirements of  the plants, amount of rainfall,
nature of  the soil with respect  to  its ability  to hold water, etc.
Another form of  rotational irrigation deals with the distribution of water
among farmers when the supply of water is regularly insufficient to irrigate all
the land in a system.  In this situation  the whole system may be divided into
several large parts, each part taking its  turn receiving water from one crop sea-
son to another or  from one year  to another.
Increasing the certainty of water supply to  individual farmers and adopting
the system of rotational  irrigation have greatly reduced one type of externality
common to most irrigation systems,  the stealing of water fVandermeer,  1971].  In-
creasing the certainty with which individual farmers receive water when needed
reduces  the incentive to steal, since an individual farmer can rely on the system
to provide the water he needs.  Rotational irrigation also makes it more difficult
for farmers to steal water,  since it  is no longer continuously available in the
ditches serving  their fields.39
Related tQ  the two  developments in irrigation just discussed was the evo-
lution of  an  information system which permits managers of  systems  and users  of
water  to exchange  information about water needs and availabilities and to evolve
water use plans which result in technically efficient utilization of the available
water.  In its simplest form, farmers announce their water needs  to the irriga-
tion association prior to  planting  their crops.  The irrigation association estimates
the amount of water available for irrigation from reservoir storage, streamflow,
and groundwater at the start of a crop season.  If  the  total amount of water is
insufficient  to irrigate all  the land in a system, the allocations to  individual
farmers are such  that they achieve  the most efficient use of water for each
hectare actually irrigated.
At  times the  initial estimate of water availability and  the estimated irrigated
acreage are too high.  This may be due, for example,  to below normal rainfall
during the period of  irrigation, which both reduces  the amount of water available
to  the system through streamflow and  increases the amount of  irrigation water
needed by farmers  to compensate for lower rainfall.  In such situations a new set
of  calculations is  performed on  the basis of  the two-way flow of  information
between system managers and farmers, which results in a new allocation plan
designed to maximize rice production from the available water supply.
It might be in the interest of  individual farmers  to inflate  their estimates
of water needs  in order to ensure getting all  the water they want.  However, this
is difficult to do  in a situation where those responsible for  the allocation of
water know  (1) the size of either individual  farms or fields,  (2) the nature of
the soils in these fields as  it  affects water requirements, and  (3) the parameters
of  the water response function.  It  is not easy for Taiwan farmers  to  lie about
their water needs because the above information is  available to  system managers.
It should also be obvious that in other places where  this  type of  information is
not available to  system managers, farmers are  in a  position to exaggerate water
needs and,  in the process, to  reduce the overall efficiency of water allocation.
The available literature does not  indicate the precise basis used to deter-
mine how much water each user receives during each crop season.  In the simple
case, where only one crop such as  rice is grown,  it is not  clear whether each user
gets  the same amount of water regardless of  the size of each farm or whether water
is  allocated among farms  in proportion to  farm size.  This would not be an impor-
tant problem if  all farms were about  the same size.  But typically, this  is  not
the  case.  This  issue  needs  further  investigation.
The actual allocation procedure is much more complex than the simplified
example just presented.  Farmers usually grow several  crops with varying needs for
water.  The irrigation association has  to  take into account  the water needs of
these different crops.  Furthermore, the cropping patterns utilized by farmers
are based heavily on the way  the irrigation association allocates water.  However,
rice is usually considered the primary crop  and has  a priority claim on available
water.
The information system internal to  the irrigation association seems  to have
led to  an efficient allocation of water supplies in situations where the agricul-
tural technology and  the physical design of  the systems are stable.  But  the
information system also played an important role in facilitating dynamic change
in the irrigation systems with respect to  the introduction of new agricultural40
technology and the redesign of  physical features of  the water distribution
facilities.
Taiwan has a well-developed system of agricultural research and extension
capable of developing viable new agricultural technologies and demonstrating
their use under farm conditions.  In other words, new technologies can be deli-
vered from research stations directly to  farmers.  In irrigated areas, farmers
who are members of  irrigation associations are also members of, or have direct
access  to,  organizations concerned with the dissemination of new agricultural
technologies or new production inputs.  If  farmers  individually or collectively
decide  to use new technologies or  inputs and  these require different patterns of
water use from the old ones,  this  information can be transmitted to the managers
of  irrigation systems.  The irrigation managers  then calculate new water delivery
plans.  Through the interaction between farmers and the managers of the irriga-
tion systems, irrigation bottlenecks  to  the adoption of new technologies are
minimized.
This  same information mechanism is  used to  change the physical structure
of  irrigation systems.  These changes may involve substantial investments by the
irrigation association.  They can include expansion of water storage capacity,
extension of the area receiving water from the system, and redesign and improve-
ment of  the existing water delivery system.  Information concerning changes in
the irrigation potential of a system is  conveyed to  farmers who use this  informa-
tion to  decide through their elected representatives  in the irrigation association
whether or not to  carry out suggested improvements.  If  such improvements are made,
desired changes  in cropping patterns can be  communicated to managers of  the system.
A new water delivery plan can be evolved through an iterative exchange of  informa-
tion between farmers and the managers of  the irrigation systems.
5. Incentives
We have indicated that  the management of  irrigation systems  in Taiwan appears
to be responsive to  the water needs of  farmers and  to changes in agricultural
technology, as well as  to  the need for making improvements in the physical per-
formance of  the systems.  These characteristics  of the irrigation systems of
Taiwan (and a few other countries)  stand in sharp contrast to what one finds
in most other countries of Asia.  What accounts for these sharp differences?
A distinctive feature of  the irrigation of Taiwan is that the systems are
essentially owned and managed by the farmer-users of the water.  Thus  the managers
of  the irrigation systems work for the farmers.  The irrigation associations, which
are farmer cooperatives, can hire or fire managers depending upon their performance.
Even when some members of management are appointed by government, they are expected
to  be responsive to  the needs and desires of  the members of  the irrigation asso-
ciation.
The relationship between the management of  the irrigation systems and  the
farmer-users found in Taiwan is markedly different  from that which exists  in many
other countries.  In most countries the irrigation systems are built and managed
by the national or  state  (provincial) governments.  The appropriate government
unit hires and  (rarely) fires management.  The farmers who use or wish to use the
irrigation water have little direct control over  the performance of  the managers.41
This weak linkage between management and farmers can and does lead to  inefficient
distribution of water and makes it difficult to  adjust water distribution to
changes  in technology or  to  changes in  the design of the systems, which other-
wise might be implemented to  improve their efficiency.
In the case of  Taiwan the rewards  to management are determined by the elected
representatives  of  the members of  irrigation associations.  And there is  evidence
that irrigation associations do reward good management and do penalize poor
management.  The reward structure includes  financial returns to management,
promotions, and nonmonetary recognitions such as  prizes,  In contrast, systems
where management is  divorced from the users of water have incentive structures
for management which are usually not linked,  or are linked weakly, to  the opera-
ting efficiency of the irrigation system.
Emphasis on personnel efficiency and rewards is  explicit.  Irrigation asso-
ciations  are encouraged to  have well-established  personnel policies which provide
job security, adequate financial rewards, and attractive retirement programs.
Employees  are also provided with considerable amounts of training to help  them
master the  technical and managerial tasks they are expected to  perform, as well
as  to understand the water needs  of  farmers  [Tsui-Yuan, 1965].
Part  of the incentive structure consists of a variety of  contests in which
employees of  irrigation associations participate.  These contests involve both
financial and nonfinancial rewards and are interestingly symmetric in their reward
structure.  An example of  grade evaluation and rewards is  given in Table 1 [Joint
Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1968].
Another important aspect  of  the incentive system is  the interrelationship
between the collection of  irrigation fees and  financing the operations of  an irri-
gation association.  The operating budget of  an irrigation association depends
directly on the collection of water fees from farmers.  In order to preserve their
jobs,  the technical and administrative staffs of  an irrigation association have a
strong interest in ensuring  the collection of  fees.  If  collections are poor,
revenue will not be adequate  to cover operating costs and will eventually result
in a reduction in  the size of  the staff of  the association JWickham et al.,  1974;
Ko  and  Levine,  1972].
TABLE 1.  Grade Evaluation and Prize and Punishment
Points  Grade  Action
Award of prize in document,
Above 80  A  money, or souvenir.
70-79  a  Award of price in money or
souvenir.
60-69  C  No prize  (or punishment)
.
Below 60  D  Punishment upon consultation.42
The willingness of  farmers  to pay their fees depends heavily on how well
the irrigation associations are operated, i.e.,  the amount and timeliness of
water received.  The better the system is managed, the more willing the farmers
will be to pay their fees.  This is  also true for voluntary farmer participation
in certain operations of  the system, such as  controlling the release of water
into fields, performing maintenance work on the portion of  the system located
near their  farms, etc.  Thus job security levels of remuneration for manage-
ment personnel are  tied directly to  how well a system is managed.
6. Implications for Other Countries
We have tried to  distill a set of economic and management principles which
appear  to explain  the high level of  efficiency of  irrigation systems in Taiwan.
However, we have not indicated the  true complexity of  irrigation systems  and
irrigated crop production found in Taiwan today with which the management of these
systems must contend.  One source of  complexity grows out of  the size of some of
the systems.  The Chainan Irrigation Association serves an area of approximately
150,000 ha.,containing probably about the same number of farmers.  Another  source
of complexity is the complicated cropping systems  that tarmers follow involving
several crops,  each with a different  length of growing season and with different
water requirements.  It should be obvious  that the structure of management and
the information required to run efficiently large irrigation systems like the
Chainan system must indeed be very complicated.
The management of  irrigation systems in Taiwan is  often used as a model that
other countries, particularly in Asia, might follow.  However, it is  doubtful that
other countries could in a short period of  time achieve anything like the level
of  technical efficiency one finds today in Taiwan.  In most other countries,  one
or more of  the  four prerequisites for successful management discussed above is
missing and could not  easily be established.  Creating strong and effectively
implemented agricultural development policies  that recognize the value of irriga-
tion water will require substantial reordering of development priorities  and
strengthening of administrative services dealing with implementation of develop-
ment plans  and programs.  These changes require a reorientation of national
development policies and programs and will be fraught with all manner of political
problems.  The same can be said for providing legal and administrative bases  for
permitting  centralized planning of  investments in irrigation development but
decentralized management of  the irrigation systems.
The creation of  information and incentive systems within the management
structure of irrigation systems will require considerable research, training of
management staff,  and education of  the users  of water with respect  to  the benefits
to  them of  improved management.  These steps also require considerable time and
effort.
There are also environmental, cultural, and political considerations involved
in trying to  transfer the Taiwan model of  irrigation to other  countries.  The
technical design of irrigation systems, as well as  the development of  certain
management principles in Taiwan,  were  influenced by local environmental conditions,
particularly with respect to  topography, climate, soils, and crop  technology.  One
would expect to  find considerable differences  in these conditions among countries43
as well as within certain countries.  Design and management principles will have
to  be  adjusted  to  specific  environmental  conditions.
The political institutional framework for  the management of irrigation systems
in Taiwan grew out  of a particular political history and cultural setting.  During
the 50-yr.  period of Japanese colonial rule and  the  subsequent 30 yr of  indepen-
dence, strong emphasis was placed on the investments  in technology and infrastructure,
including irrigation, required to  accomplish rapid  rates of  growth in agricultural
output.  These achievements involved  a combination of  incentives  to  farmers and
an ample measure of force.  Furthermore, the  institutions  that were developed  to
implement agricultural development programs, such as  the irrigation association,
seemed to be politically and culturally acceptable in the sense that they elicited
responses from participants that were desired by the governments.  It  is doubtful
that direct transfer  of  the approach in Taiwan to  the development and management
of irrigation systems would yield beneficial results in other political and cul-
tural settings.  The Taiwan experience would  have to be molded and adapted to
conditions  prevailing  in  other  countries.
The relevance of  the Taiwan experience to  other countries lies in the recogni-
tion of  the importance of the economic and management principles we have discussed
and  the key interrelations among at least some of them.  The further development
and  formalization of  these principles need not be limited to  specific country
situations.  However, their applications will have to  take account of  the political,
institutional, cultural, and technological circumstances that one finds in
individual  countries.
As was already pointed  out by Levine and Wickham [1975],  improvements in the
design and management of  irrigation systems will under the best of  circumstances
be a continuous process involving a series of  numerous small but significant
improvements.  It might be highly worthwhile therefore to study in detail the evo-
lution of  irrigation management in Taiwan since about 1920,  paying particular
attention to  each improvement that was introduced, the technical and economic
forces  that created the basis  for each change, and the institutional response re-
sponse required to make each change effective.  This kind of  detailed sequential
history of  the evolution of  current irrigation management  in Taiwan might provide
useful insights as to how to  proceed in other countries.  One could  compare the
current state of irrigation technology and management in a particular  country to
a comparable period  in the history of Taiwan.  The focus would be on how the
relevant principles  of successful management in a particular period  in Taiwan
might be transferred and adapted to  conditions prevailing in other  countries.
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IV. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ABEL'S COMMENTS ON TAIWAN IRRIGATION1/
ABEL:  Someone raised a question about water allocation.  The area irrigated may
be divided into three parts.  Area A has  an assured supply of water while area B
may get water some years  and may not  get water in other years, depending on the
reservoir level, which is dependent on rainfall.  They try to  inform the peasants
as much before planting time as possible concerning the quantity of water they can
expect.  Let us assume that area C will not get any water for irrigation.  The
important-thing is that  the peasant knows  this before he plants his crop.  He does
not plant a rice crop in area C hoping  to get water, because he knows there is no
water.
The water fees are different between area A and B.  Second, the land tax is different
because  the land value on which the  tax is based differs from A to B to C.  Area A
would be taxed more heavily  than area B either with a higher rate or  a given rate
applied to higher value, and B would be taxed more heavily than area C.  As  they
have improved the supply of water and made other improvements  these boundary lines
have  been  changed.
WICKHAM:  What I have observed  in Taiwan is  that the  areas within the system
receiving water are not  static.  There is  a rotation of  these areas.
ABEL:  That  is another aspect of  their rotational system.
WICKHAM:  The rotation gets around the objection that you wind up with farmers
with a set management capability in one area with a given amount of water.
ABEL:  In some systems they do follow a three-year rotation.  Suppose there  is
enough water to  irrigate 1/3 of  the total area.  In year 1, area A will get irri-
gation, B and C will get none.  In year 2, B would get irrigation, and so on.
You may in many years have enough water for A, B and C to have a crop.  In the
next year you may have enough for B and  C.  In fact,  there  is very little area
which never gets any water.  In year  1, area A has enough water  to grow a rice crop,
area B does not have that much but  enough for a crop of  sugar  cane. Area C gets a supply
equal  to 1/5 of the need for a rice crop which is  enough for a few low-intensity
crops.
GOLAN:  How would these farmers compare under similar conditions with a farmer in
the Philippines or Indonesia?  I maintain that it is  considerably better,  so there
must be something else besides  this management system that explains why he gets
higher yields.
ABEL:  But that  is  not the question I am asking.
GOLAN:  You are asking how come he  is  so much more efficient?  I am saying there
are many other things you have not discussed which will explain why he gets high
/  Since Abel's comments on Taiwan's  irrigation were expanded and subsequently
published and are reprinted in these proceedings,  some of  the discussion is
omitted which is  no longer relevant.47
yields.  It might be the  price ratio between fertilizer  and the crop.
ABEL:  I  am-not using the term  "efficiency" now  in  terms  of  cross-country  compari-
son of productivity.
GOLAN:  Maybe I fail  to understand the point.  This particular system gives you
what?
ABEL:  What  I  am  concerned  with  is  trying  to  determine  what  appears  to  be some  of
the  important  factors  that  explained why irrigation systems in Taiwan seem  to  work
well.  I  am  not  saying  that  mine  are  the  only  four  reasons,
GOLAN:  Work in what respect?  What  do  you  mean  when  you say work?
ABEL:  The system seems to work well in that given  the technology and management
they are going to maximize output in a command area from  the amount of water they
have  available.  That will  not  be  the  same  level  of  output  as  you  would  get  from
a different set of plant varieties, and different  levels of management  practices.
GOLAN:  Compare  the Indian farmer who has a tube well where he is  his own manager
and makes all his own decisions, or take the Philippines where you have a communal
system, 150 hectares, where they made their own decisions.  They meet all your
requirements and yet when you look at their output  it does not approach the output
of  the Taiwanese.  Why?
ABEL:  You are  confusing two things.  The Indian farmer who has a tube well is  pro-
bably using his water quite efficiently.
GOLAN:  What is  your definition of efficient use of  water?  I am not very clear.
You have to measure it  somehow because if you are talking about  efficiency, you
must have some yardstick of efficiency.  What is  that yardstick?
ABEL:  I am using a command area because you can put a limit on the amount of water.
The yardstick is  to "maximize" physical output with a given amount of water and a
set of production technology.
STATEMENT:  I do not  think Martin is  trying to make a comparison of Taiwan and
other  countries.  Clearly, there are other problems, the environmental questions,
the temperature, and so  on.  All these questions are important, but that is not
his point.  What he  is  trying to do is  to identify four points that seem to work
in Taiwan and which while  they might not work as well in other countries, might
still be four important points.
GOLAN:  But can we not ask what you mean by work?  I am not  impressed that  they
work;  that  is not the crucial issue.  Are you saying in Taiwan if you give a farmer
a certain amount of  fertilizer, assure him a price, and give him a fixed amount of
water, he  will  produce  more rice?
ABEL:  I am not  talking about farmer efficiency.  I am talking about the efficiency
of a system.  I am not  saying that  the Chinese peasant or the Taiwanese peasant  is
more efficient in his use  of water or  is a better farmer than the best Indian farmer
or the best Philippino farmer.  What I am saying is  that for a given amount of water
in the whole system that there is  strong evidence that in Taiwan they have evolved
a set  of mechanisms whereby they achieved technical efficiency for  the system.48
GOLAN:  Do you mean that it  is  technically impossible to grow any more by trans-
ferring any water?
ABEL:  As a bold proposition, that is what I am saying.
GOLAN:  That sounds like a very bold proposition.
ABEL:  It  is but I do not believe that I am exaggerating.  Any other allocation
within the system would lead  to a lower level of agricultural output.
GOLAN:  Could you not improve by lining canals, or making other investments?
ABEL:  That is  different.  They know very well that they are not doing the best
they can do  in all the systems through lining,  re-design and a variety of  invest-
ments.  What I am saying is  that at any point in time  if you take the physical
structure the way it  is  and fix the technology and the management,  then they are
technically efficient.  The whole history of Taiwan is  continuous progress in
improving the efficiency of  these systems through re-design, changes  in technology,
etc.  The interesting question is how they did  it, what were the incentives, what
were  the  signals  they  used.
TIMMONS:  The system you have described gives the farmer more assurance of his
water supply expected for use on his parcel of  land.  With this security, he would
face less uncertainty because of  less variance from the mean.  But how do you
achieve assurance of water supply?  Do you get it by following a more conservative
reservoir management system or by keeping a larger storage reservoir?  What kind of
flexibility do you build  into the plan?
ABEL:  As near as I can tell, the way they do  it is  by controlling  the amount of
water delivered to  a farmer's field in  any given period of  time.  The delivery sched-
ule is  adjusted throughout  the season for variations in rainfall,  If  there is a lot
of rain, they will deliver  less water;  if  there  is below average rain, they will
deliver more.  It is  inherent  in the delivery  system, not in  the reservoir capacity.
TIMMONS:  Also, the information system is  crucial in delivering accurate information
to  the farmer so  he can plan his  cropping system.
ABEL:  As  far  as  an  individual  farmer  is  concerned,  I have drawn  this  in  the  sim-
plest  terms.  An individual farmer may have several crops growing simultaneously,
and only part of his  land may be in rice, the remainder  in other crops.  This infor-
mation is  transmitted  to management  for calculating his water needs, and he will get
so much for his paddy fields and a different amount for each of his other crops.
TIMMONS:  Assume that the farmer decides  to  shift from rice into onions.  Is  he going
to get docked for water because he has  changed?  He would be entitled to  enough water
for rice, but if he decides to  go into something else, can he switch some of  that
water he saved into another crop  or  into another area?
ABEL:  He can do whatever switching he wants  to do.  Each farmer would get the same
amount of water.  It may be that due to differences  in soil characteristics,  or
whatever reason, they may get different yields.  All I am saying is  that they would
strive  to give each farmer the same amount of water per hectare of rice.
GOLAN:  Any system that has  storage can do  it without difficulty and does do it.49
ABEL:  Any system can do it  but not many do  it.  From the farmer's point of view,
he knows prior to planting how much water he is going to  get for his cotton crop.
The same exchange of information takes place in the Turkish system as takes place in
the Taiwan system. That is a terribly important element that  is missing in most
canal irrigation systems  that  I have seen.
When I was in India, there was a scandal in the Gunganauga area.  There was a crop
failure  because  the  canal  managers  decided  it  was  time  to  clean  the  canal.  It  turned
out that  this was before the last one or two critical irrigations for  the crop.  They
shut down  the canal, and  there was a crop failure.
TIMMONS:  I have reservations about the utility of  taking these four points as
verbatim truth of  good irrigation and  say that  they apply anywhere in the world.
ABEL:  The point to  be made is  that  here is  an example of  a society looking at  its
water resources and it has  come up with a systematic methodology for allocating the
water.  The Taiwanese would be among the first to point out  the inadequacies  of their
systems.  One thing is  that there is now a real movement away from so-called farmer
control and back into a more authoritarian system.
V.  DISCUSSION ON THE ROLE OF U.S. UNIVERSITIES
IN  TRAINING  FOR  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
ABEL:  Suppose  we  want  to  train managers  of  irrigation  systems  to  do  a  better  job,
any  place  in  the world.  What I  am  searching  for is  some principle that you could
apply and begin to explain why particular systems work the way they do.  But we are
still faced with "What do you teach them?"
In the context of Taiwan this has two elements.  Certain things are under the control
of the system managers or the farmers.  Certain things are external.  The whole
system of water law (and it  is  enforced as national water law) is an important
piece of  enabling legislation.  No system wrote that water law.  That was done by
society.  The question of  policy (recognizing water as  a scarce output) again is
external to  the system.  There are things  that the manager can do, but there are
things  that go beyond the manager, that society will have to wrestle with.
QUESTION:  As a part of  the training of the student who is going back to become a
manager or watermaster would you teach him programming?
ABEL:  That would not be my  first priority.  It depends where the student  is going.
I would teach a student going back to Taiwan some of  the most sophisticated optimi-
zation techniques.  For someone going back to another LDC, I would not bother even
teaching linear programming.
QUESTION:  What would you teach?
ABEL:  If I were trying to  advise a student who is  going  to operate at  the managerial
level, I would probably recommend not only programming, but also a variety of  opti-
mization techniques in a dynamic setting.  If a student were going  to go  to work
in certain parts of the Philippines or India, I would not stress linear programming
beyond learning the basic concepts.  There needs are more in the nature of  elementary
questions of  organization, of simple management techniques, not the most sophisticated.
If  the student made some progress, I would suggest bringing him or her back for another50
year or two  of study.  We should not  train people the same way for all countries.
STATEMENT:  I was a little surprised  to hear you say that you would train the one
going to Taiwan  in optimization techniques, because that would be most appropriate
where your allocation decisions are centralized.  If you have a  more decentralized
system where the individual operators are more involved, then the training may be
more in organization and  information systems.
ABEL:  You have farmer participation, but  at the reservoir level somebody decides
at the beginning of  the season how much water there is going to be.  Under this
kind of dynamic organization, you could use sophisticated techniques.  But for  systems
in the Philippines it would break down because you do not have the grass roots
responses to make it work.  You do not have control of the water.
No matter how much assurance you give him, the farmer at the end of  the canal knows
he will not get water.  If a  manager came from India, I  would train him in law and
order.  Then he can go  back and make sure  that farmers take only their share of  the
water.  Go  to most  countries and you will find the farmer at the head  of  the canal
gets all  the water he wants, and  the farmer at the end of  the canal does not  get
any.  Optimization is  not going  to do you any good.  The first thing you have to
introduce is  law and order of  an irrigation system.
As you read  the history of irrigation in Taiwan, one of  the issues that was of  con-
cern was  farmers stealing water.  They dealt with that within the incentive struc-
ture.  In Taiwan rewards and penalties could be very great.  Collecting water fees
was another problem.
WICKHAM:  In talking about types  of  training, the point seems  to be, we do not have
enough water  control to use any optimization program.  In such cases the most appro-
priate training would be to  bring water under control.  One thing that involves is
measuring water, both the volume and quantity you have flowing at a given time.
Until you can actually bring water under control and deliver it  to  the ends of the
canals, you do not have to worry about optimization.  Law and order is a further
problem when we are being frustrated  by farmers.  To  be able to  control and measure
the volume of water means additional investment  in the system.  Even without that
investment, you could almost double coverage of an irrigation system by better
policing  the water.
ABEL: A geographer at the University of Wisconsin did aninteresting set of papers on
irrigation in Taiwan.  One of the things that comes out of the Chinese experience
is  that stealing is a function of uncertainty.  As  the Taiwanese were able to build
more certainty into their water delivery system, the amount of stealing went down.
The stealing did not disappear but there was a positive relationship between cer-
tainty and less stealing.
STATEMENT:  Stealing is  a function of  cultural background wherein one has a certain
perception of property rights.  The farmer at the head of the ditch who gets all the
water may not view that as  stealing at all.  Indeed, he is  probably one of the pri-
vileged members of society or else he would not be at the head of the ditch.  If he
did not  start out at  the head of  the ditch, after five years he gets there because
of his power.  He does not call  this stealing at all.  He calls it  getting his  just
due.51
HOWE:  I would like to  come back to  the set  of points that Dan raised  this morning
in regard to  intellectual imperialism.  This becomes much  more relevant when we
start asking, "How  are we going  to  train people?" or "What is going  to be the con-
tent  of  the training?"  I would illustrate this by the dilemma that we have all run
across, where you are working  in a country and the main obstacle to our particular
perception of  efficiency is clearly corruption.  You know that people know how to
run systems, they are highly trained technically, they can optimize and model,
synthesize, simulate, but you know the reason things are not optimized is  that
somebody is getting paid off under the table.  The consultant  is always in a dilemma
in facing these situations  in the sense  that his  technical input can only be a mar-
ginal improvement in the situation, the really big  changes relate to the whole value
system.  When somebody expressed great disappointment at the rate of progress in
improving water resources and planning in a particular country, they said:  "When
they have been 200 years devising a system that  is precisely designed to channel
income into the pockets of  the select few, how can you hope to reform it in six
months of  work?"  How much do we have to get into the value system and how much
do we have to  adjust values?  What is the possibility that the system is one in
which the guy closest to  the canal is  a person perceived by society as being a
person  of  merit  who  has  worked  his way  up  there?  The minister  or  deputy  minister
is  diverting resources in this particular way but after all he has worked his way
up in the system, and now receives his just reward.  Should we get  into issues like
this  either as a consultant  or as a person who purports to  train people from these
countries?
QUESTION:  Chuck, are not you  really talking about  incentives?  Where do  the incen-
tives  lie for the people who are working inside the system.  It  seems  to me these
are just as important as market prices  are when we look at market problems.
HOWE:  I am saying we need to  address these issues, but Ido not know how far to
push them.  If you are afraid to  confront the value systems or criticize the value
systems that appear to be generating corruption or unequal distribution of  income,
then there is really very little you can say.  All you can do  is look at each system
and say, "That is  an interesting system but  you really cannot say it is inefficient,
because  they have their own definition of efficiency and pretty soon you are reduced
to  complete inability to  transmit anything.  Education then is reduced to a very
technical set of  issues  that the person regardless of his beliefs or values may
find useful.  But  is  that the only kind  of  education we can give or do you really
have to  address  the question of value systems?"
I had dinner with Ralph Richardson from The Rockefeller Foundation a couple of
months ago.  He was talking about the long struggle not only with training people,
but with identifying people who would go back and work as educators  or agricultural
agents who would maintain an objective,  scientific approach and not  enter into  the
system of being bought off.  They felt  that  it was important to build up a cadre
of experts who were not only technically expert but who had  an interest in seeing
that  the information got  carried to  the people in the field including the small
farmers.  How important are  those issues?
ABEL:  I see a very limited role for  foreigners.  One thing we can do  is  try to
understand better the behavior that flows from existing incentive systems, including
corruption.  I am very pessimistic about what foreigners can do in terms of  changing
the basic values  of society.  John Brewster and others who wrote about this suggest
that these are things that the  society is going to have to work out for itself.
They are going to have to work it out in their own way.  For example, some societies52
may decide to use a great deal of unceremonious vigor in getting things done.  I
do not  see how we as outsiders really can play much of a role in transforming
power relationships in society.  From a training point of view,  what we might be
able to do is to work with people to make them aware of different ways, institu-
tionally and politically, of dealing with a given problem.  The Taiwan way or  the
American way or the Turkish way is not necessarily the best way for Indonesia or
India.
STATEMENT:  These problems  should be kept in perspective because there is no system
in which there is not  some element of corruption from someone's point of view.
Just keep  in mind, "Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times".  Can you teach anything about
evaluating systems  as institutional structures generating incentives which can be
handled in a fairly positive way in teaching?
SCHRAMM:  Mexico is notorious  in  that all public officials are on the make and yet
we point to Mexico's progress  in agriculture as an outstanding example of a country
that has really done very well, not only in agriculture but in economic growth gen-
erally.  Long ago in this  country it was pointed out  that the cities that were best
governed were those which were most corrupt.  I am not advocating corruption;  I am
just saying that  it  is not always clear that corruption in high places is  necessarily
inconsistent with rapid economic growth.  It  could probably be achieved more econo-
mically without the corruption, but  these are not obviously inconsistent.
WICKHAM:  Although I am pessimistic  about the role  that outsiders can play in trying
to  affect corruption, there is one area that does offer limited hope.  It  is  not in
telling governments what to  do, but  in building and operating pilot projects.  A
project can be implemented in the desired way and  then evaluated in the  light of  other
alternatives.  It  is not hard  to  find people who are more or less uncorrupted and a
new project is not impossible to start off right.  Abe and I have been working on
such a project in central Luzon which I will discuss a little tomorrow.
BROMLEY:  I would like to respond  to  Chuck's point because I am not convinced that
it puts us in a corner and that we end up with paralysis.  We do need  to be careful
how we define problems.  A problem to us may be seen differently from their perspec-
tive.  Our culture influences not only the definition of  the problem but  also the
things that we cast up to  be selected among in terms of  solutions.  There are  two
sources of  bias.  One is how we define a problem and secondly, in the case of policy
or  institutional changes, the  dials that we suggest be turned and how far we turn
them.  The answer is  not paralysis but  caution and a bit  of humility.  We need a con-
tinual recognition of the absence of a reserve army of willing risk-takers  to  follow
national  leaders and pull up their roots to migrate to  irrigated agriculture.  Recog-
nize that in a lot  of  traditional societies you do not have that kind  of willingness
to  take risks, and recognize the profound implications this has  for the kind of
policy recommended.  The more interesting question is why do you have this willingness
in some places and not very much in others.
CROSSON:  That is  two different questions.  The way you put  it  this morning, you
seemed to be suggesting  that even if  the opportunity existed, you could not  count
on a response to  take advantage of  those opportunities.  I would challenge that.
There is a  lot of evidence all around  the world that, with real opportunities, small
farmers will respond.  There is  evidence from land development or colonization in
Latin America where  the government builds a road and the people are in  there right
away!  In the Philippines in response  to the Green Revolution, there was an upsurge
of marketing services both on the input and output side, all spontaneous and small
scale.  We make a mistake if we  sell short the capacity of small farms or small53
businesses  to respond  to a real opportunity.  Corn in the northeast of Thailand
is another example.  But  it was the farmer who was responsible.
You  could look at  it  the other way around.  The consequences of making  the jump
if they fail are very great indeed, because their margin is so small.  If you say
that because the margin of gain is  small, the effort is not forthcoming, I would
agree.  But that  is not saying the same thing as  the capacity is not there.  It
locates  the limit somewhere else.
QUESTION:  Are we talking about distinguishing between  those aspects of  the environ-
ment that  a farmer can control himself or  collectively through some group and  those
things  that are really beyond his control?  One of  the elements of  the whole develop-
mental game, certainly not the only element, is  to bring more and more things that
affect  the farmer's welfare either directly under his control  (each farmer has a
tubewell)  or  indirectly through collective action, under  the control of a farm
group.
BROMLEY:  All you have to do  is  change the probabilities of pay-off.  You do not
have to  bring it  under his  control, all you have to do is  change the expected value
of  the gains.
STATEMENT:  Dan's point is a very important one.  What we want to  do is  reduce the
variation and put the mean in the proper place.  Control does not have to  be given
to  the farmers to  do it.  All we really want is  to  improve the level of performance
of  some of  those factors now not under the control of the farmers.  Trying to  put
all these under  the domain  of farmers is  not necessarily the right  approach.  Farm
management  economists have a tendency to  think only in terms of farmer decision
making.
The question that always  comes up is,  "Why do you invest in irrigation when you can
increase the productivity on the  rain-fed lands by applying more fertilizers, by
using improved seeds, etc."  This  is one  of the mistakes the outsiders make.  If
you look at the production response you are right, but when you look at the farmer's
behavior, you find  that he is  trying to minimize risk and maximize profits.  We need
to  look at  the response from the farmer's point of view and not  from the outsider's
view who runs a computer analysis which shows the farmer will be better off even
with a failure two years out of  five.  You cannot expect a small farmer in a developing
country to  risk crop failure.
Farmers want to minimize the maximum cost of  loss that may ever occur.  They have
absolutely no ability to survive a loss beyond a certain point.  We fail to make
that  allowance when we estimate the farmer's response  from irrigation.  Even if
farmers have seen that 100 kilograms of  nitrogen produces  the highest returns,  they
only apply 60 or 70, because they are  trying to minimize possible losses.
We are also  talking about another class of risk in a  system, the risk to  the farmer
that, even if he makes optimum decisions and  takes optimum actions,  the system
managers will not take the actions  that will make it possible for the farmers  to
reach the production possibilities.  We are comparing systems  in which there is
information in  the hands  of  two groups of decision makers.  The system managers have
economic information as well as  information on what  the farmer's response might be.
There may be feasible ways to  decrease the risk to  the farmer.  Even so, he may
not go at once to  the optimum response, but every time you help him do better, you
are moving in  the direction of the optimum.  If  there is anything in the Taiwan54
system it  is  that their management system gets  them closer to  the point you would
reach  if you had the same set of resources in the hands of  a single entrepreneur.
Information flows fairly well from the farmer back into the system.
SFEIR-YOUNIS:  I would like to make a couple of comments based on my experience in
Chile.  One is  on corruption.  It  seems that whatever the inefficiency it cannot
be attributed 99 percent  to  corruption.  There are other troubles that relate to the
type of  institutions and development planning process.  There are some countries
where you have a tremendous  control from  the center, applying to  certain types of
resources.  In the first place there is a strong, national environment.  They want
to increase output and they recognize there is  a scarcity.  However, not  every
institution in the country which has responsibilities for natural resources under-
stands what scarcity means.  They also do not understand the difference between
natural resource and other  types of inputs.
Second, even with centralized decision making, you also see many institutions dealing
with the same resource.  What happens is  that water is one input in farm production,
but you have more than five or six important institutions dealing with other types
of resources without connecting  them to  the water institution,  The institutional
set-up that farmers try  to  deal with is  completely unorganized and creates risk.
The farmer uses water at  the level he believes to be most efficient, but  the insti-
tutions may be more interested  in  their payoff than efficient water use.  Corruption
is a side issue in deciding crop efficiency.  The main problem is that there is no
understanding of how to develop a planning system that works.  In Chile, for example,
the output price system is  completely isolated from the input price system.  So you
have an institution in the government that sets potato prices and  the farmer will
react to  those prices and  input prices.  However, there  is no relation between  the
output price and input price setters.
Finally what should you teach a person who is  coming to  the U.S. and will go back to
Taiwan.  The most important point  is what are the problems and where and in what
direction are the  institutions being developed.  This  is more important than mastering
linear programming.
TIMMONS:  I would like to  respond to  two points.  Different people view techniques
differently.  I never use linear programming as an end  in itself, but as a means not
only to help  formulate the problem, but  to  try to get some quantitative measure on
some important problem.  There is nothing  sacred about linear programming as a parti-
cular technique but as an analytical device  it can provide valuable information such
as  shadow prices.  It  is useful to know scarcity prices for particular resources.  If
you want  to determine how scarce water is and  if you want to move to  a more general
equilibrium  framework,  linear  programming  can  be  a  very  useful  device.  It is not an
end  in itself, but we may be remiss  in not emphasizing  how the  technique should be
used and for what purpose,  rather than stressing the technique as  an end in itself.
You raised another point  that  is very  interesting.  This point embraces knowledge
about the institutional structures that operate within  the country.  There exist
certain external advisors who do  learn enough about  the institutional structure of
the country to  operate quite  effectively within the country.  The distinction at that
point between foreigner and native begins  to evaporate, at least in terms of knowledge.
But most of us do not know enough about institutional complexities within a particular
country.  Hence we are  faced with a particular dilemma;  do we become country special-
ists or do we continue as  subject matter specialists?  We experienced  a movement
towards country or regional specialists in  the 1960's  but this movement has declined55
in recent years.  If,  in fact,  the kind  of problem situations that we are dealing
with differ so much from country to  country, do you  train a person from Taiwan
interested in irrigation the  same way that you would train a person from Bangladesh?
If  so, what is  the role of U.S.  educational institutions?  You can broaden the
question to  include foreign assistance institutions and educational research insti-
tutions outside  the  U.S.  What role  do  they  have?  One  choice  is  to  become  an  expert
on Bangladesh.  That is  a valid  choice and you work only with the problems of
Bangladesh,  but  that  amount of  country specialization  may  not  be  acceptable  or
possible for most water specialists.  So we have this dilemma of  how do we accom-
modate whatever it is  we have to  offer  to  the location-specific needs of  people in
different countries?
The solution probably lies in a  mixture of the two.  In a graduate seminar--or in
any particular university--there are some real advantages in having students from a
number of  different countries.  There surely must be a common core of  economics
which would be applicable to many countries.  The specialization has to  come in
terms of  students  doing  thesis research in their countries where they take the  tools
and knowledge that they learned  and  apply them to  their own conditions.  And to do
that,  the students and their advisors must be sufficiently literate regarding
country conditions,  to make adaptations suggested by country conditions  in keeping
with  the general body of  theory in  the dissertation research.
SFEIR-YOUNIS:  John, does  that  imply that given departments would then be fairly
well specialized even though they have a general body of methodology and tools?
TIMMON:  My reaction would depend on the department's resources. We have had a
technical assistance program in Peru since 1962 and whenever we had as many as 16
to  18 students  from Peru on campus at Ames we would organize special seminars for
those students in addition  to  their regular courses.  We try to get them to identify
the kinds of  problems  that they face in their own countries which inhibit develop-
ment.  They describe  these problems  in terms of  the effects on productivity and
income  distribution, primarily, and  then they identify their institutional  struc-
tures that lead  to  these problems.  Also  they investigate alternative institutions
for achieving  their objectives. They are not  going to make  the choices;  the leaders
of  their countries are going  to make the choices.  But without this problem identi-
fication within their own countries there is a  real danger of  the students becoming
technicians  in particular methodologies, without recognizing  institutional differences
among countries where the problem exists.  So we train only mechanical robots.  They
can carry out all kinds of methodologies very effectively, but  they do not know why
they are doing it  unless  the methods are applied to a  problem within a particular
country.  And it seems  to me that this mix between an understanding of problems within
a country and  the applications of  the appropriate research technology is  what is
needed.
WICKHAM:  At IRRI we consider the field work as  the important part of the graduate
research.  International Rice Research Institute obviously is not in the position to
provide classroom experience, but to a limited extent, we can be a  vehicle, essen-
tially for foreign students studying in America to come back to  their country to do
their research.  I am not making an open offer, but we are always looking for  these
kinds of students and if we could play a  modest role in this respect we would like  to.
TIMMONS:  We are probably getting  into part of  the discussion for  tomorrow, but for
some  time I have felt that individual universities are not going  to be able  to become
specialists  in all  the 150  countries of  the world.  Although students may come to a56
particular university from any country, I would like to  see us try to work toward
a sort of  pooling of  our university talent  to work with these students.  For example,
if  I knew you were in the Philippines and we have students returning to  the Philippines
to  do dissertation research, I could check with you concerning high priority pro-
blems the students might work on in the Philippines.  It would be helpful to our
Philippine student if I could phone you concerning his or her training and  interest
to  see what you think.  And then possibly the thesis research could be done under
your direction.  It saves us resources and provides a means to pool our university
resources.  Right now we have very imperfect information on who from our university
staffs,  foundations, and AID are in particular  countries for certain periods of  time.
We  worked  out  arrangements  a  few  years  ago  in  Peru  for  North Carolina  State  University's
graduate faculty members in Peru  to be on our graduate faculty and vice versa.  With
assistance from North Carolina we gave final graduate exams in Peru.  There is  no
point in just coming back to  the U.S.  to  take the dissertation exam.  In some
instances we had  qualified members of  the Ministry of Agriculture sit in on examina-
tions.  These members  could ask more incisive questions  than we could about what the
student was doing and what would be the use of  the dissertation in the country's
development.  This  is  the direction the universities should move.  Economists
are scattered around in the world  in many countries and major professors of foreign
students should try to  take advantage of the competence of these scholars  in assisting
foreign graduate students with research in their native countries.
ABEL:  In preparation for  tomorrow, I would like  to  suggest a couple of things.
First, we should go around  the table tomorrow and ask advice on what we as resource
people can do and what our universities and the technical assistance organizations
can do.  Are we  thinking about what would happen if we turned all of ourselves  into
consultants or are we thinking about training  graduate students to work on their
countries' natural resource problems?  Are we thinking about eventually establishing
their capacity to  train their own people, which would include not only people who do
research and  training, but short courses  and things  that might improve decision
making.  Are we thinking about doing research and helping build up LDC's own
research capacity?  As a lot of Dan's questions suggested, we ought to  try to give
some indication of how we expect advice to be given.  There is  in  the U.S.  and else-
where in the world so much economic rent connected with ownership and use of  natural
resources that we are in a much more politically sensitive area than we are when we
just deal with production functions and give advice  to farmers on fertilizer, pes-
ticide, and seed varieties.  If we could get  the countries to do all we want them
to do with natural resources, we would really be pulling away at the foundations
by which control over society  is exercised.  This makes it a little different propo-
sition from programming ourselves into our country to do the research.  Gunter and
the people who have been connected with Mexico can testify that it is a lot easier
to become personna non grata if you are advising people on these questions  than if
you are advising  them on simple, sectoral agricultural planning.
I would like  to add another question for us  to be thinking about tomorrow.  We went
through a period in the 1960's where there was  a great stress placed upon crop  tech-
nology.  The results were very salutary in a number of  places.  But what was not
realized at  the time is  that our technology was being applied in resource environ-
ment favorable to  the technology.  We began to  see that favorable environments were
limited in supply.  While I would be the  last person to downplay the importance of
crop and  livestock technology, there is a growing realization that there is a very
important interaction between the resource environment and the performance of
technology.  'Randy  Barker  and Bob Herdt have a project in the Philippines which is
beginning to show how important the environment is in certain situations.  There
ought  to be much more emphasis placed on problems of improving the resource environ-57
ment as a way of more fully exploiting some of  the biological and chemical  tech-
nology that exists and that will continue to be created,
QUESTION:  What do you have in mind to  increase the resources?
ABEL:  You can do two things:  C1) you  can develop technologies which are adapted
to  the resource conditions that  exist or  (2)  you can do things to  change the natural
resource conditions.  These are not mutually exclusive and you could follow a mixed
strategy.  We are learning there is a lot of  interaction between the potential gain
of a given technology and the quality of  the resource environment.
QUESTION:  How do you define quality of resource?
ABEL:  Let us  take a simple example, rice.  We can find varieties  that in a parti-
cular area may he suited from the point  of view of  disease and insect resistance,
It has  experimental station yields  of  6.2 and 6.5  tons per hectare;  but farmers are
getting 2.5  tons per hectare.  Some experiments in farmer's fields show that pos-
sibly 2 tons  of this difference may be due to  the quality of  the irrigation system
(the control of water).  Some other place it may be something else in the resource
environment.  The other 2 tons may be explained by management practices and a
number of other things.  The early spread of  the Green Revolution was on the best
irrigated areas and went like wildfire in the  Indian wheat areas, until you ran out
of  irrigated areas and the effective constraint became how fast you could expand
irrigation.
In the eastern Indian villages where Bill Easter was studying village irrigation,
water control was the key.  In the winter  (dry season) where you had  less water
than in the summer  (wet season)  farmers on some soil started growing wheat while
still growing paddy in other fields.  But they could do it  because they had indi-
vidual control over water in the  fields.  On lighter soils on the higher lands,  it
made sense to  grow wheat since you got about the same gross value for  the wheat as
for  the rice.  It made sense to do  it because wheat requires less water, but  they
could not do  this until they got  control over water  in  the individual fields.
These are just some  isolated examples of what I mean by the interaction between the
quality of the resource environment and how much of  the technological potential can
be exploited.  You still have  the other  two options open.  We should not ignore this
middle ground.  In other words,  if you have a lousy irrigation system maybe you
should breed  the best variety you can  for  that lousy irrigation.  If  we can improve
the quality of  the  irrigation system, that  is  an even better alternative.
STATEMENT:  What you are  really talking about is not just  the resource base but
improving the farmer's access  to  the resource base.
ABEL:  I define resources and  the quality of  the resource environment  to  include
access.  An example would be Southeast Asia where many of  the original irrigation
systems were not designed for  irrigation in dry seasons but were designed to  supply
supplementary water  in the monsoon season.  But with a little bit, or sometimes a
whole lot, of  tinkering, you can redesign a system that will irrigate part of the
command area in the dry season and will produce very high yields because of high
solar radiation combined with irrigation.
STATEMENT:  As we continue our discussion we have to recognize that just  as the agri-
culture of  a  country does not  exist in a vacuum from the other  sectors,  the use of
natural resources does not exist by itself, but has  to be intertwined with other
resources and  institutions.58
VI.  SOME CRITICAL ISSUES IN IRRIGATION
PLANNING FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA
G. Levine  and  T. Wickham-
The design and management of  irrigation systems  in Southeast Asia is
largely based on past experience and resulting conventions, or rules of
thumb.  Even where project proposals are made for international funding, most
of the important relationships  follow closely these rules of  thumb, or those
transferred  from other parts of the world.  This practice has had mixed
results, and we believe this  is because a number of important issues  are not
adequately or explicitly considered  in the process.  This paper attempts to
analyze several of  the more critical  issues relating to  the design process of
new systems,  and several more relating  to system management.  It  outlines what
we believe  are low efficiency practices and  suggests alternatives based on our
experience and, where available,  on data from pilot projects.
By critical issues we mean those choices which can have a major impact on
the success  or failure of an irrigation system.  Some of  them are  frequently
overlooked, or not  really considered a matter of choice.  Others may not be
included in project statements  or management guidelines, but are nevertheless
decided informally.  Each critical issue can have a marked effect on  the
performance --  measured  in engineering, agricultural or  economic terms --  of
irrigation systems  in Southeast Asia.
The paper  is directed to  Southeast Asian irrigation systems because our
experience  is primarily in that region.  Many of the issues,  and perhaps the
conclusions, apply to other parts of  the world, however, where the context of
irrigation is similar  to  that of Southeast Asia.  This  context can be described
briefly in terms of environment --  humid tropical with pronounced wet and dry
seasons;  of agriculture -- almost exclusively lowland flooded rice;  of past
water use -- largely supplemental during the wet season, but  recently extended
where possible to dry season plantings;  and in terms of  farm organization --
many small farms between 1 and 4 ha. in size,  each dependent on the system as
the source of water and on neighboring farmers  in its  on-farm distribution.
Finally, the paper focuses  on design issues and on management issues.
Irrigation design usually  specifies the location and size of the system, the
dam and canal  layout, the nature of farm level distributaries, if  any, the
expected volume of water, and a recommended cropping pattern throughout the
year.  An economic justification of  the design is  also provided, usually based
on one or more criterion such as benefit-cost, internal rate of return, or net
farm income.
Once designed and built, a  system must be managed.  Management, often
called operations and maintenance  (O&M), refers  to  the routine allocation of
water within systems and its distribution to and among farmers.  It  therefore
involves scheduling of cropping seasons, of reservoir releases where applicable
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and of water deliveries  to the farming areas.  It  also includes repair and
maintenance work on  canals and structures,  and administrative responsibilities.
Design and management influence each other.  Management must be organized
around the physical components  of a system, which are  specified by design.
Certain management practices are precluded by some  design choices while others
are favored.  Rotational irrigation at the turnout cannot be practiced if
farm ditches are not  provided in the design.  Management's influence on design
is  less  obvious but equally important.  Shortcomings commonly attributed to
poor design can sometimes be alleviated by intensive and dedicated system
management such as  is  sometimes found  in smaller community run systems.  No
design can be considered ideal in a permanent  sense, and an evolving manage-
ment program is necessary to  continually bring out  the fullest potential of a
system, and  to  identify appropriate changes  in the physical  system.  Evaluations
of  different management practices  in existing systems will also provide excellent
information  to  serve as  a base for design choices for future systems.
While design is  normally a prelude to management we have deliberately
placed the discussion of management of  existing systems before that of design
issues  because large numbers of  systems are already  in place.  We feel that
significant  improvements in  irrigation for large areas are possible with
improved management.
A.  Management Issues
1.  Priority in  Improved Water Management:  Farm Level vs. Main System
New higher yielding varieties  and greater population density have combined
in recent years to  increase the demand for  irrigation capability.  New varieties
of  rice can produce about  twice as much grain per unit of water as  traditional
varieties, provided water  (and other inputs)  are supplied dependably throughout
crop growth.  Even more important to  some farmers, the newest varieties of rice
mature in less than 100 days  from seeding, permitting a better chance of double
cropping in areas of  marginal water  supply.
The increased demand for irrigation  is being met  through new system con-
struction  (discussed later),  and  through improved management of existing ones.
The need for improvement is  apparent  in studies  from Malaysia showing up to 30
days of lag between first release of water and  the date  it reaches  the last
farm, and those from the Philippines showing mean water use efficiencies at  the
farm level of only 38%  in the wet season, and  68%  in  the dry.  In the Central
Plain of  Thailand farmers sometimes do not use water  intended for  them during
the  dry season.  These and many other examples reflect  the need for more
intensive use of water at the farm level in the larger  systems of  Southeast Asia.
Efforts  to  improve farm level management have included a number of pilot
projects ranging  from complete land consolidation to  limited farm extension
programs.  The physical  improvements of land consolidation, including land
leveling, redistribution of landholdings, and construction of roads,  canals,
and drains, probably costs over US  $1,000 per ha. at  today's prices.  Its
rationale  is  that major improvements in farm level water use cannot be achieved
without these large expenditures on physical extensions of  the system into  the
farm level environment.60
Pilot projects intermediate in  intensity between traditionally run systems
and land consolidation have been tried in many countries.  They have had varying
degrees of success, the reasons for which could be  the subject of an interesting
research undertaking.  But  one of  the most common shortcomings of  pilot projects
is  their inability, where successful, to  serve as a model for widescale  improve-
ments beyond the pilot area itself.  This  is not surprising, for very few pilot
projects are actually planned for  that purpose.  Most of them are small in area
--  a 300 ha. project  is a relatively large one --  which limits their applica-
bility for systems  of ten thousand to  several hundred thousand ha.  Furthermore,
in efforts to  ensure their success, pilot projects are almost always located in
highly favorable portions  of the system, typically near the beginning of canals
where water can be supplied dependably.  They are also usually provided with
abundant inputs, both budgetary and  in terms of personnel.  While such projects
may tell us  something about what may be achieved at considerable expense, they
cannot be expected to  serve as a vehicle  for broad on-farm water management
improvements.
Up to  this point we have discussed on-farm, or  farm level improvements,
but there is also the network of  canals and  structures between the dam and  the
turnout releasing water to the farmers, which we call the main system.  Construc-
tion of main systems accounts for the major expense of new systems because of
the earthmoving and hardware involved;  it is  also  the focus of most traditional
engineering design attention.  But once constructed, main systems have not
usually received much further attention except through routine maintenance,
which we discuss in the third issue of  this section.
A Philippine  study of a form of on-farm rotational  irrigation brings out
the importance of  improved management in the main system.  The purpose of  the
project was to  ±mplement a rotational schedule based on a five-day recurring
cycle, in three 50 ha. blocks.  It  involved building all  the farm level  canals
and structures  to permit  the rotation, advising the farmers of the new pattern,
and then carefully measuring and  controlling the water releases  into the blocks
on the basis of a rated unit  flow.  The project was successful in that the scheme
worked satisfactorily after a few false starts.  But as a standard of  comparison,
three other 50 ha. blocks were also monitored in which the only modification was
to measure and control  the rate of water supply in an amount equal  to  that of
the nearby rotational blocks.  The mean grain yield, water use efficiencies,
and dates of planting and harvesting were not significantly different between
the two  forms of  irrigation  indicating that there was no additional benefit to
all the on-farm development associated with rotational irrigation.  But  the
measurement and control of water releases, a function of  the main system in
that project, resulted  in remarkable performance  improvements for both forms of
irrigation relative to  traditionally operated  systems.  Although the study
covered only one season, there  is no reason  to expect  the conclusion to differ
with experience over more years.  Evidence exists of  similar type effects even
in arid zone irrigation  (Dez Pilot Project,  Iran).
It is  often a surprise to  find that many on-farm improvements cannot be
made until some basic improvements have been implemented in the main system.
This is the reason most pilot projects are located near the headworks, to
reduce the chances of disruption caused by main system breakdown.  Even the
simple concept of distributing a given rated flow through a turnout - a single
turnout - produces very stringent demands on how the system is  operated upstream61
of  that  turnout.  It  is even more complex when several turnouts would be
controlled in  this manner.  Relatively minor adjustments of  the gate  settings
at  the headworks of each canal, or of checking heights  (to partially obstruct
the canal in order to  raise the elevation of water in it)  can easily cause 50%
- 75%  over - or under-irrigation at  the further turnouts.
Proponents of  farm level priorities  in management improvements often point
to  the farmer as  the basic person responsible for conserving water.  There is
no  question that  large quantities of water are lost at the farm level, but if
too much water is released  from the canal onto  farmers' fields there  is no
alternative  to  its being lost  into drains.  Flooded rice fields can hold only
a given amount of water beyond which all excess will drain from the lowest
fields.  Farmers  often take steps  to divert excessive water to  their fields, but
this reflects a breakdown of management at the main system, not the farm level.
Rather  than concentrating on tertiary farm ditch construction, we should give
priority to  tighter main system management.  Some suggestions  for appropriate
technology  in this connection are offered in the next  section of the paper.
Of course  there is  an important need to bring farmers more fully into the
decision-making process regarding water use, and programs to  that end should
be encouraged.  But who can carry them out?  If  their purpose is  to  improve the
climate of  cooperation and shared responsibility between  the farmer and the
system ditch tender  or water master, it  is most unlikely that agencies other
than the irrigation agency could carry them out successfully.  We should work
with farmers by training main system personnel  to do  their jobs as  well as
possible, and  to better relate  to  farmers.
In conclusion, the effects of poor management may be reflected at  the
farm level, but most of  the  causes are  found upstream within  the system.  We
believe farmers  act generally  in their own best interests in the use of water,
and to  urge them  to change their practices on behalf of distant farmers,
distant tomorrows,  or distant concepts such as national production targets,
is not likely to  be successful.  Farmers continue to  expect major improvements
in the way traditional systems  are being managed, and while many of their
expectations are excessive we believe that the systems should take the first
step in managing their domain more intensively.  As these improvements are
gradually realized,  farmers should be brought  into  the program.  The best way to
help  the small irrigated farmer is  through the  large system which serves him.
2.  Sophisticated vs.  Simple Management Technologies
In the simpler diversion systems of  Southeast Asia water flows more or
less  freely through the canal network and onto  farmers'  fields.  Most of  these
schemes have evolved as  supplemental systems  for the wet season crop, when
mean expected rainfall  is almost equal  to the  total crop requirement, although
its distribution  is uneven  throughout  the season.  Irrigation water is  in
relatively abundant  supply, the systems  are managed rather extensively, and
water control is  relatively weak.  Flooded rice, which dominates  irrigated land
in Southeast Asia, illustrates this point well.  While it  requires perhaps 50%
more water than the average upland crop,  it  does not require great care in
water conveyance and distribution among farms.  Upland crops need channels to
supply and drain water at periodic intervals,  keeping the soil moist but not62
flooded.  Rice thrives on modest depths of flooding which can usually be
achieved by a continuous  supply of water to  terraced and bunded fields.  Field-
to  field irrigation is not satisfactory for upland crops.
Now that double cropping is  becoming  increasingly important some of  the
more intensive technologies developed for arid areas should be examined for
their applicability in the humid  tropics.  But first we should see how well
existing technologies perform under today's conditions.
The question of management technology for the farm level usually focuses
on tertiary distribution systems.  In very  flat flood plains and where irrigation
canals have relatively few and well controlled turnouts, such as in Kedah,
Malaysia, farm ditches appear to be necessary in distributing water quickly and
equitably.  In the Philippines where land slopes are greater and the points of
water release from the canals are numerous, overland or field-to-field water
movement seems to work quite well.  Studies  in that  country have not found
significant  difference in  grain yield or  in the incidence of drought between
farms  located close to  supply canals and  those located far from them.  One reason
for  this is the orientation of landholdings.  Farms  tend to be very long and
narrow so  that the maximum number can have direct access to  the canal.  Thus,
field-to-field irrigation is largely confined to  one's own farm. Less than one-
third of the farms  served from several Philippine systems received water
passing over more than two other farms.  There  is no evidence  that fertilizer
nutrients move with the water from one field  to  the next provided  that the rate
of flow is slow enough that soils  are not  carried with the water.  It appears
that this form of on-farm management is  satisfactory for most diversion systems.
Storage projects are justified primarily on the basis of  area double
cropped, and this means storing excess river water during the wet months  for
use in the dry season.  This is  different from the diversion situation, for
now farmers are called upon to  economize in water use during the months when it
is  plentiful.  Water savings  are important in these circumstances, but  it  is not
easy to motivate farmers  to make them in view of  their past  experience with
diversion technologies.  Since the overall storage system will benefit  from
economical water use, it is  more likely that main system technologies will be
more appropriate than on-farm technologies such as rotational irrigation.
Several techniques have been used for many years  to  allocate water in the
main system during periods of  scarcity.  One of the most common methods is to
suspend deliveries into a  whole canal or set  of canals and continue supplying
another  set.  After about a week the canals which were closed are provided with
water and another  set  is closed.  This rotation continues until the drought
period is  over.
Another form of rotation within systems which appears quite promising is
the sequencing of water availability in sections along a canal.  Although water
must be supplied along the entire canal in order to  irrigate the last portion,
it  may not be of high enough elevation to freely flow onto the fields along the
upstream sections.  Checking, or obstructing the flow is  the usual way farmers
near the beginning of canals increase the water height to  the point where it can
command their fields.  Pilot work in restricting checking to  scheduled periods
in each section of a canal appears to be a simple and useful management technol-
ogy.63
In terms  of hardware, perhaps  the most important need at the present time
is  for structures to measure the flow of water at the major branching points
or gates of  the  canal network.  These devices are well known and need not be
expensive, particularly  if designed and built with the  original canal construc-
tion.  Accuracy of + 10%  is  adequate.
Another  important device would be gated turnouts with measuring capability.
Some forms  of  this  structure are found already in Southeast Asia, although they
are often not  used and sometimes unusable.  It will be very difficult  to avoid
over-irrigation by some farmers unless the turnouts  serving their fields  can be
closed.
Finally, a means of  transport  is necessary for systems personnel  to monitor
the canal and meet with farmers.  Motorbikes for selected personnel are becoming
valuable acquisitions  for many systems.
Technologies for better managing main systems are badly needed.  They need
not be highly sophisticated,  and  in fact must not  if personnel with modest
training are  to interact with  them and explain them to  farmers.  Implementing a
comprehensive package of management practices specifically  for the farm level
does not appear justified at the present time where flooded rice is  the only crop
grown.
3.  Operations vs. Maintenance
We often refer to  operations and maintenance  (O&M) as a single concept.
A strong case can be made for divorce of the couple based on mutual incompat-
ibility.
Operations generally refers to  the allocation of water in the system, the
collection of water rates,  if  charged, and other administrative matters.  Water
management is  the main field operation.
Maintenance of  systems  is  the routine  care of embankments  and structures,
and the occasional rehabilitation of badly deteriorated systems.  Rehabilitation
can be  considered deferred maintenance  since well maintained canals do not
usually need periodic renovation, while badly neglected canals do.  An economic
study comparing these two maintenance approaches would be interesting.
Incompatibility of maintenance and operations stems primarily from conflicts
in allegiance of  the personnel called upon to  do both.  Maintenance is  carried
out almost exclusively along  canals, and those doing it  have no reason  to  get
onto  the land  to  see how adequately the water is  irrigating the command area.
Maintenance functions require essentially no  contact with farmers except possibly
where farmers have broken embankments.  Many maintenance activities can be done
by groups of men working  collectively.
Operations, or management,  calls for a very different person.  He must be
able to  relate well  to  farmers and  solicit their feedback.  He must have the
opportunity to  assess  the adequacy of  irrigation throughout his area of juris-
diction.  He must know something about agriculture, for farmers expect him to
and ask him technical questions.  Although the system authorities in the
Philippines do not endorse  this  idea, many farmers there reported that they64
even prefer that  ditch tenders assigned to  their areas farm their own parcels
of land in order  to better understand farming and irrigation problems.
Under financial duress, most irrigation authorities are asking their O&M
men to undertake both functions.  Maintenance activities almost always pre-
dominate in their day-to-day work, however, because accomplishments in that
field are more visible.  The system of rating ditch tenders  in the Philippines
is based largely on the extent of  grass cut along canal embankments at certain
times of the year --  a criterion which is  at least  easy to measure.  The
distribution of water from several hundred  turnouts over a season could not be
rated in that way.
We would recommend a separate labor  force for routine maintenance.  This
force could be recruited from the farming community and be paid on a piece work
basis.  Operations personnel could then be recruited more carefully, trained,
and given more responsibility  for improved water management.
4.  Water Rates:  Farmers vs.  Society
The two  reasons usually advanced for farmers paying a substantial water
charge are (1) it  helps allocate water more efficiently, and  (2) farmers
achieve higher yields  and higher net farm income with irrigation which justifies
their  paying  something  for  the  water.
Water rates can serve as an allocative device only  if  they are based on
the volume of water used.  At the present  time this  is not  the basis anywhere
in Asia, including Taiwan where water management is relatively sophisticated
and efficient.  Rates are  imposed instead on an area basis, which probably
tends  to worsen allocation equity since farmers then have an additional incen-
tive  to get  the highest production from each hectare they can regardless of the
water used.  In  the Taiwan case, control is  sufficient  to maintain allocation
equity.
Under present circumstances it  is  impossible to measure water to  every
farm, and it  is  unlikely that this will change in the foreseeable future.
Even if  each farm had its  own supply turnout  at the canal, practical instrumen-
tation to measure that flow is not  available.  Laboratory-type devices  could be
tried, but  the annual costs of these instruments, using a nominal interest rate,
would far exceed any reasonable fee which farmers might be expected  to pay.
A somewhat more promising alternative  is  to measure  the water passing a
certain point in the main system, and charge the group of farmers  to whom it is
supplied.  This could  theoretically be done in the 50 ha. rotational units being
built in  the Central Plain of the Philippines.  However, there  is wide variation
in the amount of water needed to  supply a rice crop even within nearby areas,
due to  variable water losses to  seepage and  percolation.  Would it be fair to
charge farmers on lighter soils more in view of the fact that their input costs,
such as for fertilizer, are also likely to be higher?  And assuming that water
was measured accurately throughout  the season, what adjustments would be made
for farmers who were supplied and charged for more water than they needed, but
whose supply was critically short during  a key period, resulting  in reduced
yields?65
It  appears to  us that control of water flows at  the turnout or within  the
canal is  the best means of water allocation now available.  The  fact that  it is
not now being done very equitably  does not mean that this system should be
replaced by a monetary charge system, but  rather that water control should be
improved.
The second argument, that farmers  get higher yields  and net income from
irrigation, also deserves deeper analysis.  It  is not difficult to  quantify
the yield increase resulting from supplemental irrigation to a previously rain-
fed farm.  This can in turn be converted to net farm income and used  to  justify
a substantial water fee.  There is no question that the first farms to receive
irrigation have higher net farm income and can afford  to  pay for the water.  But
as the proportion of farms  under irrigation increases there is real question
whether spreading water to more new farmers will mean greater income to  them.
Since the demand for rice is highly inelastic,  farmers  as a group stand  to have
higher net  income by producing less grain, and lower income from more grain.
For each additional ha. receiving irrigation there would be more production,
with disproportionately greater downward pressure on prices.  Over the long run
farmers  are not  the beneficiaries of yield-increasing  irrigation;  society is.
Perhaps a better approach to  the question of water rates would be to  assess
the true beneficiaries  of water some fraction of the cost of providing it.  A
most obvious beneficiary is  the landowner whose property suddenly doubles or
triples  in value when irrigation is  extended to  it.  An effective land tax is  a
rational and administratively straightforward way to recapture  part of the costs
of  irrigation.  This  is being done  on a limited scale in some states of India as
a  "betterment  levy".
Another approach follows from recognizing that increased production results
in reduced  costs of  rice  in  the general economy.  Even  if  the price does not go
down, increased production stemming from irrigation would keep  it  from going as
high as  it otherwise would.  The beneficiaries of  this are  the rest of society
-- everyone  except farmers who presumably do not buy rice at all.  The fact
that  general tax revenues are  frequently used to build and operate systems  is
an  indirect acknowledgment  that society does have  a stake in increased  food
production.
Finally, to  the extent that increased production through irrigation
results  in conserving, or  even earning, foreign exchange, some way should be
found to  tax a portion of  that income.  Export taxes are  one way if there are
exports.
The argument  for farmers to pay water charges is,  in short, more conven-
tional wisdom than economic  or logical wisdom.  One even wonders if  the farmer
should not receive a rebate for all the extra work of planting the second crop,
for attempting to maintain a  stable insect, disease and fertility environment
in spite of much greater ecological threats,  for preventing his fields  from
deep flooding due  to occasional oversupply from the system -- and then quite
possibly for  incurring a major crop loss due  to brief  but critical water
shortages in the system over which he has no  control.
The most important point  in the water charge issue is  the need for adequate
and  sustained support to  extend and intensify irrigation capability.  Where the66
funds come from is not as important as their availability year after year.
New research initiatives are needed to identify the true beneficiaries of
irrigation if  it  is accepted that  the beneficiaries should bear  the major
part of the cost.  Recent events affecting water  fees in Taiwan also suggest
that  the specific circumstances, e.g. relative importance of the agricultural
and industrial  and service sectors, make one  form of fees or taxes more
appropriate than others.
B. Design Issues
The increasing focus on more irrigation, particularly in the form of
large scale, capital intensive projects  suggests that issues related to  system
design are becoming increasingly important, and in our opinion are becoming
critically important.
1.  Optimism  and  Uncertainty
If  economics is  the "dismal science" then engineering must be called the
"bright technology", because it is evident that in a large number of projects
a high degree of  optimism must have been operating during the evaluation of
potential resources and  in the estimates of the effectiveness with which those
resources could be used.  It  is not generally appreciated by many in the
planning and decision-making hierarchy associated with irrigation projects
that there often is a high degree of uncertainty incorporated into the physical
and biologic design values that are the basis for the  system.  Frequently,
this uncertainty is of such magnitude as to make many other project questions,
e.g. what is an appropriate discount rate, almost irrelevant.
As an example:  the most important single set  of data relating to  the
physical environment of an irrigation project is  that which defines the basic
water resource.  A variety of  statistical and hydrologic techniques are
available  for arriving at the critical design parameters  (long-time average
flows,  low and high flows of specified recurrence probabilities, etc.)  and
many of  these techniques are elaborate and sophisticated.  The validity of
the answers derived using these techniques, however, is a function both of the
extent of  the input data and of the quality of that data.  In many projects,
both the quality and  the duration of  record are such that major variance is
associated with the answers and significant errors have resulted.
The estimates of  flow in  the Colorado River that formed the basis  for the
interstate allocations of the  flow were sufficiently in excess of actual flow
that major reallocations have been necessary.  These were partially responsible
for the  large investments  in the California Water Plan.  In more recent years,
the estimates of average  flows into Bumiphol reservoir, in Thailand, have been
found to be approximately  30% in error, with almost one-third less water
entering the reservoir  than had been indicated in the original design.
A  second example of a major design parameter, the estimated life of
reservoirs on sediment-laden streams, has recently been in the news.  Not-
withstanding  a  sophisticated understanding of sediment transport dynamics,
large errors were made in the projections of sediment accumulation and67
subsequently in the design of  the Big Sanman Gorge dam  in China.  This
resulted in  the need  for complete redesign and reconstruction after only
five  years  of  operation.
Clearly,  the influence of errors of these magnitudes  in single important
design factors  is  so great that many other potential issues pale by comparison.
Other  examples of  uncertainties in the physical design parameters can be
cited easily.  While they may be of  smaller  impact  than those indicated
previously, their cumulative effect can be of major importance.  The evaluation
of soil  suitability for irrigation, for example, provides estimates of  suscep-
tibility to salinization or other drainage problems.  Frequently, susceptibility
is grossly underestimated.
These types and magnitudes of variance are not  confined to the physical
environment evaluations.  Errors in expected yields  frequently are on the order
of 25%  or more.  Estimates of plant disease impacts, of  irrigation related
human health problems, and similar problem areas are little more than guesses.
Unfortunately, the current design process does not encourage, nor usually
permit, a depiction of the uncertainty that might provide a more accurate
picture of the proposed project to  the appropriate decision makers.  During the
critical  feasibility stage the typical design procedure includes:  the
accumulation of  available data, most often in secondary form  (primary data
collection is  usually limited  to potential major construction sites;  occasion-
ally crop field trials  are used  if a major crop is  planned),  the evaluation and
rationalization of  the  data, and  the determination of the  "best fit"  relation-
ships based  on the data.  Once  a specific relationship is  determined, e.g. the
"average" flow hydrograph for a stream (discharge vs. time),  this  relationship
is  assumed to be  correct.  All further calculations are assumed to be  starting
from zero  error.
As  successive relationships are utilized,  the resulting  "best fit"
relationship is  again assumed  to be  correct.  Ultimately a set  of  "design" values
are arrived at which are treated as  if  they are true.  The area that potentially
can be served from a water source is a typical answer derived  from the successive
utilizations of different sets of physical data inputs.
The final answers might not be too  far  from a reasonable estimate of the
real world if  the errors associated with the various  "best fit"  relationships
were randomly distributed.  Experience suggests, however, that an  "optimist"
tendency biases  the results toward an overestimation of project capability.
Whether this optimism  (and it  is not limited to  the engineers in the design
teams)  is  the natural bent of  "doers", by contrast to  "thinkers",  or is  enhanced
by  the potential benefits  to the designers  (and related agencies and individuals)
from project implementation, separate from the benefits to  the project bene-
ficiaries,  is an interesting question.
The entire problem of uncertainty in design is  compounded further by the
almost complete exclusion of  the human factor in the derivation of design
parameters.  As  suggested earlier, rules of thumb are used frequently in design,
and nowhere more frequently  than where the human being is  operatively linked to68
the project activity.  For example, in systems where the on-farm water distri-
bution is other than flooding, the "design" water use efficiency assigned  to
different types of  distribution methods  (furrows, borders, etc.)  is a "rule of
thumb" efficiency.  Where the rule is obtained in a cultural context different
from the proposed project it will only be fortuitous  if it is  reasonably
accurate.  Rarely is there any attempt to  derive more site specific criteria
based upon direct contact with local farmers.
In summary,  the uncertainties  in many areas of project design are much
greater than assumed;  these uncertainties are found in the physical and biologic
aspects of project design, as well as in the more generally recognized uncertain
economic areas, the uncertainties are masked by the design process;  estimates
are biased toward an optimistic view of the proposed project;  many issues are
irrelevant  in the light of  these uncertainties;  any realistic evaluation of a
proposed project must explicitly consider the critical undertainties.
2.  The Decision Stage
The design process for a development project usually proceeds sequentially
from a pre-project  to the pre-feasibility, feasibility and finally to  the
detailed design stages.  Usually, the decision on the type of project that is
most appropriate is  made early, often at  the pre-project stage, and frequently
without  serious consideration of other alternatives.  The Mekong development is
an example wherea priori judgment was made that  the key to  the development of
the region was the large scale exploitation of  the Mekong River, without
explicit considerations of  other development alternatives.
In a similar way, decisions about alternative irrigation projects, e.g.
small-scale supplemental irrigation projects, small-scale reservoir projects,
large-scale year-round irrigation projects, etc.,  are made with minimal
critical comparisons.
In part this  is  due to the ways in which project objectives are  specified.
If,  for example, a development objective is  stated as the increasing of dry
season production of rice by 1000 tons,  the alternative types of irrigation
projects that can be considered are very limited.  An alternative objective,
the increase of rice production by 1000 tons, opens  the way to a much broader
consideration of alternatives.
A recent pronouncement from India illustrates  the point.  It has been stated
as policy that India will plan to  increase the proportion of its  total rice
production derived from the dry season by a specified percentage, to  reduce the
variation in annual production.  A policy stated this way, automatically limits
the project alternatives to  irrigation projects, probably with reservoirs,
either  surface or groundwater.  The more basic objective, to  stabilize rice
production, would permit a much wider consideration of alternatives, with a much
higher probability of arriving at economical and appropriate projects.
In addition to  type and degree of project objective specification, the
information about available resources plays an important role  in the  selection
of project type and specific project locations.  These decisions  frequently are
based upon preliminary information of questionable accuracy, as suggested in69
the discussion of design details  in  section 1.  The information most readily
available tends  to  emphasize the resources most prevalent.  Constraints in
resources are not obvious, particularly as  they relate to  proposed changes in
the agricultural system of  an area.  Where there are attempts to  identify
resource constraints at a relatively early stage, the resources or environ-
ments that are emphasized almost always are the physical and biological.
Economic considerations are  secondary, and  social constraints  are rarely
identified.  Yet,  the phrase "the system is perfect but the people are lousy"
(or, more euphemistically, "we have  trouble with the human resource") is
commonly heard  in  "modern" systems  in developing countries.
It  appears to  us,  that  in  the pre-detailed design period the development
objectives  should be  specified  in  such a way as to  leave maximum flexibility
for project  type and  site selection, and that  the decision relative  to both
type and  site should be delayed to  the feasibility stage.  We recognize  that
this requires a proportionally greater  investment before decisions are made,
because more alternatives will be carried through the  feasibility study
process.  This process, however, may tend  to minimize or at least  to  counter-
balance some of  the tendency to  be overly optimistic.
We also suggest  that  increased attention be paid  to  the human  capital
resource available  to both the prospective project clients and  to the govern-
ment which frequently  is  an active participant in irrigation projects.
3.  Idealism vs. Pragmatism:  Phasing and Staging
Partly as a result of  educational philosophy and partly as a result of
the  availability of  a  number  of  "laws"thatdefine  behavior  of  the  physical
world,engineers  and scientists  involved  in design frequently use the  "ideal
model" as  the  design goal.  This  "ideal"  system is modified in  the planning
and design process  as  constraints of various  types are  identified.  For
example, a  water use  efficiency of 100% while  still meeting crop needs,  is  a
theoretical achievement, but design efficiencies usually are approximately
60%.  The design process  starts with the theoretical value and proceeds
through successive reductions as  water losses are identified.  However, if  the
losses become "excessive" the design is  modified to  reduce them, e.g. by
including canal lining, providing for control gates,  etc.
The definition of  "excessive", however, is more often based upon a
feeling  that certain levels  of  losses are acceptable and  others are unacceptable,
rather than upon a balancing of the relative costs of achieving a specified
efficiency vs.  the  costs of not reaching that level.  Rarely is a project
designed for  30%  efficiency, yet many are actually operated  at that level.  In
particular circumstances of  available water supply, limited management resources
and minimal adverse effects from over-irrigation, a design value of  30%  might
be the most economical and most effective way to  achieve project objectives.
But it  goes "against the grain" for an engineer to  design an  "inefficient"
project.  The concept  of  total efficiency, which integrates  environmental,
economic and social efficiencies is not  effectively utilized.
Related  to  the focus  on an ideal model is  the degree of  "modernization"
incorporated into  the design.  Systems  are almost always designed with the most
modern features  currently available  and theoretically appropriate, almost70
irrespective of  the current  level of agricultural or  irrigation practice in
the area.  Direct service to  individual holdings, on  demand, with volumetric
metering and with high efficiency is  considered  to be the "ideal",  providing
the farmer with maximum decision-making independence, and reflecting modern
approach to design.  While this  is not always achieved in design, and rarely
in practice, it still reflects the ideal.  In  striving for  this,  as suggested
in the discussion on operation and maintenance, measuring devices, control
gates, modern institutional structures, etc. are incorporated into the design,
even when the prospective clients have no experience with these components.
The modern project design, however,  includes provision for training and  for
extension efforts to insure that the system personnel and farmers will learn
to use the modern facilities and institutions.
Where the proposed  system is  large, the design frequently incorporates a
staging of development in which a portion of the area is  completed in accor-
dance with the modern design and operated,  in principle, with training and
learning objectives  in mind.  While these areas typically are larger than  the
"pilot" projects described earlier,  they suffer from similar problems.  The
resources available to  them, and their favored locations make them unrepresent-
ative, though not necessarily without  significant value.  A number of major
problems  in  the Muda River Project were identified  in the first stage develop-
ment with important changes in the design resulting.  In other cases, however,
when problems  are identified in  this first stage of development, especially
when those problems are related  to  the ways  in which the  clients are utilizing
(or not utilizing) the project resources, there has been a radical redefinition
of project objectives rather than project redesign.  Perhaps the most significant
of  recent examples is  the Dez Project in  Iran.
We would like  to suggest that the concept ofphasing be considered, in which
not only  the size of the initial area is. staged, but  that  the degree of progress
toward  the  "ideal" is  staged.  Thus, a project would be planned and executed
to combine successive degrees of modernization, feedback, learning  (by clients,
operators, and designers) and where appropriate, expansion.
The obvious objection to  this approach is an apparent  increase in project
cost and an increase in the time to achieve  the "final"  state.  We argue,
unfortunately  without specific supporting data, that  in reality  if any
realistic discount rate  is used, costs would be lower.  The system would be
more appropriate to  conditions, percent utilization of current investment would
be higher, and  the probability for making serious mistakes would be reduced.
Obviously, there are aspects of systems which cannot be staged or phased.
Where the basic design calls for a major reservoir, this cannot be staged.
However, the operational  technology and farm  practices anticipated to  be used
with the more stable water supply might be tested and evolved on a relatively
small area, using modest storage development and/or wells to  simulate the
projected reservoir operation.
4.  Large vs. Small Projects
For a variety of reasons, many external to  the real needs of the farmers,
there  is a growing emphasis on large project development.  A  sense of urgency
about the pace of development and about food production contributes.  The71
attitudes of major lending agencies,  of within-country development agencies
and of political  figures all add to  this emphasis.
Significant problems can be expected.  Large-scale projects usually
involve high per hectare investments  concentrated in a limited region, fre-
quently resulting in reductions of  development funds available  to other areas;
inter-regional disparities may result.  Large-scale projects frequently
require external consultants and design teams,  especially where the major
lending agencies are involved.  The problems of uncertainties, emphasized
earlier, are exacerbated in  this situation.  The  terms of reference and the
time scale associated with the use of external consultants are such that
serious problems with the basic premises  for the projects can be expected.
On the plus  side,  it  is argued  that large projects make more effective use
of  the limited  local design and managerial resources.  While there may be some
justification  to  this argument,  it  is not entirely valid.  In mobilizing local
design and managerial  talent for  the Upper Pampanga River Project, the Philippines
scoured  its  existing  systems for the highest quality talent available.  These
individuals  have been concentrated for  the  80,000 ha, $80 million project, but
no evaluation has been made of  the impact of this mobilization on the many
systems from which they were drawn.  It  is  at least arguable, that  an intelligent,
vigorous and knowledgeable  (about a specific locality) individual can make a
more  valuable  contribution  in  a  position  of  major  individual  responsibility  in
a relatively small project, than as a member of a team in a larger project in
an area different from the locale of his experience.
It  is also  argued that  large projects are necessary for the effective
utilization of relatively large, but variable water supplies.  A large reservoir
is necessary to  stabilize the supply;  reservoir projects have higher per
hectare costs;  the area that can be served adequately is  increased greatly over
that which can be  served by a run-of-the-river project.  Accepting this as
valid, an unresolved question remains.  Can the potential benefits of  small-
scale projects --  the utilization of  local experiential knowledge, the feedback
and response speed,  the involvement of  the clients be achieved within the
context  of a large-scale project?  Is  it possible to develop a large project
that represents, at  the field level, an agglomeration of  small projects, even
though the major facilities  are designed and operated as a large  project?
The suggestions made for  the operation in our earlier  section represent a
potential analogy, though at a smaller  scale.  What might be appropriate
institutional mechanisms for achieving this mode of operation, and what might
the  costs  (financial and other) be are unanswered questions that have major
importance for many countries,  at  this  time.
In summary, the major points we are trying to make in this entire section
on design are that:
(1)  In the context of the developing countries, especially the humid
tropics of Asia, it  is  essentially impossible to  design an effective appropriate
project before implementation.  The design must explicitly include an extended
period  for feedback and  revision.72
(2)  The effective utilization of relatively radical departures  from
traditional practice, on the part of  farmers, will take place only over an
extended period of time.  Phasing of  changes may permit a smoother transi-
tion at lower real cost though at an apparent higher initial cost  than the
abrupt introduction of new methods.
(3)  There is a need for evaluating the relative impact of investments
in large and  small projects, and  for methods to  gain the relative advantages
of  small projects within large ones.
(4)  Given these uncertainties and extended requirements for design and
implementation, new techniques must  be developed for providing realistic
information to  policy and project decision makers.73
VII.WICKHAM'S COMMENTS AND THE DISCUSSION DURING HIS
DELIVERY OF THE LEVINE-WICKHAM PAPER
Scientists try to develop  the relationship between water use and yield
without measuring water, if you can believe it.  But the curve itself,  the
reason it has developed better for rice, I assume is  because of the nature of
rice.  For other  crops, the  timeliness of  applying water really affects  that
curve.  I have worked a great deal on potatoes and with potatoes  timing is more
important  than the amount of water.  The time element leads to a number of  curves
and  there is  a lot of work being done all over the world on estimating these
curves.  Timeliness mixed with amount is  a very technical problem.
It  is  amazing how few devices we have to measure the amount of water.
These measuring devices need not be expensive and they need not be all  that
numerous.  We just need them in a few strategic points  in a canal so  that we
can have some idea how much flow we have.  To  farmers the option of  closing
water off  to  a field is a necessary condition for good water management.  The
best would be grated  turnouts with measuring capability and when open you could
measure the volume of water flowing into the field.  This is  certainly a tech-
nological possibility but  is  scarcely ever done.
Finally, we need transport for  the people managing the irrigation system.
Water has to  be allocated in different parts of  the system.  Managers need some
way of determining if  the water is  reaching  the desired area.  Motocycles or
some form of  communication are needed  to  know how the system is performing.  We
had an aerial surveillance program over part of our  irrigation area  and I was
impressed how much you can see  (and how cheaply) from light planes.  We need
some  system of movement and  feedback to  see how things  function.
Technology for better management of main systems is badly needed.  They
need not be highly sophisticated.  In  fact,  they must not be  if personnel with
modest  training are to use them and  explain them to farmers.  Implementing a
comprehensive package of  management practices  especially for the farm level
does not appear justified currently, where flooded rice is  the only crop.
We often refer to  operations and maintenance  (O&M) as a single concept.
A strong case can be for divorce of the couple based on mutual incompatibility.
Operations  generally refer to  the allocation of water in the system, the collec-
tion of water charges  and other administrative matters.  Maintenance is how you
clean out  canals, paint  the structures, clean the grass from along the canals
and generally keep  the canals in shape.  When maintenance is not done on a
regular basis, rehabilitation  is  required.  Rehabilitation can be considered
deferred maintenance.  In fact, the amount of money spent on rehabilitation
might be more or less equal  to  the maintenance costs.  Why are  these two  func-
tions  (maintenance and operations)  in conflict?  Maintenance is  carried out almost
exclusively along  the canals, and  those doing  it have no reason  to get onto  the
land  to  see how adequately the water  is  irrigating the  command area.  Maintenance
functions require essentially no contact with farmers except possibly where
farmers have broken embankments.
Management and operations, on the other hand, calls for a very different
person.  He must see what is happening in the fields.  Is water reaching the
farmer's  fields?  Operations  requires very intimate knowledge of  farmers and
communications with them.  Maintenance does not  require any knowledge of  agri-74
culture but with operations you need  to know something about farming.
One of  our research projects in the Philippines discovered that many
farmers  prefer that  their  ditch tenders  be  farmers  who  would  better  understand
farming and irrigation problems.  Under financial pressure most irrigation
agencies hire one person to  do both.  The problem is  that promotions are based
almost exclusively on the most visible performance and visibility means  cutting
grass and cleaning up debris along canals.  There is no comparable means of
measuring and rewarding excellence in water management.  We would recommend a
separate work force for maintenance.  This work force could be recruited from a
farming community and be paid on piecework basis.  Piecework is quite acceptable
in Asia and  there is no  reason why it  could not be done  this way.  Operational
personnel could be trained  for  agriculture and for water management.  This
training could  not be crammed  into  a construction type who has no appreciation
of  agriculture.  Therefore, these people must be recruited very carefully and
be given more responsibility for improving water management.  I cannot over-
emphasize the  importance of the  human resource now available in the terms of
ditch  tenders, water masters and many others.  What we need  to do  is  strengthen
their relationship with their farmers  and give them more training and responsi-
bility.
QUESTION:  Are you referring to  separating operation and maintenance all the way
up  to  the reservoir, or are you talking about the ditch tender level?
WICKHAM:  Primarily the ditch tender.  I have not had much to  do with the other
levels such as  gate keepers, water masters and higher up.  Even at  that point,
the maintenance should  be done by a maintenance crew and the distribution of
water among  the canals should be separate.
QUESTION:  Why did you not say anything about communication in your discussion
of  transport?
WICKHAM:  Of course, it would be nice to have a nice communicating network, but
I do not give it  as  high a priority as  transport.  Communication does not have to
be emphasized.  Half a day is  enough, or  even a day is  enough lead time.
The last question I want to  talk about  is water rates.  The two reasons usually
advanced for farmers paying a substantial water charge are (1) it helps  allocate
water more efficiently and  (2) farmers achieve higher net farm income with irriga-
tion which justifies their paying something for  the water.  Water rates serve in
terms of allocation only  if  they are based on the volume of water used.  At the
present  time nowhere in Asia, including Taiwan where water management is  relatively
sophisticated,  is water sold by volume.  Rates are  imposed, instead,  on a per area
basis which probably  tends  to worsen allocation since farmers then have an addi-
tional incentive to get  the highest production they can, regardless of the water
used.
Under present circumstances,  it  is not possible to measure water  to every farm
and it  is unlikely this will change in the foreseeable future.  I have spent over
a third of my last five years working on  the measuring of water and unless some
new technological development occurs,  it  is impossible  to measure water reliably.
I am concerned that  the yearly cost of  any device which could be tried would be
two  or three times the amount of  any reasonable charge that the farmers might be
expected to pay.  A  far more promising alternative  is  to measure the water passing
a certain point  in the main system and charge a  group of  farmers  to whom it  is75
supplied.  This  could theoretically be done in the 50 hectare rotational units
being built in the central plain of  the Philippines.  Here we have measuring
devices that  could work and the instrument cost could be allocated over 50 hec-
tares.  But  let me point out a few rights  that are exceptionally difficult  to
handle.
Farmers on light  soils are going  to require a lot more water since there is  a lot
more water loss due  to seepage and percolation.  These farmers  are going to have
to pay more since they require more water to  grow a crop.  These farmers are also
going  to have  to use more fertilizer if  they are going to  get the same yields  as
farmers  on  heavy  soils.
But, even more important, what happens if  the farmers were supplied and charged
for more water than they needed?  Given the tremendous variations in the amount
of  water delivered, can we control the volume of water so  that the farmer really
gets  the amount he needs when he needs  it with any assurance and not supply him
100,  200,  300% more than he needs for perhaps weeks at a time.  Suppose we do
supply him with much more water than he needs except for a critically short sup-
ply for four or five days when the crops desperately need water and his yields
are reduced 1/3  or  even 1/2.  He was  supplied with abundant water, more than
enough for the season so  that his fee on a volumetric basis may be high.  The
tolerance in our ability  to  control the delivery of water is  nowhere near in
balance with the benefits  that come out of  a volumetric measure.
In a system where it  takes  three to  five days from the main storage to  the diver-
sion dam, it  is  difficult to  regulate flow based on farmers'  requirements.  For
example, after three dry days water is  released, but by the time water gets to
the diversion dam three to  five days later,  it  has rained and the farmer really
does not need the water.  If  you charge on a volumetric basis, he  is  going to  say,
"do not  let it  through my outlet".  Who is  going to pay for the water?  We are
dealing with a monsoon system where, by the  time the water is delivered it  is not
needed  in  many  cases.
Where the water just goes into the drain and  out, because it  is not needed, it is
almost  impossible to  talk about volume education.  Volume education could be talked
about under arid  conditions where the irrigation is  the sole source of water
because their  is no rain.
EASTER:  Would you make that statement for both wet season and dry season or  are
there any  systems where volumetric measure is  practical?
WICKHAM:  The irrigation system is designed  for  the wet season and being used in
the dry season.  It is  going to be a very long, difficult process for farmers to
think in volume terms but  one is justified in trying.  The point I want to make
is  that  the government is not going to  be able to measure the volume used in big
areas.
In the case of  the Philippines the difference between the wet season and dry
season water supplied  is  about  .8 of a meter with .8 of a meter in the wet season
and  1.6 during the dry season.  This  is  2,4 meters for the year.  It appears that
the control of water flows in the canals is  the most important need of water allo-
cation.  The fact that water allocation is not now being done very equitably does
not mean current methods should be replaced by a monetary charge but-  rather by better
water control.76
The second argument for water charges is  that farmers get higher yields and
income from irrigation.  It  is not difficult  to quantify the yield benefit  due
to irrigation.  Even wet season supplemental irrigation increases yield very
significantly and you  can attribute all of  the yield in  the dry season  to irriga-
tion.  There is no  question that  the first crops  to receive irrigation produce
higher net farm income.  But as  the proportion of  farms under irrigation increases,
there is a  realquestion  hether  spreading  water  to  more  and  new  farms  will  mean
higher farm incomes.  Since the demand for rice  is highly inelastic, farmers as
a group stand to have higher income by producing less grain, and lower income
for more grain.  For each additional hectare receiving  irrigation there would
be more production with lower prices.  Over  the  long run, farmers, as a group,
are not the beneficiaries of yield increases.  Perhaps a better approach to  the
question of water charges,  or water fees would be to assess  the true beneficiaries
of  irrigation and try to  charge them something rather than charging farmers on  the
assumption that they are  the beneficiaries.  The most obvious beneficiaries  are
the  consumers.
The  land  values  begin  to  rise  even  before  the  irrigation  project  is  in  full  opera-
tion.  Therefore,  an  effective  land  tax,  with  which  we  have  had  a  great  deal  of
experience, is a much more positive way to  approach the problem.  Another approach
which recognizes  that increased production has reduced the price of  rice is a
national  subsidy.  Even if  the price does not actually go down, it will not go up
as much as  it otherwise would.  Clearly  there is  a benefit to  the  national economy
and this has been recognized by the fact that many governments pay irrigation sub-
sidies directly or  indirectly.  We ought  to recognize who benefits and be quite
open  about  the  subsidy.
STATEMENT:  This  is an approach that we typically take for food crops and usually
for agricultural output  in a country.  What you are saying for most of Asia is
absolutely right.  However, I would like  to point out one important exception in
other places  in the world.  There are commodities, whose demands are very large
either domestically or because they are a small part of international trade.  This
is particularly  true for a lot of  commercial crops that are produced for export
such as  cotton in Nicaragua or Brazil.  For  these commodities  it may be that
nearly the full benefit  is  captured by  the producer.  One wants to  look very
carefully at  the nature of  the demand and  the price elasticity.
In fact, if you are growing  something like strawberries, can you really justify
using national  treasury receipts for  irrigation?  This really opens  the gates to
all kinds of  subsidies for projects with national benefit.  You could start with
a basis of  levying charges  by means of  fixed rates  that would absorb the cost,  or
you could make your rates reflect the productivity of water.  You have two basic
contexts  from which to  start.  Have you assumed that the cost of  the system would
be borne by a combination of  operators and owners,  so  that you would reduce the
amount capitalized into the land values?  Otherwise, you will  have to have some
kind of a capital gains or an increment tax after the increase in land values.
WICKHAM:  You mean, having a tax high enough to  capture the increase in net incomes?
STATEMENT:  No, having a way of  pricing it high enough to minimize the capitalization
of  income  into  increased  land  values.
WICKHAM:  Let  me  explain what I  think has been done on a particular project in re-
gard to  taxing farmers.77
The Philippine government charges  the beneficiaries X kgs.  of  paddy in the wet
season and a higher amount in the dry season for water.  This is  based on net
returns without trying to  say whether the cultivator  is a tenant or an owner.
But for irrigation in the Philippines, where the cultivator is very poor, you
have to  do something.
STATEMENT:  What you  are saying is  that because the poor farmer or the lease
holder cannot afford to pay for the water, we should not charge anything, but
what about the large land owners?  You have to do something and then hope that
you are going  to have a mechanism to  insure that the lease holder can make a
living.
WICKHAM:  Why do I think that the farmer is  not the beneficiary in irrigation?
My thinking goes back to rice and what has been done with HYV's.  We produced
the highest yields with good irrigation.  We then ran into disease and  insect
problems which not only affected the IRRI  farm but all neighboring farms.  You
will find it in  the IRRI annual report.  We found some very serious virus diseases
which we had absolutely no control over.  All of  these are related  to an unstable
environment which is much more adverse to high yielding  rice.  We have to recognize
that farmers gain from high production only in the short run because of drops in
prices.  The true beneficiaries are society not  the individual farmer who, in
fact, might deserve a rebate for all additional expenses he has not only  this
year,  but  also  in  years  to  come.
STATEMENT:  Large price fluctuations would hold only in a case of  a commodity
like potatoes where you have large fluctuation from year  to year.  In most countries
like the Philippines you have a minimum price.  You cannot show that for a long,
long time you have fluctuations downward.  You have tremendous fluctuation upwards
where you can make a real killing.
STATEMENT:  Tom, this is  too simple a view of  a very complicated problem.
Actually,  there are some farmers  that have done very well.  The same is  true of
the whole  technology area.  And some farmers will really gain from irrigation.
What happens then, if  the price goes down, there are farmers at the margin who
are going to  be driven out of  the industry. What you are saying is  that  if you
look at the whole net social benefit  across all farmers,  it  is  close to  zero.
But  that does not mean that there will not be large groups of farmers who have
captured  a  permanent  gain  in  income.
WICKHAM:  I would agree with that  except for one point.  That is  that I am quite
concerned about  the problem of maintaining production environments over long
periods  of  time.  The environment is going  to become so sensitive  that the net
benefit  to all  farmers  is not  going to be positive.  All the expenses of new
technology or  irrigation are not really embodied in the supply curve.
STATEMENT:  Tom, what you are  saying, then, is  that whoever evaluated  this project
failed  to  take into account  the cost of double-cropping.  Presumably, whoever did
the evaluation took into account that  as  one moves into double-cropping, you
will have to mechanize, use higher  fertilizer inputs, pesticides, etc.  All this
should have been taken into account.78
VIII. DISCUSSION OF LEVINE AND WICKHAM PAPER BY EASTER
EASTER:
I had  a chance to read Tom's paper last night but his notes  from Levine are new,
so I will not  comment much on them.  Although I agree with a lot of what Tom said,
I will point out  some of  the basic differences between irrigation systems that I
looked at in India, and the ones that he has  talked about in the Philippines.
These differences lead me to  some very different conclusions regarding the need
for field channels  or laterals on farm plots.
My research was primarily  in eastern India in Sambalpur district on the western
side of  Orissa State and in Raipur district on the eastern side of Madhya
Pradesh.  In this part of  India you can usually produce one rice crop a year
based  on the monsoon rainfall but during  the rest of the year you do not produce
anything without irrigation.  The large  system in Sambalpur is  for both power
and  irrigation.  With adequate rainfall, there is  enough water to  irrigate two
crops.  During the rainy season irrigation supplements rainfall but the dry sea-
son crop is  completely dependent on irrigation.  The system was completed in the
middle 1950's but many  farmers did not  start using the water until the early
1960's.
The point  that Tom makes on main canal controls and improvements  is  an important
issue.  Improvements are needed in  the Sambalpur system, particularly on the
canals near  the farms.  The control question the engineers are aware of, but I
do not know what  they are doing  to improve control.  Our major concern was with
improving water distribution at the village level.
The most pressing need was for on-farm improvement of irrigation systems.  There
are, at  least, two essential components.  One is  technical assistance to  the
farmer and the other is  a total village commitment to  the program.  You also need
coordinated assistance from the Irrigation Department and the Agricultural Extension
Officers, which was occurring in  Sambalpur.  Most of  the villages we investigated
were at the end  of a canal although farmers near  the outlets were getting excess
water even in some of these villages.  The critical reason why the field  channels
and improved water control were so important,  in contrast  to  the Philippines was
the large number of  farm plots  irrigated from one outlet.  Tom talked in terms of
one and two  farms irrigated from an outlet.  We found ten to  twenty farm plots
served by  one outlet.  One farmer may even have two or  three plots scattered in
the 25  to  125 acres served by one outlet.
The farmers near  the outlet definitely received more irrigation water and  had a
lot to  say about who obtained water below them.  If  the farmer near the outlet
wanted to  stop water from flowing through his fields so  that he could fertilize
he closed the outlet and no one below him got water.  The farmers did not want
water flowing through their fields while fertilizing since they were afraid  the
fertilizer would wash away.  Tom argued  that there is  no evidence that fertilizer
is  lost by water flowing from field  to field.  This may be true.  However, the
real question is what  the farmers believe and  they believed they would lose ferti-
lizer.
Our analysis of  the water management program found net annual benefits of 150
rupees per acre.  This  is obtained with an average expenditure of about 34  rupees
per acre  for construction and  a 6 rupee per acre annual expenditure for maintenance.79
If our figures are anywhere close we are talking about a net present value of
578 rupees per acre using a 20%  discount rate and a project life of 10 years.
A very profitable kind of  project.  Judging from the way farmers are responding
to  this project and demanding technical assistance, the benefits must be trans-
ferrable  to other villages.
The District agricultural extension people started out with just two villages.
When we did our investigation four villages had been completed and they were in
the process of  doing nine more villages.  Given their staff size, they could not
handle more than nine villages a year.  In addition  to  the villages they were
working in, there was  a waiting list  of villages wanting technical assistance  to
install field channels.  So,  at least in this  case, it  appears that the  field
channels were doing a real job for the farmers.  I was very surprised at  the
magnitude of the benefits.  When we started the survey and analysis I was not
expecting anything of  this magnitude.
TIMMONS:  Could you explain a little bit more about what you mean by  field
channels?
EASTER:  Each village has 5 to 10 canal outlets, depending on the size of  the
village.  These outlets were designated by  the irrigation authorities and serve
anywhere from 25  to 125 acres.  What you have is a large area with a number of
small plots, most less  than an acre, and  farmed by different farmers.  The field
channels  that  the district agricultural extension staff  installed go right on top
of  or  right next to  the levees.  Channel placement is  such  that the levees are
reduced  in size rather  than land being taken out of  production.  The field chan-
nels  allow each farm to  control the water going  to his  fields.  If  he does not
want any water he can let  it by-pass his fields without shutting  it off  to  the
next  farmer.  You do not run into the problem of  the fellow at  the top shutting
water off  and depriving other  farmers of  water.  You also get a better distribu-
tion of  water throughout the area irrigated by each outlet.
The system of  field channels  includes some drop structures and  some pipes  to
prevent erosion.  The engineers working with the farmers design the channel place-
ment so that water goes down hill.  If  some farmer does not want a channel in his
field, the engineer determines how best  to  go  around him.  However, all  farmers
generally cooperated since the whole village agreed to  the project.
The extension people realized  that they had  to keep  the system very simple and
low-cost.  On the average,  the agricultural extension spent only about 28  rupees
per acre  for construction of which about 18 rupees was for  technical assistance
and 10 rupees was for materials,  structures and pipe.  Farmers are responsible
for digging the field channels at  an average cost of  6 rupees per acre and for  the
maintenance.  The technical input  is not really sophisticated but  it requires some
engineering training.  The farmers tried to do some on their own and ran into
some real problems,  such as  getting  the channels going up hill.
I would like to  comment on one point Tom  made, on the non-use of water by Thai
farmers and Tom's  example of  some of  their problems.  This  could be a  question
of  farmers not knowing how to  irrigate.  I do not know if  this  is  the case, but
in Sambalpur  they did not irrigate for  about five or  six years because of  a lot
of beliefs  about the use of  this water.  One thing that happened was farmers
from Andra Pradesh, who were traditional irrigation farmers, moved up, bought
land and  started irrigating.  How much this  contributed to  the education of  the
rest of  the farmers in terms of irrigation, I do not know, but it appeared  to
be an important factor.80
Another thing we talked about earlier was putting in a system without properly
educating the farmers and expecting  them to adopt irrigation right away.  At
least in the Sambalpur case, it did not work for about five or six years.  Now,
they are clamoring for more water, particularly during the dry season.  One
reason the field channel program has gone so well is  because the farmers  at the
end of  the canals were not  getting enough water.  The field channels allow for
better water distribution within the villages that are not obtaining enough water.
The program does not  solve the problem that villages near the head of  the canal
are getting more than enough water and  the ones at the bottom not enough.
We have already said a lot about water pricing and what we talked about can be
divided into three pricing  functions;  the repayment function, the allocation
efficiency function and  the income distribution function.  In the case of allo-
cation efficiency, you might want to  think about using the village as  the
measuring point.  On the average a village covers about a thousand irrigated acres
in Sambalpur.  Water would be delivered to  the village and  the more water the
village farmers used, the higher the water volume charge would be.  The village
charge would  then be allocated  to  the individual farmers based on acreage owned.
If  the farmers are more efficient in their use of water, their overall  acreage
charge would be less because the village volume charge would be lower.  It might
work, since  the village is  still an important institution in India.
The second point I would like  to make is  about the role of water pricing in income
distribution.  The income distribution impacts  of  irrigation depends  on the
ownership of  the land.  Is  the land concentrated in a few hands, or is  it distri-
buted among a large number of small owners?  This is  an important question in
whether we charge and what we charge the farmers  for the water.
On the ownership point, I would like to go back to the experience we had in the
small Raipur irrigation project.  The project is  irrigating only about 26  acres.
But when we surveyed the village after  the project area had been designated,
guess who owned  that  26 acres?  Most of  it was owned by two of  the biggest
farmers in the village.  This was a project funded by the Ford Foundation and
the Intensive Agricultural Development Program (IADP),  but no one seemed to  know
its distribution implications until we did  the survey.  This points outthat
tion project  benefits  can go  to a few land owners and can be very concentrated.
In such cases the income distribution impacts of  low water charges become impor-
tant.
Finally, in the Sambalpur case, with net  returns  of 150 rupees per acre per year,
government should begin to  charge these farmers  for the project costs.  They
could pay the cost and still have quite a surplus  left over after just the first
year.  Some allowance would have to be made for bad crop years  so that farmers
could defer payments.  Farmers' payments would help reduce project funding
restrictions and  allow the district extension staff  to  expand and work with more
villages, and would reduce any  income distributional effects.
TIMMONS:  Bill actually introduced a fourth function in his  pricing system which
is ability  to pay.
EASTER:  The second recommendation which I would make concerns the need for tech-
nically trained people  to work with farmers in improving village irrigation.  This
appeared to be the bottleneck in Sambalpur.  If  I were advising the government
on this project I would say, "Train about  20 more of those engineers and get them
out in the villages".  In addition, you would need  two or  three helpers for each81
engineer, hut  they would not need much technical training.
There are 400 or more  irrigated villages, but at nine villages a year  it will take
them 40 years  to  finish.  On the other hand, you can go too  fast and do a sloppy
job.  Unless they get  the extra technical help, they should not  try to do much
more than nine villages a year.  I would emphasize the importance of keeping  the
irrigation improvements simple and cost low.  At a later stage, one can bring in
more sophisticated technology, but under current conditions  the disttict extension
people should slowly expand  their program.
Finally I would like  to stress a point Tom made in the latter part of his paper,
that  is  the importance of  considering alternative designs and the whole question
of  looking at alternatives.  This  is very, very critical in our work with irmiga-
tion projects.
QUESTION:  Bill, do  these costs reflect  the cost of  training these engineers?
EASTER:  The costs included are just  the wages paid.
General Discussion
GOLAN:  If  you are going to  try to do  the survey through crews out  in the field
it becomes almost  impossible to  cover large areas.  So,  you have to go  into
aerial photography in order  to do  it.  For  example, the Indians want to do
4,000,000 hectares  in five years.  Now, you just  figure how many people you have
to  send out  into the field to do  the survey if you are going to put field channels
over  that  size area.
ABEL:  There are  two things  that are very important.  First, you could not do with
aerial photography what was done in these villages, because you are working with
very micro units, and a small difference in elevation can be terribly important.
Second, Bill mentioned that you had  to  get the whole village to  agree.  What he
did not  say was that you do not  get the village to agree without spending some
time in the village.  You reach a critical mass, like, maybe 60 or  75% of  the
villagers cooperating and it  is  amazing what influence they will have in getting
the remaining villagers to  agree.  We saw the social dynamics working and the
survey engineer played an important role in knowing the village and planning  and
helping to  facilitate this social change.
GOLAN:  Maybe you misunderstand me.  All your aerial photography is  going to  give
you are  contours in order  to  do the survey.
EASTER:  This  information was already available in Sambalpur.
ABEL:  Let me make one other point.  If you look at this training program, it
cannot be classroom training.  These people have already been trained in the
classroom but they need  training in the field.  With a well structured program,
in several places  in India, you could  proceed in a geometric progression.  There
is no reason why you cannot build into  the village work the training component
which is  going to create the next group of  trained people.  The point  that Bill
made is very important:  If  you are going  to just routinely expand  the numbers,
and forget about the quality, you are going  to have a disaster on your hands.82
WICKHAM:  We have used aerial photography a great deal in our research, and I
am very grateful for having it available.  They make very good base maps.  The
problem with aerial photography is that we almost  inevitably are tantalized  into
using it beyond this purpose, and we begin writing in the boundaries based on the
photos.  If we could restrict it  to providing contours for  the field survey, they
should be used.  But  it would be too big a temptation for people in India to do
what they did in the Philippines, which is  to write in all of the boundary lines
in the office in Manilla, and then give it to the people in the field.  Nobody
in the field dared  to argue with these maps.  The result was that when we tried
to  find six 50 hectare  test areas where we could actually carry out irrigation
comparisons, we could not find six that worked out of  hundred and hundreds.  The
aerial photography was misused and in an area where people are not highly trained,
there  is a high probability that aerial photography will be misused.  But, I agree
in principle, for without aerial photography you cannot go very rapidly.83
IX.  PROSPECTS FOR IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT  IN NICARAGUA
Curtis L. Larson
As in many other Latin American countries, rural poverty  is a major problem
in Nicaragua.  The rural ppor include a large number of campesinos  (small
farmers)  living at the subsistence level and also a large number of farm
laborers.  The annual income of  the latter is  typically very low for two
reasons:  low daily wages  (U.S. $1.50 to  $2.00 per day in 1975) and seasonal
employment of as  little as 100 days per year.  The living standards of most
campesinos are not much better since  their farms are typically very small and
the crop yields low, due largely to  their  inability to  utilize current agri-
cultural technology.
Nicaragua has  substantial land and water resources,  though it  is not a large
country.  In 1973,  the total areas of  cropland and pasture were 803,000 ha.
and 38,824,000 ha.,  respectively.  Crop production is  concentrated in but
not limited to  the Pacific plains where there are extensive areas of  productive
soil.  Livestock production is  important in both the Pacific and Central Zones.
The area devoted to  pasture includes not only hilly land but  also large areas
of level land with black clay soil  (known locally as  sonsoquite) which can be
used for growing rice and could be used for other crops by providing proper
drainage during the rainy season and irrigation during the dry season.  In
1973,  only 5.2 percent  of  the cropland  (41,500 ha. and 7,400 ha. of pasture)
was  irrigated, with most of  the cropland producing rice and sugar cane.  This
is  a very small area  in relation to  the potential area of  irrigable land and
the available water resources.  With a climate that is  suitable for multiple
cropping, Nicaragua has a considerable potential for increasing food production
and national income through expansion of  irrigation.
1.  Potential Yields With Irrigation
Annual rainfall in the Pacific and Central Zones varies over the area from
about 700 mm to  2500 mm.  The precipitation is  concentrated in a 6-month
period  (Figure 1) during which a single, annual crop can be grown quite well.
Corn and cotton are the  two annual crops commonly grown without irrigation,
corn by the  small farmers  and cotton by the "commercial"  farmers.  In most cases
the land lies idle during the dry season.
Differences in average yields for single crops, with and without irrigation,
range from 56 percent  on cotton to  400 percent on pasture  (see Table 1).  Only
a  small part of  the large differences  between rainfed and irrigated yields can
be ascribed only  to  irrigation since, as  shown in Figure  1, the wet season
rainfall is nearly adequate, although this varies with location.  The most
important factor  is  the low level of  agricultura  technology utilized by most
nonirrigation farmers, many of whom are subsistence farmers.  Thus,  there is
potential for  increasing crop production by improved farming practices and by
irrigation.84
Multiple cropping is  clearly feasible in Nicaragua with irrigation, and has
been used  to a limited extent.  With cotton as  the rainy season crop, corn,
beans or sorghum are grown under irrigation during  the dry season.  In this
way, production and gross income per hectare  can be increased several times
by irrigation combined with agricultural technology.
Pasture yields are of special interest  and are important in view of  the large
area of  pasture.  The fivefold increase in pasture production (in animal
units) with irrigation is  due to  the fact that pasture is  needed year-round
and its livestock carrying capacity is,  therefore, determined by the dry
season forage production.  In Nicaragua, beef  animals on unirrigated pasture
typically lose 45 kg. during the dry season!  This loss has  to be regained
during the rainy season which is,  of  course, very inefficient.  Nevertheless,
raising cattle extensively can be profitable, if done on a large scale, thanks
to low land costs  and low labor costs.
In general, the precipitation is  inadequate for growing paddy rice.  Multiple
cropping of paddy rice is  common with irrigation.  Perennial crops  (bananas,
etc.)  require irrigation and so does sugar cane, although some is grown at
reduced  yields  without  irrigation  (Table  1).
2.  Soil and Water Resources for Irrigation
The area of  potential cropland in Nicaragua is  estimated at 1.5 million ha.,
almost  twice the present amount.  The land suitable for irrigation was esti-
mated by an agency of  the Nicaraguan government- 1  as  follows:
Suitable for most  crops - 418,400 ha.
Suitable for selected crops  only- 426,900 ha.
Total  considered  irrigable  - 845,300 ha.
More than half of  the land suitable for irrigation is  designated for selected
crops  such as  rice due to poor internal drainage  (mostly sonsoquite soils).
The total land area suitable for irrigation is more  than 20  times  the area
presently irrigated.  However  this does not give any consideration to  the
water for irrigation.  Because water resources for irrigation have been
investigated mainly on a project basis, enough information is  not available
for an estimate of the  total  irrigable area where water is  the limiting
factor rather  than the  land.
The major water sources for irrigation in Nicaragua are groundwater, natural
lakes and reservoirs.  Nicaragua has  extensive groundwater supplies at reason-
able depth (less than 30 m.)  in many areas  that are well suited to  irrigation,
mainly in the Pacific plains north of Managua.  It  is  estimated that about
70,000 ha. can be irrigated profitably by groundwater in the areas studied  so
far.  Projects  totaling 45,000 ha. have been proposed for irrigation with
water from Lake Nicaragua, which is  quite unique, being an unusually large
source of good quality water.  Lake Managua water is  not suitable for irri-
gation due to high boron content.  Current proposals for construction of
reservoirs for irrigation total about 19,000 ha.




































Table  1:  Average Yields  for Rainfed and Irrigated Crops,






































1/  Approximate national average  (in some cases without fertilizer and
other improved practices.
2/ Irrigated yields are with fertilizer and good management.
3/ As compared to rainfed upland rice.



















Table 2.  Approximate Costs of Gravity Irrigation in Nicaragua for Alternative
Water  Sources, 1972-1973.1/
Available  Groundwater,  Pumped  Reservoirs,
Streamflow  Tube  Wells  Lake  Water  Gravity  Delivery























Total  operating  cost





SLand  preparation  costs  not  included.
2/
SBased  on  1972-73  prices.
Source:  "Diagnostico de las Posibilidades de Riego en Nicaragua," UNASEC




The total area of proposed projects from all water sources is about 150,000 ha.
This is  almost four times the area now irrigated but much less than the area
of  soils suitable for  irrigation.  Thus, although potential water supplies,
both groundwater  and  surface water, undoubtedly are well in excess of  those
identified  to date, water supply appears  to  be the limiting factor for ulti-
mate  irrigatton development  in  Nicaragua.
3.  Costs for Alternative Water Sources
A somewhat unique aspect of irrigation development  in Nicaragua is  the alter-
native water sources in certain areas.  In addition to  the three major sources
mentioned above, there are small amounts of  streamflow available to a few
locations.  These supplies are quite small, however, since  the prolonged dry
season reduces most streams to  little or no  flow.
Comparative costs  of  irrigation development and operation for the four water
sources were determined in 1972-73  (Table 2),  all for gravity irrigation.
In terms of  investment cost, the use of  tube wells is  lowest in cost.  One
,reason is  that  the well depths are relatively low, usually 10 to  30 meters.
Another is  the small area  (as small as  100 ha.)  that can be irrigated econom-
ically by a single well.  Thus, an extensive canal system and series of  control
structures is not needed,  in contrast to  the other sources.
Even the use of available streamflow has a higher initial cost than tube wells,
since either a pumping plant  or a diversion structure some distance above the
irrigated area is needed along with a long delivery canal, and smaller canals
to  distribute the water.  Likewise, the use of lake water  (from Lake Nicaragua)
entails a substantial investment cost for a pumping plant and a canal system.
This is true even though the irrigable land  is close to  the lake and the
maximum pumping  lift is about  25 meters.  As usual, the investment  cost for
reservoirs is quite high in relation to other water sources.
In terms of  total annual cost,  including operating costs, the lowest cost is
somewhat different.  The major difference is  due to  the cost of  energy for
pumping  (which  has increased in  importance since the study was made).  Con-
sequently, the diversion of  available streamflow is  the lowest in total annual
cost and tube wells second.  In these terms  (total annual cost),  reservoirs
are still the highest cost but the differences are reduced considerably in
comparison to other water sources.
4.  Government Involvement in Irrigation Development
Most of  the irrigation development to date in Nicaragua has been done privately,
mainly by sugar cane plantation owners and by rice farmers.  Government  invol-
vement in irrigation is  relatively new, and has  occurred mainly in two  forms.
One involves financial assistance to  a semipublic corporation providing and
applying irrigation water  (pumped from Lake Nicaragua) to an area of about
1000 ha.  The principal crops  of  the project area are sugar cane, bananas, and89
pasture.  Another form is  a program of  technical and financial assistance for
tubewell  irrigation  of  units  of  about  100 ha.  The  program  is  voluntary  and
the units are, therefore, dispersed throughout  the good soil  (cotton growing)
area.  Multiple  cropping is,  of  course, practiced on  these units,  in the
manner  described earlier.
Until recently,  there has been no government  agency charged with or capable
of  planning or implementing irrigation projects.  Project  studies have been
carried out mainly by consulting firms.  Project  implementation, however,
requires government involvement.  In the case of  the program irrigating 100 ha.
units from wells referred  to above, the program is handled by the Central
(National) Bank of Nicaragua, with help from a consultant on technical assis-
tance.  At present, a government agency for implementing new irrigation pro-
jects  is being developed.  Eventually, this  should make it possible  to  imple-
ment larger scale  irrigation projects.
Another government agency, known as  INVIERNO, has been established for  pro-
viding various types of assistance to campesinos,  including extension, tech-
nical assistance and  credit.  It  is partially supported by AID and,  according
to recent reports,  is already providing positive results.  Although the agency
has much to do  in areas  that are not irrigable, subsistence farmers  are also
found in the irrigable areas with good  soils.  These farmers  are limited by
the lack of  land  (often less than 5 ha. and  sometimes less  than one ha.)  and
by shortages of  education,  capital, etc.
Extensive irrigation development  in Nicaragua would relieve rural poverty in
several ways.  First, very small farms could  be  farmed intensively, with
multiple crops, with adequate  fertilizer use, etc.,  enabling the campesinos
to produce  some crops for sale.  Secondly, multiple cropping on commercial
farms would approximately double the duration of  employment annually for  farm
laborers.  Finally,  irrigation development  could  facilitate land redistribution
by making smaller  farm units profitable.  Thus, a landowner with several
hundred hectares of  cropland, now unirrigated, may be willing to  sell a portion
of  it  if assured of  irrigation for  the remainder.  The portion sold would
then be used  for development of new family-sized irrigated farms and  for  en-
larging farms that  are too  small even if  irrigated.  This would be an equitable
program if  executed properly.  At  the same time,  it would lead to much more
efficient use of  the country's land and water resources.90
X.  SOME AID SPONSORED WORK IN WATER MANAGEMENT
COREY:  I will start with explaining what some universities are now doing for
AID in water  resources.  We  have 211(d)  grant programs with a consortium of
five universities in the area of  soil and water managment.  This concept, I
guess, was developed about six years ago in the AID's office of  agriculture
and started with three universities but is now up  to  five.  These universities
have formed a consortium called the Consortium for International Development.
They have tried to  break up different phases of what they refer  to  as the
water chain.  Each of  these universities  is  involved  in a different part of
the water chain.  The University of Arizona is working on watershed manage-
ment but not necessarily agriculture watersheds.  Utah State University's
area is management of water on farmers' fields.  Colorado State University is
concerned with water delivery to  the farm and removal of  excess water from  the
farm.
The extension of  these three grants are quite specific in the way these
universities are linked with LDC's or with international centers  or with each
other.  We are asking  the universities to  do some studies called "state of
the art studies."  "State of  the art"  is  a critical review not  only of  liter-
ature but also of  the actual practices being used.  These  studies are used  to
help  identify problems.  What Martin discussed yesterday with the Taiwan
situation  is  a  state  of  the  art  study.
The other  two universities in  this consortium are University of  California at
Riverside and Oregon State University.  One grant was just made a year ago,  and
one of  them is  just in  the process of  being granted.  The University of
California at Riverside has a 211(d)  grant in the area of dry land and summer
rainfall agriculture.  Oregon State University just negotiated a grant  in dry
land agriculture and  the associated animal management, and for winter precipi-
tation agriculture.  The five institutions  are all involved in water manage-
ment principally at the farm level, including agronomic and  engineering aspects
of  the management.  They are going to  do some studies together  in countries
where AID wants help such as  sending a team to Kenya.  We contact the executive
director of the consortium and  he gets maybe one man from each of  the univer-
sities,  or maybe all from one university.  They may also get one from two
consortium universities and one from the University of  Florida or some place
else.
QUESTION:  Are all of  the basic disciplines such as  engineering, agronomy,
soils,  animal science, economics and sociology going  to be involved  in these
studies?
COREY:  I cannot say that all of  these disciplines are involved in each of
these institutions, although the economics, engineering and agronomy are.
The two research contracts given to Utah State University and Colorado State
University are probably more important and more interesting to you.  These
contracts I am fairly familiar with because I worked on Colorado's  contract
for the past four years before I came to Washington.  The universities were to91
do research on farm water management which would lead  to greater production
in LDC's.  Utah State concentrated its  efforts  in Latin America while Colorado
State concentrated principly in Pakistan.  I really do not know why these concen-
trations, other than Utah State was  involved in Latin America in other programs
and Colorado State had been involved  in other Pakistan programs.
Utah State has put a lot of  effort in developing production functions  for
fertilizer, water, and for various crops.  Their  lawyers gathered together  the
water laws for a number of  countries in Latin America.  They had a rather
large seminar  last summer and published the results of  their work.  Utah's con-
tract  is a little different from Colorado's.  Universities cannot go into any
country without being sanctioned or  commissioned.  However, Utah State has
been responding to mission requests  to send people to Latin American countries
so they have been in all these countries for various reasons.  What research
they do  in a given country is dictated by what the mission and  the ministry
of  agriculture  wants  done  in  that  country.  Generally,  some  institute  will  want
technical help  to do research in irrigation practices,  irrigation methods, or
production functions, and will ask us if Utah State can do the work within
their contract.  However, I would rather see them get involved  in some things
like Tom talked about  this morning, namely, making some of  their  irrigation
systems  work  better.
These two University  contracts will run to  1976 and now we are  trying to
decide where we want to go next.  This was one reason I  was very happy to
come to  this meeting and hear your points of view, which I have to  admit, I do
not get enough of  in our  group.  The Economics and Sector Planning Division
sits down on the next  floor and we sit up  on our floor and we do not get
together  enough.
The program in Pakistan started out  to be a program where we worked with various
research institutes  to do  some specific studies  such as managing saline water.
Managing saline water is  important because a lot  of  the underground water is
quite salty and by mixing it with canal water  it  can be utilized.  After I
initiated these projects I found I  was not being used full-time, so  I developed
another program.  A pilot study on how to make these systems work better, was
also developed.  This was a system very similar  to what Bill Easter described.
For  those of  you who  are familiar with the irrigation system in the Punjab in
Pakistan, you know that there is not a headgate in that system which runs out
to  50 farmers.  The water flows all  the time when there  is water in the canal.
If  it rains and the water  is up  to  the farmer's knees, he still gets water
from the  canal system if  in fact the canal has water flowing in it.
There are now five men working on three projects, an economist,  two  agricul-
ture engineers and  two agronomists.  This really has  not been as  successful
as  it  could have been if we had gone there at the outset to  set up a pilot
study.  The idea had  to be first  promoted with AID and  then the government
of  Pakistan, because no university was working on these problems and we could
not work within a country without having a project agreement.  Much time was
spent finding agencies who wanted to do something  to  improve irrigation.  Then
the agreement had to be moved up through the bureaucracy.  But something sig-
nificant has happened  in Pakistan.  There is  now a concern in the Pakistani
bureaucracy for doing something about  their water management problems.  Just
going out and measuring water was a big eye-opener  for them.  They had read
all the reports and the manuals which consultants had given them to help design
their  system.  They said,  all their reports and design manuals say that  the92
losses in the ditch system is IQ  percent.  We measured the losses at  50 per-
cent to  IQ00 percent.  They did not believe  this.  In fact, one of  the chief
engineers argued  that it  could not be because  the system was designed for a
10 percent  loss.  Once they realized the magnitude of the water loss, they
became concerned.
There  is  a  great  need  for  training  in  the  field  at  a  rather  low  level  of
technology.  More is achieved than just learning how to measure water and
how to survey fields.  Once they see and understand why they are doing  it,
it  is really thrilling to  see them operate.  They become just as  enthusiastic
as we do.  If we just give them the manual or the mechanics of doing it,  they
do not have any  trouble with it,  but  their understanding and incentives are
not there.
In the fall of  1973,  a seminar was held at Utah State called "Research Needs
in Soil and Water Management."  The results were put out in a rather neat
package and some worthwhile concepts were developed.  There is  a great need
to  train technicians in the field where they will be working.  Time  is an
important input to a training process.  To actually get started requires
people in a given place for quite a time.  There also needs  to be some
concern by government  at high levels.  What Martin said yesterday  is  important.
You need a concerned government.  Many of these people who become good govern-
ment planners pass through your institutions.  I have seen several people
who have gone  through our universities and in a few years are in very signifi-
cant places  in government.  We should also be thinking of seminars directed
at rather specific topics such as how.to improve or how to manage irrigation
systems.
HAGEN:  Part of  our chief concern in the division of  economics and sector
planning  is project design analysis.  This means developing a logical frame-
work with basic project goals and objectives  along with outputs and assumptions.
The function of  our particular division is largely to  fill the critical econom-
ics gap  in AID. Existing divisions  have a great many technicians  in the physical
science, soil and water, for example, but there is  a serious economic defici-
ency in these divisions.  For example, the lack of  consideration for water
pricing and  the economic analysis of  irrigation projects.
X.  CONCLUDING DISCUSSION ON THE ROLE OF U.S. UNIVERSITIES
IN TRAINING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
BROMLEY:  It  seems  to me we are talking  about training and education and
research on  two different levels.  Tom's  talk and Bill's discussion are really
sort of  at the manager level.  Another kind  of  training and education is  for the
highly trained person who is  going back to developing countries to  play a role
in natural resources management in general.  I was wondering, do we dare con-
sider splitting the group  into two  pieces and to  talk about  them separately?
ABEL:  I think we have to.  We really have two kinds of  education roles.  One
level that we might call the field manager and the other  level might be the
research economist,  university professor or high-level advisor  in the govern-
ment agency dealing with resource economic questions.  Each person might want
to address both levels  of  training in your comments.93
CROSSON:  Of  the two  categories of people, I am very skeptical that universities
have much of anything to do with respect to the type of  training Tom and Bill
have discussed.  It sounds  as  though the kind of  training that is needed is  for
people who are going to  actually manage the distribution of water at  the system
and subsystem levels.  Some valuable things can be done, but I do not see the
U.S. universities or other kinds of  institutions playing  an important role.
Let me say a little bit about the kind of  involvement Resources  for the Future
has had.  In one part of our program we put people in various places  to work at
a host institution, a university, where that person was expected to  cooperate
with host colleagues  to develop a research program.  In this way we hoped to
stimulate interest in resource economics.  We did this  for three or four years
and are no longer pursuing  that phase of  our work.  I would have to  say that on
the whole we did not accomplish very much.  The reasons are variable, but one of
them is  that we did not concentrate our efforts.  We put one person each into
several countries and that probably was a mistake.  It probably would have made
more sense to put  two or  three people  in one country.  Since we did not do  that,
we are now in another part of  that program in which we work with essentially
post-doctoral people in a number of  Latin American countries.  We encourage
them by providing  financial incentives as well as intellectual inspiration to
do work in resource economics,  specifically water and water management in
agriculture.  The first phase of  that program has been completed and has  some
potential for  showing results.  The main problem for this  program has been
finding people with backgrounds in resource economics and water and it has  turned
out  to be a major problem.  I am not  that familiar with other  parts of  the world,
but  in Latin America resource economics  as a field of study does not  exist.  In
order  to find people to work with, we ended up working primarily with engineering
types who had some economics background.  They were not really economists  and
this has been a problem for us.  We feel  that the intellectual tradition these
people have prevents  them from seeing the problem the same way we do.  Their
approach is  different and not really  the most appropriate in the present  circum-
stance.  They emphasize technical aspects, the highly mathematical model
building kind of  an approach to  problems with a heavy emphasis on hydrology.
All the kinds of problems we have talked about the last two days  tend  to be over-
looked and not even seen as problems.
Another major problem is keeping people interested in working in research.
Because of  the demands on their time  to do other  things either in government
or  in the private sector,  it is  hard to  keep them on research projects.  The
U.S. universities might be able to  stimulate and build an enduring capacity
to do work in the field of  natural resources in Latin America, but  to do it we
will have to think of a way  to make it financially attractive to professionals,
once they go back, to be  involved in research.  The fact is  that at the present
time there is not much individual pay-off  to research in Latin America.  We
may have to train  enough people so  that we could lose a  lot of  them  early
because they are very valuable to government in decision making roles.  If we
really get  enough people to serve  in research positions, we may have to  insti-
tutionalize the research so  that when a person takes  a job at the university,
research institute or government institution, it  is  really understood to be a
research job.
This is  the way we at RFF have been trying to  operate on a small scale.  The
small scale may be one of  the reasons why we have had problems with it.  People
will, in all honesty,say "Yes, we are going to  spend  this much of our time doing
this',' but  the  fact  is  that they do not.  Because of  these various pressures that
I am talking about, you need a university or special institution where people94
can go because they want to do research and there has to be a financial incen-
tive to  stay.  Right now, that kind of  situation is  rare.
ABEL:  Your observation about  the lack of  people trained in resources  in Latin
America would also hold  for most of Asia.  The economists are not  trained in
resource economics.  The people we found that had some resources background
were  primarily  engineers.
We have to  think about  training people  in the context of working with a govern-
ment, trying to  get government to recognize the importance of  the area.  Just
training a bunch of people and sending them home is  disastrous, but the idea
of  training people systematically as part of  some larger relationship could
pay off.  There are a couple of Asian countries that would hire resource
economists.  The ministry of  agriculture would hire them and the national irri-
gation administration would  too.  In some places all you would need is  to  get
them into government while they are being trained.
BROMLEY:  I do not have anything  terribly profound to  say on the education.  I
am impressed by this group and my interest would be in getting this group  togeth-
er again in six months.  The paths we have been going on are sort of  independent
of  one another and we have not worked very closely.  Here are three universities,
Wisconsin, Minnesota and  Iowa State, which are within a stones throw of  each other.
We do not want to  exclude Washington, D.C. and Colorado from this  little discus-
sion, but with the proximity of  these three schools  and the history of  our work
in developing countries and in resource  economics, it is a crime that we just
never talk to  one another.  I  do not know what else  to say about it  except that
we should find some way for this  group to stay in  touch.  We have had these
ridiculous regional research projects  sponsored by the Agricultural Experiment
Stations for fifty years  and I am not  sure what they have done.  If  this group
could get together once a year, we could outstrip  their performance.
ABEL:  There is  a problem developing in regard to where the 211(d) grants are
moving.  It is now very difficult to obtain AID funds for graduate  training of
students from LDC's for research in their own country.  Did your students all
go back to  their countries and are they now engaged in research?
BROMLEY:  Most of them have gone back and in some cases  there were no casualties
at all.
ABEL:  The Ford Foundation put an enormous amount of money in training people.
There is a difference in return rates and it  relates to how the universities
select their students.  We try to select students who already have established
themselves  in their  country.  Many  times they are selected for us.  The Agricul-
ture Development Council and Rockefeller Foundation do an excellent job of  selecting,
so  it  is not "we".  We gladly take the students  they  select.
How you select the student seems to me a very, very important step and this  is
the point I was making earlier.  The linkages to an institution are more impor-
tant than the training.
HOWE:  I do not have any new insights  to  share, I am afraid.  In  terms of
training, I certainly see these two levels of  training in different countries
depending upon their  own heritage, training and background.
There is a need for people at lower managerial levels.  People are needed who
know how to organize repair facilities for tube wells or who know how to keep95
records  for the geological survey.  There are just many levels  of technical
skills  that are  terribly needed.  The higher  skill levels are also needed, but
in a country which has very  little in the way of educational institutions or
training programs, the emphasis  should be on technical skills.  In all of  their
systems, agriculture, range management, water programs, transport and everything
else, trained manpower is  needed.
A country like Kenya, with a stronger educational structure and which has bene-
fited from a lot more  technical training  inputs  from many countries,  needs people
who have the capability of  heading up planning teams:  the kinds of  people who
would form a team to look in an integrated way at land and water resources and
not formulate just a program, but make studies and continue an on-going evalua-
tion of resources management.  This requires a team approach and a set of people,
each of whom has expertise in a particular area, but who can communicate his or
her discipline to  the engineer or  economist or rural sociologist.  Unfortunately,
most developing countries seem not to be interested  in this  kind of education.
For  example, Kenya has rebuffed a number of  times the efforts  of foundations to
improve their  educational institutions  and to provide a new program for training.
We cannot do  things greatly differently than we have been doing.  We have been
giving them a solid background in theory and methodology and we can permit them
to return  to  their countries  to do their research.  As John and several others
brought out,  the research should be relevant to  their own continuing interests.
We do have a fairly large number of foreign students at the University of
Colorado, but many of  them are sponsored in such a way that they cannot return
to  their own countries for research.  Once  in awhile you will get someone who
does a thesis in theory and that  is  fine, but most do not have that  interest nor
should  they.  The student needs  someone he can work with in his or her own coun-
try after going back.  The students  should be  supported  to do a meaningful piece
of research that  provides them with an entree into the profession in their own
country.
We are not an agriculture school, but we do offer natural resources  as  a field
of  specialization at  the Ph.D.  level.  But most foreign students do  not take
resource economics.  A lot take economic development which of  course deals with
some of  the same issues but  certainly not  totally the same.  They also take
macroeconomics,  theory and policy control and monetary theory.  Most of  them
leave without getting a good background  in project analysis, let alone, resource
development.
BUTCHER:  I do not have the overseas experience to  tie to,  but I do have some
experience in training students  from LDC's.  I discovered I have another relevant
experience, I grew up on a farm that was at  the end of  the ditch.  I know some-
thing about  that phenomenon.  We used  to  get an awful lot  of irrigation  water on
Sundays and holidays  and when it  rained.  A lot of  water came down the ditch
during those times.  I also thought  I observed in the discussion some similarities
between some of  the fundamental problems and principles  that occur in irrigation
and water control in developing countries.  The rules of  thumb that we have come
to apply would not be appropriate.  But  if you get back to some of  the fundamen-
tals  such as  the incentives and  the breakdown in the benefit and cost linkages
to  the person who is making the decision, they are very similar across countries.
I  see quite a bit of  opportunity to  help solve these water problems  in LDC's and
quite an opportunity to  transfer experiences between countries.  Linkages with
programs and with institutions in these countries are very important  to the ef-
ficient operation of  an institution and in helping LDC's both in  terms of  the
training of  students and in LDC based research.  Some of  the topics we might look96
at include the pricing  issue and the whole question of financing and repay-
ments.  These might be areas where some basic research could  be done.
One of  the real questions is  the basic  trade-offs between irrigation and other
kinds of  investment including the real uncertainty as to  irrigation's actual
value  to a developing country.  When I think back to  the comments about environ-
mental quality and some of the pollution problems,  I do not have a very good
idea of how important  they are.  What kind of  trade-offs ought to be made between
environmental quality and other resource uses?  The trade-offs  are likely to be
different because of the different  income levels, kinds of technology and  cul-
tures.  It is  a place for some basic investigations.
WICKHAM:  I would like to  comment on what International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI) is hoping  to do.  To begin with, I want to explain some of our plans  in
the water field. First, one of our ways of  operating is  to try to have a pilot
project which actually  implements some change in  the field.  We then assess
its  impact both in terms of  inputs and outputs to  estimate the  costs and bene-
fits.  The first part  is really a training program at the lower level.  The
second part is  tied  to research and a training program at the academic  level.
The way we operate, it  is hard  to distinguish between the  two  types  of  training.
We would tend  to use graduate students doing thesis  research on the academic
side.  We would tend  to use local people, employees of the area or employees
from the irrigation agency  to  do  the other training part of  it.  There is a
great deal of overlap and  it  is hard  to clearly differentiate these two  training
roles.
In the past, the water management work has been a part of  the economics depart-
ment and that  is why we can say a little about resource economics.  I am sure
that it will continue, although I suspect in the future there will be a little
more separate focus on the engineering and economics.  I do not think this will
create any problems as  long as  Randy Barker is  there to direct the economics.
In the future, there are  two or three new developments that I hope we can
achieve.  One of  them is  to begin studies roughly comparable to what we are
doing  in the Philippines in some of the following countries:  Thailand,
Indonesia and India.  I am  thinking in very modest terms and am quite attracted
to Bill's  comments on trying to  train 25 people and being a little bit unsure if
even that was pushing it.  In a lot  of discussions,  if you say  25 people, they
kind of  ignore it  as  being out of  the question.  When I look back on two or
three years of my own experience at IRRI,  I cannot even say we trained  25  people.
Therefore, I am quite mindful of  the limited volume of people who can be trained
if you are really going to  try  to  teach technological skills and get competently
trained people.  We hope to  start pilot field projects over relatively wide areas
looking at  different levels of intensity of water management, highly intensive
water management, moderate levels of  intensity and low levels of  intensity.  We
would look at  the investment costs for each.
Another idea we would like  to try would be to demonstrate to  irrigation agencies
the feasible improvements to  existing management.  You can talk all you want and
write articles about it  but until you can demonstrate improved management in the
fields,  they are not going  to listen to you and they should not.  We have collected
quite a bit of data the last couple of years,  partly from the water response model
that Martin discussed yesterday and some other distribution work we are doing
along canals.  We would like  to  try to  construct this water response model, not
out of research data, but from field  data.  However, there are a great many97
impediments  in doing that.  This model hides a tremendous number  of assumptions
which we sweep under  the rug but  they have  to be swept out again.  Our possible
involvement with other  agencies includes quality graduate students  to help us
do this work.
One thing  that  bothers Randy Barker and myself  is  that we are not  always  able
to  get the highest quality graduate students to work with us  in our research.
Consequently, one area of  possible  collaboration between ourselves and univer-
sities might be good graduate  students who are looking  for opportunities to do
research  in  Asia.  We  could  handlea  quite  limitednumberof  students.  We  would
not,  generally, be able  to help  them in their  course work.  The course work
would presumably be done in the U.S.,  although there  is  a university right next
door  to IRRI with a number of  people who have done or  are doing  their Ph.D. work.
One qualification  is  that we would find  it very difficult to  support American
graduate  students.  What we would look for would be Asian students studying in
the U.S. who might be looking  for an opportunity to go back to  these countries
to work.  If  we would start these projects in Thailand, Indonesia or possibly
India,  citizens of  those countries would be the most logical people  to  invite.
And at  the present  time, we do not have a good supply of trained citizens from
these  countries.
We are now trying to establish a network in Asia to consider  irrigation problems.
We will be having a seminar  in April or May next year.  We hope to have a regular
system of  communications  in the region.  There might be a way to  relate the com-
munications network with some of the  things we have talked about.
There is  one other angle I ought to mention:  the institutes  really do not do
very much in  trying to  implement our research ideas through national programs.
We do not feel we are  in the position to do it.  This might be a role for AID
or maybe a university which would go  the next step.
GREGERSEN:  I see  three levels of  training based on my experience with forestry
in Latin American countries.  The management technical level is not very impor-
tant in forestry.  Then there  is  the higher level of  training, and here, again,
at  this stage this  kind of  an individual is not needed in forestry.  The area in
between is  the most important  in forestry and I am trying to  aim my program at
this  level.  We need project analysis but not at a sophisticated level.  The
person has  to know how  to do simple things.  Thus far, we have had  four students
go  back to  Latin American countries and they are all working with U.S.  industry.
One of them has just gone with FAO.  The point that Abel made earlier is  impor-
tant.  These students  did not have the government affiliation to  go back to and
do research.  I have a student from Ecuador who is  tied very closely to his
forestry agency or  institute and will be going back, I am sure.  I just returned
from Guatemala where they have very capable management technicians  and very
sophisticated planners  in the forestry institute.  But  in between the project
level and project identifying, there is  nobody in economics in Guatemala who is
doing or can do  the project analysis.
TIMMONS:  First I would like to  identify the changing environment in which the
universities are functioning  today and which may well persist  in the years ahead.
I jotted down seven points which I have thought about off and on over the years
when I have been in other countries.  One is the need for  our courses to  shift
their content very definitely to  the LDC's problems, particularly if  as many as
48 percent of  the graduate  students in certain economics departments are from
other countries which is  the case in several U.S. universities.  Second, we have98
to  give more attention to  the applications of our knowledge to problem solving
and less  to  elaborate national and sectoral models which we are trying to  force
upon a number of  countries.  Third, we are going  to have to  put much more emphasis
upon institutional change.  This we know dangerously little about, because the
kinds of  institutions being formed in developing countries are quite different from
what we have.  People who take preconceived concepts of private property or family
farms,as we know these concepts, to the LDC's had better stay home because they are
going to  become frustrated and possibly neurotic.  Fourth, there are increasing
numbers of agencies, universities and countries working in less-developed countries
today.  You go into a country and there will be representatives  of numerous  other
countries working there.  We rank about  16th among the countries  of  the world in
terms of the proportion of gross national product devoted to constructive technical
assistance abroad.  Amounts of U.S. assistance we see in the Federal reports and
news media include the destructive technical assistance.  The armaments component
of U.S.  aid is difficult to disentangle within the total aid package.  But we
rank very low, and we are going to get  lower the way things are going.
The fifth condition I sense as part of this  changing environment is  that we are
going to have considerably less funds and fewer foreign students to work with in
years  ahead.  We are going  to have to adjust to  these kinds of  conditions.  Sixth
is  the tendency for U.S. universities today to  turn away from LDC's and  to work
more on domestic problems.  This  is going to be all the more true if  the financing
drops.  Professors are going to research topics and  teach courses in subject matter
areas with financial support for  their research and graduate students.  Seventh,
there is  a latent although very fundamental U.S.  trend  toward recognizing  the
importance of  natural resources in developing food, fuel and shelter, and in
helping satisfy balance of trade problems.  Given these conditions,  the need for
trained people remains the scarcest resource  (even including water)  in the LDC's
today.  Relevant knowledge and its adaption to  local conditions in LDC's also
remains an extremely scarce resource.
I become bothered when I hear the AID regional bureau chiefs and country directors
refer  to such things  as 211(d)  grants as university handouts.  I am also bothered
by the university's failure to  adjust to  the realities of  the situation that
exists  today and into  the  future.  Looking at this matter more positively, the
university's mission remains basically (1) generating knowledge, (2) communicating
the new and the older knowledge, and  (3)  within a framework we have never really
done much about--"science with practice". We do a lot more with the science or research
part of  the motto than we do with the practice or utilization part, although our experi-
ment stations and extension services are involved heavily domestically with this
practice or utilization area.  These are concepts that AID personnel have been
voicing lately, although I am not sure how well they comprehend what is meant by
utilization and linkage modes.  But these are important concepts.
How  do we start reorienting ourselves to  serve these three missions or functions?
Are we going  to continue our on-campus training and  research of foreign graduate
students within an essentially national mold?  Or are we going  to adjust to the
needs of  foreign students or else discourage their admission?  In terms  of  courses
we have set up so many prerequisites that students cannot take the courses they
need because they are cluttered up with prerequisites.  We are going to have to
follow a model some of  the universities tried  to follow in the water resource
program financed under the 1964 research and  training act.  I was on a committee
that abstracted courses from twelve different departments.  We took the parts
out of  these courses  and made them into a series of  three courses which do not99
have very many prerequisites.  A very interesting thing happened when we took
the hearts out of  all those courses;  there really was not much left for  the
prerequisite.  Some of  these sacred courses have to be redone.
The off-campus  training, research, and application can still be served to a
degree by students working together with professors  as  teams.  But we have
another  task of back-stopping the students who have returned home to the less
developed  countries and who urgently need help occasionally but do not have
access  to  it.  Our students in the U.S. can telephone us  or see us at professional
meetings or  see other people in other institutions, but this does not happen  in the
LDC's.  This is  quite a serious problem because  they are isolated and require
further help as  needed.
We still have a job of assisting the universities in LDC's but  I am becoming some-
what dubious about the success  of  these efforts particularly in Latin America
where  I  see  a  fine  institution  grow  up  and  develop,  and  then  be  dispersed  and
neglected.  In some of  these countries we have to recognize that  the place  to
help and work is  not necessarily in the universities.  The governments them-
selves  provide opportunities for us  to make our contribution, particularly in
special educational training  for middle-management and research.
I might conclude my comments with six recommendations.  Do not  take these very
seriously but I always like to  end on a positive note.  One, I certainly agree
with Dan, I found this  conference  extremely exciting and informative and I have
gotten a lot out of it.  These are the kinds of stimulations we used to get from
the old regional committees.  Second, we have to  expand  this kind of a dialogue
process we have been going through here in a seminar environment to some of our
colleagues  in the developing countries.  It  is  a little bit strange, here we
are, essentially a group of U.S.  citizens talking about the problems of the
developing countries and only  one person here is  from an LDC. There is  real
danger in relying on the second-handed facts which we have gathered while wan-
dering around the world for  the past two decades.  Third, our universities might
start specializing a little more on problem areas or geographic areas, although
I would not neglect the virility of  the basic disciplines and the open-door
policy of  admissions.  This  is what helps make a university, the universality
of students from different  countries, a world on the campuses.  But, we are
probably going to have to  specialize more.  Fourth, I recommend that universities
work together in resource economics, although there might well be a division of
this specialization by countries.  Fifth,  the U.S.  and state extension services
should be used to  a greater extent in educational efforts within the LDC's.
Finally, if  the U.S. universities are  to continue their  teaching and training
of LDC's students, funds must be made available by the federal government.
Assistance to  LDC's is more of a national  than a state funding responsibility albeit
the nation's most valuable education capabilities reside within the universities
of  the states.
GOLAN:  There is a wealth of  things that U.S. universities can do.  While  they can
not provide people from LDC's with everything they need  to know about particular
jobs when they go back home, they can provide them with knowledge of  specific facts
relevant to  their particular  countries.  Learning experiences which help them learn
how to  think about problems and judge which facts are relevant  to particular situa-
tions are very important.  Some basic theoretical concepts are also useful.
Students should also learn how other countries have dealt with problems similar
to  theirs.  There are really a lot of things  the university can do.  The main
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I noted  several speakers  saying something about training people to  go back
to  their  countries  to work.  When you  talk to officials from LDC's,  they want
more positions for  their  nationals in international organizations.  They think
that not  enough staff  from LDC's are presently  serving in international organi-
zations.  So,  it  is  not only the individuals  that want to work overseas, their
country too may encourage them to do  so.  It  is  not too bad because they get
good  training and quite often go home later.  We need people from LDC's  in
international organizations and, therefore, you are not doing a disservice to
people if  they stay here after you have trained them.
International lending institutions like the World Bank look to universities,
Rockefeller Foundation, IRRI,  etc.  to develop  the ideas.  What the World Bank
can do  is pick up ideas that somebody else has developed and then put some money
into  developing  and  expanding  them.
What Tom was telling you about the water management projects is  a good example.
The minute we are convinced something like the water management projects make
sense, we are willing to  help train the  staff required for the projects.  At
the same time, Bill was talking about his experience in India which highlighted
some of  the problems we have to  face in constructing projects which are often
large projects.  We have to  try and  find a way to  rebuild these projects  in the
quickest and most feasible way.  Maybe we are picking the wrong projects.
However, once they have been picked,  the best possible project design should be
adopted, and for  that we need  a large amount of  training built  into the project.
We can set up  technical training for  the implementation stage.
The resource economist will be needed before the project has been selected.
You need him to  force the engineers and the agronomists to  look at  alternatives
such as different  construction methods and different implementation techniques.
Once the project has been selected and the implementation starts,  that is when
you need  the technically  trained people  to make the project run.  The resource
economist  still has a role  in the implementation stage, but the technical people
have a bigger role.  You  in the U.S. universities have collected a tremendous
pool of valuable information.  The studies  and the training that  is provided is
appreciated  in most places.  We at the World Bank definitely realize it.  One
of  the reasons I am here is  to find out what is available so we can make better
use of  it.
One of  the problems that  the universities face, and it  is not a new problem, is
that many people from LDC's want to  take advantage of  the facilities being
offered but do not have the funds to  pay for such training.  This is  not limited
to  the universities and is  an increasing problem around  the world.
MARTIN:  Nobody has really gotten out of the lip service stage in looking at income
distribution.  It seems to be a bigger problem for the resource economists and
agricultural economists.  For example, what does  it mean for income distribution
if we build a big irrigation project and let  the present land owner capture the
benefits?  Will we make  the assumption that we will get efficiency first and then
straighten out the income distribution?  It may be easier to  buy up the land be-
fore the irrigation project and design the whole project in 10 hectare farms.
Otherwise you have a hard time ever getting  the land into the hands of the small
operator other  than the small tenant.  There  is a great deal of  foundation work
that needs to  be done by resource economists on these income distribution ques-
tions.  If we do get together again, income distribution is something to put on the
agenda.  It  is  different than anything  else because we are not going to get a chance
to go  to Thailand or the Philippines and study income distribution.  The most we cando  is  train some students  to  go back and work on the problem.
COREY:  The workshop has been very productive.  If  there is another one, I would
suggest bringing in some more problems from other LDC's.  I know that a number of
AID people in our programs would have both benefited from and made some valuable
contributions  to  this  workshop.
ABEL:  I would strongly endorse that  idea.  We need to both expand the scope of
people from the U.S. and bring in people from LDC's.  Furthermore, I hope we will
have the opportunity to  continue this kind of  interaction.  We owe a special
appreciation to Chuck Howe and Gil Levine and Tom Wickham for taking the time to
prepare the papers.  Having  the papers was a very useful way to structure and
focus our discussion.  We thank you all for coming and making the  two days
extremely interesting.  John is  absolutely right, it  is  going to be hard for  those
of  us interested in resources  to  find money even for small programs.  However, one
gets  the impression that each of us here somehow or  other will be  involved, whether
it is  in India,  the Philippines or  someplace else.  I would hope that we can stay
in touch and bring more people into this kind of  network.102
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